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Abstract
On Subcomplete Forcing
by
Kaethe Lynn Bruesselbach Minden
Adviser: Professor Gunter Fuchs
I survey an array of topics in set theory and their interaction with, or in the context of, a
novel class of forcing notions: subcomplete forcing. Subcomplete forcing notions satisfy some
desirable qualities; for example they don’t add any new reals to the model, and they admit
an iteration theorem. While it is straightforward to show that any forcing notion that is
countably closed is also subcomplete, it turns out that other well-known, more subtle forcing
notions like Prikry forcing and Namba forcing are also subcomplete. Subcompleteness was
originally defined by Ronald Bjo¨rn Jensen around 2009. Jensen’s writings make up the vast
majority of the literature on the subject. Indeed, the definition in and of itself is daunting.
I have attempted to make the subject more approachable to set theorists, while showing
various properties of subcomplete forcing that one might desire of a forcing class.
It is well-known that countably closed forcings cannot add branches through ω1-trees.
I look at the interaction between subcomplete forcing and ω1-trees. It turns out that sub-
complete forcing also does not add cofinal branches to ω1-trees. I show that a myriad of
other properties of trees of height ω1 as explored in [FH09] are preserved by subcomplete
forcing; for example, I show that the unique branch property of Suslin trees is preserved by
subcomplete forcing.
Another topic I explored is the Maximality Principle (MP). Following in the footsteps
of Hamkins [Ham03], Leibman [Lei], and Fuchs [Fuc08], [Fuc09], I examine the subcomplete
maximality principle. In order to elucidate the ways in which subcomplete forcing generalizes
vthe notion of countably closed forcing, I compare the countably closed maximality principle
(MP<ω1-closed) to the subcomplete maximality principle (MPsc). Again, since countably closed
forcing is subcomplete, this is a natural question to ask. I was able to show that many of the
results about MP<ω1-closed also hold for MPsc; for example, the boldface appropriate notion
of MP
sc
is equiconsistent with a fully reflecting cardinal. However, it is not the case that the
subcomplete and countably closed maximality principles directly imply one another.
I also explore the Resurrection Axiom (RA). Hamkins and Johnstone [HJ14a] defined the
resurrection axiom only relative to Hc, and focus mainly on the resurrection axiom for proper
forcing. They also show the equiconsistency of various resurrection axioms with an uplifting
cardinal. I argue that the subcomplete resurrection axiom should naturally be considered
relative to Hω2, and showed that the subcomplete resurrection axiom is equiconsistent with
an uplifting cardinal.
A question reasonable to ask about any class of forcings is whether or not the resurrection
axiom and the maximality principle can consistently both hold for that class. I originally
had this question about the full principles, not restricted to any class, but in my thesis
it was appropriate to look at the question for subcomplete forcing. I answer the question
positively for subcomplete forcing using a strongly uplifting fully reflecting cardinal, which
is a combination of the large cardinals needed to force the principles separately. I show that
the boldface versions of MP
sc
+RA
sc
both holding is equiconsistent with the existence of a
strongly uplifting fully reflecting cardinal.
While Jensen [Jen14] shows that Prikry forcing is subcomplete, I long suspected that
many variants of Prikry forcing that have a kind of genericity criterion are also subcomplete.
After much work I managed to show that a variant of Prikry forcing known as Diagonal
Prikry Forcing is subcomplete, giving another example of subcomplete forcing to add to the
list.
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Introduction
Subcomplete forcing is a class of forcing notions defined by Ronald Bjo¨rn Jensen [Jen14].
How subcompleteness fits in to the picture of commonly used classes of forcing notions is
illustrated in the diagram below (where σ-cl. stands for σ-closed, or countably closed).
Preserve stationary subsets of ω1
σ-cl.
Proper
ccc
Subcomplete
While all countably closed forcing is subcomplete, there are subcomplete forcing notions
that are not proper - for example, Namba forcing (under CH) and Prikry forcing. The aim
here is to go deeper into the notion of subcompleteness.
In Chapter 1 the terminology and background are given. In many ways this chapter
serves as a kind of review or consolidation of parts of Jensen’s notes, which I attempt to
follow closely. I do give some results that may not be explicitly proved, but perhaps stated,
1
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in Jensen’s notes; I attempt to only fill in the important gaps I will be relying upon in later
sections. In Section 1.1 the quantity δ(P) is defined for posets P, while relating the notion
to chain conditions and showing how the quantity acts under dense homomorphisms. In
Section 1.2 the stage is set for the sorts of models and elementary embeddings worked with
in the definition of subcompleteness. In particular, I define a strengthening of transitivity for
countable models that Jensen refers to as fullness. I give some justification for working with
these models, and give basic facts that will be refered to when working with the definition of
subcompleteness. In Section 1.3 the relevant background in Barwise Theory is given, which
is primarily used in this context to show a certain forcing notion is subcomplete. In Section
1.4 the liftup, an ultrapower-like construction, is defined.
Finally subcompleteness is defined in Chapter 2, but only in Section 2.2 after first in-
troducing the weaker notion of subproperness in Section 2.1. I show some of the defining
properties of subcompleteness after defining the notion: I give Jensen’s proof that subcom-
plete forcing doesn’t add reals, that subcompleteness of P is absolute above the verification
to subcompleness, that subcomplete forcing is subproper. In 2.2.1 it is shown that countably
closed forcing is subcomplete by showing that the class of countably closed forcing notions
is the same as that of complete forcing. In 2.2.2 the notion of subcompleteness above µ due
to Jensen is defined and I show that if a forcing notion P is subcomplete above µ then it
does not add new countable subsets of µ.
The next two chapters spend time comparing countably closed forcing to subcomplete
forcing. Chapter 3 focuses on subcomplete forcing’s behavior with respect to ω1-trees (and
some slightly larger trees) in Section 3.1 and the iteration theory for subcomplete forcing
in Section 3.2. Furthermore in the former section we also give Jensen’s argument that
Suslin trees are not subcomplete, and we show that (nontrivial) ccc forcing notions are
not subcomplete. Chapter 4 looks at axioms about subcomplete forcing; focusing on the
subcomplete maximality principle in Section 4.1 and the subcomplete resurrection axiom in
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Section 4.2. The subcomplete maximality principle and the countably closed maximality
principle are compared in 4.1.3. More on the modal status of subcompleteness is explored
in 4.1.4. The local form of the maximality principle is also introduced in 4.1.2 and its
consistency strength analyzed in 4.2.2. In Section 4.3 it is shown that the maximality
principle and the resurrection axiom may consistently be combined.
Finally, Chapter 5 is devoted to the proof that generalized diagonal Prikry forcing is
subcomplete.
Chapter 1
Preliminaries
Before defining subcomplete forcing and showing consequences of it, some preliminary in-
formation is necessary. This can all be found in Jensen’s lecture notes from the 2012 AII
Summer School in Singapore. For the published version refer to [Jen14]. I will also refer to
unpublished handwritten notes from Jensen’s website.
First, a brief outline of some of the notation used in what follows:
• Forcing notions P = 〈P,≤〉 are taken to be partial orders that are separative and
contain a “top” element weaker than all elements of P, denoted 1.
• We will be working with transitive models of ZFC−, the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel
Set Theory without the axiom of Powerset, and with the axiom of Collection instead of
Replacement. Usually we will name these models N , M , or N .
• I will follow Jensen to use the notation σ : N ≺ M for when σ is an elementary
embedding, but I will add some notation not used by Jensen, letting N 4 M denote
and emphasize that N is an elementary substructure of M .
• Let N be a transitive ZFC− model. I write height(N) to mean Ord ∩N . Let α be an
ordinal. Then I write αN for α ∩N .
4
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• Let A be a set of ordinals. Then lim(A) is the set of limit points in A.
• Let θ be a cardinal. Hθ refers to the collection of sets hereditarily of size less than θ.
Relativizing the concept to a particular model of set theory, M , I write HMθ to mean
the collection of sets in M that are hereditarily of size less than θ in M . In this case,
if θ is determined by some computation, I mean for that computation to take place in
M .
• Let τ be a cardinal. With abuse of notation we write Lτ [A] to refer to the structure
〈Lτ [A];∈, A ∩ Lτ [A]〉.
• If Γ is a class of forcings that preserve stationary subsets of ω1, then the Γ-forcing axiom
(FAΓ) posits that for all P ∈ Γ, if D is a collection of ω1-many dense subsets of P, then
there is a D-generic filter (a filter that intersects every element of D nontrivially). We
write MA for Martin’s Axiom, PFA for the Proper Forcing Axiom, andMM for Martin’s
Maximum, the forcing axiom for classes of forcing notions that preserve stationary
subsets of ω1.
• We often make use of the following abbreviation: if a map σ satisfies σ(a) = a and
σ(b) = b, we write σ(a, b) = a, b.
1.1 The Weight of a Forcing Notion
Definition 1.1.1. For a forcing notion P, we write δ(P) to denote the least cardinality of a
dense subset in P. This is sometimes referred to as the weight of a poset. ⊣
Although Jensen defines δ(P) for Boolean algebras, it’s also relevant for posets. As Jensen
states, for forcing notions P, the weight can be replaced with the cardinality of P, or even
P, for the purpose of defining subcompleteness. However, δ(P) and |P| are not necessarily
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the same, since there could be a large set of points in the poset that all have a common
strengthening.
More can be said about the weight of forcing notions, and I give some basic results below.
Lemma 1.1.2. Let P be a poset. Then maximal antichains in P have size at most δ(P).
Proof. Supposing P has a maximal antichain A of size κ, any dense set D (including one
of smallest size) in P needs to have the property that for each element a ∈ A, there is an
element d ∈ D below a, satisfying d ≤ a. Let’s assume that D has size δ(P); then D must
have size at least κ since A is a maximal antichain; indeed we have a function f : A → D,
where f(a) is an element of D below a. It must be that f is an injection, since otherwise
there would be an element d ∈ D below two distinct elements of A, contradicting the fact
that A is an antichain. Thus κ = |A| ≤ |D| = δ(P) as desired.
Below we define a homomorphism between partial orders, following Schindler [Sch14,
Definition 6.47].
Definition 1.1.3. Let 〈P,≤P〉 and 〈Q,≤Q〉 be posets. A map π : P → Q is a homomor-
phism so long as it preserves order and incompatibility:
1. For all p, q ∈ P we have that p ≤P q =⇒ π(p) ≤Q π(q).
2. For all p, q ∈ P we have that p ⊥ q =⇒ π(p) ⊥ π(q).
A homomorphism π : P→ Q is said to be dense so long as for every q ∈ Q there is some
p ∈ P such that π(p) ≤ q, i.e., range(π) is dense in Q. ⊣
We give some immediate remarks on our above definition. First of all, we claim property
1 automatically entails that for all p, q ∈ P, if π(p) ⊥ π(q) then p ⊥ q, since clearly if p is
compatible with q we have that π(p) is compatible with π(q), which is the contrapositive
of the claim. Furthermore, if P is separative (which indeed we assume of all of our forcing
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notions) then homomorphisms are automatically strong, in that the implications of items 1
and 2 may both be reversed and we have the following:
1. For all p, q ∈ P we have that p ≤P q ⇐⇒ π(p) ≤Q π(q).
2. For all p, q ∈ P we have that p ⊥ q ⇐⇒ π(p) ⊥ π(q).
Item 1 holds since if otherwise, meaning if π(p) ≤ π(q) for p, q ∈ P and p is not stronger
than q, then there is a p∗ ≤ p that is incompatible with q by separativity, which means
π(p∗) ≤ p and π(p∗) ⊥ π(q), a contradiction. Thus, if P is a forcing notion, by property 1,
homomorphisms from P to Q are automatically embeddings.
Lemma 1.1.4. Let P and Q be forcing notions. If π : P → Q is a dense homomorphism
(which means π is a dense embedding, as explained above) then δ(P) = δ(Q).
Proof. Suppose that D ⊆ P is dense and |D| = δ(P). Then π“P is dense in Q and π“D
is dense in π“P, since π is a homomorphism and preserves the partial order. This means
that π“D is dense in Q. Any other dense set in Q has to have size at least δ(Q), and thus
δ(Q) ≤ |π“D| ≤ |D| = δ(P) as desired.
We now use the remarks showing that our homomorphisms are strong to find a dense
subset of P that has size at most δ(Q). Let ∆ ⊆ Q be dense satisfying |∆| = δ(Q). Since π“P
is dense in Q, for each q ∈ ∆ there is a pq ∈ P such that π(pq) ≤ q. Let D∗ be the set of such
pq’s, where there is only one pq chosen for each q ∈ ∆. To show that D∗ is dense, let p ∈ P.
Then as ∆ is dense, there is q ∈ ∆ satisfying q ≤ π(p). Thus there is π(pq) ≤ q ≤ π(p)
where pq ∈ D∗, so we have pq ≤ p showing that D∗ is dense. This means that δ(P) ≤ δ(Q)
as desired.
If P is a dense subset of Q, then, of course, δ(P) = δ(Q).
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1.2 Fullness
In the definition of subcompleteness, in lieu of working directly with Hθ and its well-order
for “large enough” cardinals θ as our standard setup (as is often done for proper forcing, for
example), I will follow Jensen and work with models N of the form:
Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
−,
where τ > θ is a cardinal that is not necessarily regular. Such Hθ will need to be large enough
so that N has the correct ω1 and Hω1 . One justification for working with these models is
that such N will naturally contain a well order of Hθ, along with its Skolem functions and
other useful bits of information we would like to have at our disposal. Additionally a benefit
of working with models of the form Lτ [A] is that Lτ [A] is easily definable in Lτ [A][G], if G
is generic, using A.
In the standard fashion we will look at countable elementary substructures X of the N
as above; X 4 N . We then take the countable transitive collapse of such an X , and write
N ∼= X . We will refer to these embeddings by writing
σ : N ∼= X 4 N.
Often we will write
σ : N ≺ N
to suppress mention of X , the range of σ.
In fact, for our purposes it will not be quite enough for such an N to be transitive, we
need a bit more, exactly given by the property of fullness. Fullness of a model ensures that it
is not pointwise definable, so that there can be many elementary maps between the smaller
structure and the larger structure N in our setup. Before defining fullness exactly, let us
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give some more of the concepts and definitions we will be working with.
For the embeddings above that we will be working with, it is not hard to see what the
critical point is. Given σ : N ≺ N where N is countable and transitive, cp(σ) is exactly
ωN1 = σ
−1(ωN1 ), since N is countable.
Fact 1.2.1. Let N , N be transitive ZFC− models, where N is countable and Hω1 ⊆ N ,
with σ : N ≺ N . Then cp(σ) = ωN1 and σ ↾ (Hω1)
N = id.
Proof. Let α = cp(σ). Then α is a cardinal in N , and α > ω as both N and N are models
of ZFC−.
It must be that α = ωN1 , since ω
N
1 is a countable ordinal in V and thus in N , but
σ(ωN1 ) = ω
N
1 > ω
N
1 . Every x ∈ H
N
α = (Hω1)
N may be coded as a subset of ω and thus as an
ordinal less than ω1 by γ = TC({x}), and σ(γ) = γ, and the desired result follows.
Let N = Lτ [A] for some cardinal τ and set A, be a transitive ZFC
− model, let X be a
set, and let δ be a cardinal. Our notation for the Skolem hull , in N , closing under δ ∪X ,
is the following:
Sk N(δ ∪X) = the smallest Y 4 N satisfying X ∪ δ ⊆ Y.
We gather two immediate, basic results that we will refer to later below.
Lemma 1.2.2. Let N = Lτ [A] be a transitive ZFC
− model, δ and γ be cardinals, and X a
set. If δ ≤ γ then Sk N(δ ∪X) ⊆ Sk N (γ ∪X).
Proof. This is trivial; if t ∈ Sk N(δ ∪ X) then t is N -definable from some ξ < δ ≤ γ and
~x ∈ X so t ∈ Sk N(γ ∪X) as well.
Lemma 1.2.3. Let N be a transitive ZFC− model, δ a cardinal, and X, Y sets. If Sk N(δ ∪
X) = Sk N(δ ∪ Y ) then Sk N(γ ∪X) = Sk N(γ ∪ Y ) for all γ ≥ δ.
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Proof. Let t ∈ Sk N (γ ∪X). Then there is some formula ϕ where t unique such that N |=
ϕ(t, ξ, x) for ξ < γ, x ∈ X . But since then x ∈ X ⊆ Sk N(δ∪X) = Sk N(δ∪Y ) ⊆ Sk N(γ∪Y ),
it must be the case that t ∈ Sk N(γ ∪ Y ) as well. Likewise for the reverse inclusion.
Before defining fullness, we need one more definition.
Definition 1.2.4. We say that a transitive model N is regular in a transitive model M so
long as for all functions f : x −→ N , where x is an element of N and f ∈ M , we have that
f“x ∈ N . ⊣
To elucidate the definition further, we immediately have the following lemma:
Lemma 1.2.5. Let N,M |= ZFC− be transitive. N is regular in M iff N = HMγ , where
γ = height(N) is a regular cardinal in M .
Proof. For the backward direction, suppose that N = HMγ where γ = height(N) is a regular
cardinal in M . Then for all f : x −→ N , with x ∈ N and f ∈ M , certainly f“x ∈ N as well.
For the forward direction, indeed γ has to be regular in M since otherwise M would
contain a cofinal function f : α −→ γ where α < γ. By the transitivity of N , this implies
that α ∈ N . Thus ∪f“α is in N |= ZFC− by regularity, so γ ∈ N , a contradiction. We have
that N ⊆ HMγ since N is a transitive ZFC
− model, so the transitive closure of elements of
N may be computed in N and thus have size less than γ, so they are in HMγ as γ ∈ M . To
show that HMγ ⊆ N , let x ∈ H
M
γ . We assume by ∈-induction that x ⊆ N . Then there is a
surjection f : α։ x where α < γ, in M . Hence by regularity, x = f“α ∈ N as desired.
We now define fullness.
Definition 1.2.6. A structure M is full so long as M is transitive, ω ∈ M , and there is a
γ such that M is regular in Lγ(M) where Lγ(M) |= ZFC
−. ⊣
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Perhaps this property seems rather mysterious, but the fullness of a countable structure
guarantees that it is not pointwise definable, which we will see is a necessary property of
some of the models that come up in the definition subcomplete forcing.
Lemma 1.2.7. If M is countable and full, then M is not pointwise definable.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that M is countable, full, and pointwise definable.
By fullness there is some Lγ(M) |= ZFC
− such that M is regular in Lγ(M). By pointwise
definability, for each element x ∈ M , we have attached to it some formula ϕ(x) such that
M |= ϕ(x) uniquely, meaning that ϕ(y) fails for every other element y ∈M . Thus in Lγ(M)
we may define a function f : ω ∼= M , that takes the nth formula in the language of set theory
to its unique witness inM . In particular we have that Lγ(M) witnesses thatM is countable.
However, this would allow M to witness its own countability, since M must contain f as
well by regularity.
Let N be a transitive ZFC− model. Suppose N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N
is full. Then as we will find, there may possibly be more than one elementary embedding
σ : N ≺ N . If there was only one unique embedding, we would be able to define N pointwise,
by elementarity of the unique map and since N is countable.
The following lemma shows that fullness is in some sense not much harder than transi-
tivity to satisfy.
Lemma 1.2.8. Let θ > ω1 satisfy Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− with τ > θ regular and A ⊆ τ ,
and let s ∈ N . Then
{
ωN1 | there is σ such that σ : N ≺ N where N is countable and full, and s ∈ range(σ)
}
⊆ ω1
contains a club.
Proof. Let τ ′ = (τ+)L[A]. Let σ′ : Lτ ′ [A] ∼= X 4 Lτ ′ [A] where X is countable and Lτ ′ [A] is
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the Mostowski collapse of X . Let τ be the largest cardinal of Lτ ′ [A]. We would like to show
that N = Lτ [A] is full, by showing it is regular in Lτ ′ [A] = Lτ ′(N).
Claim. N is regular in Lτ ′ [A].
Pf. Let f : x −→ N , where x ∈ N and f ∈ Lτ ′ [A], and indeed range(f) = f“x ∈ Lτ ′ [A].
Firstly, f“x ⊆ Lγ[A], for some γ < τ , because τ is a regular cardinal in Lτ ′[A]. We inductively
define a sequence of Skolem hulls in order to see that ultimately f“x must be an element of
N . Let
X0 = Sk
L
τ ′
[A](γ ∪ {f“x}).
In Lτ ′ [A], X0 has size γ, so in particular it has size less than τ . Also we have that Lγ[A] ⊆ X0.
As an aside, we point out that one might already want to take the transitive collapse of this
structure to obtain something that looks like L
τ ′
[A]. The A arising from this is not very
easy to work with; it is not necessarily true that in this case, A = A∩ τ ′ as one would hope.
To remedy this we will go on to define a hull whose transitive collapsed version of A is an
initial segment of A, ultimately making the collapsed structure definable in Lτ [A]. To do
this, inductively assume Xn is defined with size less than τ , and set γn = sup(Xn) ∩ τ . We
have that |γn| < τ , as τ is regular in Lτ ′ [A]. We let
Xn+1 = Sk
L
τ ′
[A](γn ∪Xn).
This defines an elementary chain 〈Xn | n < ω〉 in Lτ ′ [A]. So Xω =
⋃
n<ωXn is an elementary
substructure of Lτ ′ [A]. Additionally, let γω := Xω ∩ τ = supn<ω γn.
Let k : Lτ ′ [A]
∼= Xω 4 Lτ ′ [A]. Then Lτ ′ [A] = Lτ ′ [A] and by construction, k ↾ γω = id.
Additionally we now have
A = k−1“A = k−1“(A ∩ γω) = A ∩ γω.
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Since Lγ [A] ⊆ X0, we have that k−1(f“x) = f“x. Thus f“x ∈ Lτ ′ [A ∩ γω] ∈ Lτ [A] = N ,
since τ ′ < τ and A ∩ γω < τ . Thus N is regular in Lτ ′ [A], proving the Claim.
Thus N is full. To show the claim, we need to show that there are club-many such Ns.
But this is true because there are club-many relevant Skolem hulls from which the N arise.
In particular, let
Γ =
{
N = Lτ [A] | for some γ < ω1, Lτ ′ [A] ∼= Sk
Lτ ′ [A](γ ∪ {s}) 4 Lτ ′ [A]
where τ is the largest cardinal in Lτ ′ [A]
}
.
Then C =
{
ωN1 | N ∈ Γ
}
⊆ ω1 is club.
Clearly C is unbounded, since for any γ < ω1, there is σ
′ : Lτ ′[A] ∼= Sk
Lτ ′ [A](γ ∪ {s}) 4
Lτ ′ [A]. Let σ
′(s) = s. Since τ > ωN1 by elementarity, we have that σ = σ
′ ↾ Lτ [A] is an
elementary embedding as well; σ : N ≺ N , and σ(s) = s. Then the critical point of σ,
namely ωN1 , is above γ.
To see that C is closed, suppose we have an unbounded set of of N ∈ Γ and an associated
sequence of α = ωN1 . As we saw above, each of these N can be thought of as the domain
of some elementary σ : N ∼= X 4 N , where X is countable. Then we can take the union of
these X to obtain X 4 N . To form σ : N ≺ N take the Mostowski collapse. The critical
point of σ will be the supremum of all of the α’s.
The following lemma will prove useful when showing that various forcing notions are
subcomplete, since subcompleteness requires certain ground-model Skolem hulls to match
those in forcing extensions.
Lemma 1.2.9 (Jensen). Let P be a forcing notion, and let δ = δ(P) be the smallest size of
a dense subset in P. Suppose that P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N where N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
−. Let σ : N ≺ N
where N is countable and full, and let σ(P) = P.
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Suppose G ⊆ P is N-generic and G ⊆ P is N-generic, and that σ“G ⊆ G, so σ lifts (or
extends) in V [G] to an embedding σ∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G].
Then
N ∩ Sk N [G](δ ∪ range(σ∗)) = Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ)).
Proof. First, we establish that Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ)) ⊆ Sk N [G](δ ∪ range(σ∗))∩N . To see this,
let x ∈ Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ)). Then x is N -definable from ξ < δ and σ(z) where z ∈ N . Since
σ∗ extends σ, this means that x ∈ N and that x is N [G]-definable from ξ and σ∗(z). This is
because N = Lτ [A] is definable in N [G] using A.
For the other direction, let x ∈ Sk N [G](δ ∪ range(σ∗)) ∩ N . Then x is N [G]-definable
from ξ < δ and σ∗(z) where z ∈ N [G]; and also x ∈ N . Letting z˙ ∈ N
P
such that z = z˙
G
we
have
σ∗(z) = σ∗(z˙
G
) = σ(z˙)G
so we have that there is some formula ϕ such that x is the unique witness:
x = that y where N [G] |= ϕ(y, ξ, σ(z˙)G).
Take f ∈ N mapping δ onto a dense subset of P. Then σ(f) maps δ onto a dense subset of
P. Thus there is ν < δ such that σ(f)(ν) ∈ G and σ(f)(ν)  ϕ(xˇ, ξˇ, σ(z˙)). Thus
x = that y where σ(f)(ν) NP ϕ(yˇ, ξˇ, σ(z˙))
so x ∈ Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ)).
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1.3 Barwise Theory
In order to show that many posets are subcomplete, Jensen takes advantage of Barwise
Theory and techniques using countable admissible structures to obtain transitive models
of infinitary languages. Barwise creates an M-finite predicate logic, a first order theory in
which arbitrary, but M-finite, disjunctions and conjunctions are allowed. The following is
an outline of [Jen14, Chapter 1 & 2].
Definition 1.3.1. Let M be a transitive structure with potentially infinitely many pred-
icates. A theory defined over M is M-finite so long as it is in M . A theory is Σ1(M),
also known as M-recursively enumerable or M-re, if the theory is Σ1-definable, with
parameters from M . ⊣
Of course we can generalize this to the entire usual Levy hierarchy of formulae, but for
our purposes we only need to know what it means for a theory to be Σ1(M). If L is a
Σ1(M)-definable language or theory, the rough idea is that to check whether a sentence is in
L, one should imagine enumerating the formulae of L to find the sentence and a witness to
it in the structure M . Below we elaborate on what models we are working with.
Definition 1.3.2. A transitive structure M is admissible if it models the axioms of
Kripke-Platek Set Theory (KP) which consists of the axioms of Empty Set, Pairing, Union,
Σ0-Collection, and Σ0-Separation. ⊣
Jensen also makes use of models of ZF− that are not necessarily well-founded.
Definition 1.3.3. Let A = 〈A,∈A, B1, B2, . . . 〉 be a (possibly) ill-founded model of ZF
−,
where A is allowed to have predicates other than ∈. The well-founded core of A, denoted
wfc(A), is the restriction of A to the set of all x ∈ A such that ∈A ∩C(x)2 is well founded,
where C(x) is the closure of {x} under ∈A. A model A of ZF
− is solid so long as wfc(A) is
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transitive and ∈wfc(A)=∈ ∩wfc(A)
2. ⊣
Jensen [Jen14, Section 1.2] notes that every consistent set of sentences in ZF− has a solid
model, and if A is solid, then ω ⊆ wfc(A). In addition,
Fact 1.3.4 (Jensen). If A |= ZF− is solid, then wfc(A) is admissible.
Definition 1.3.5. The context for Barwise theory is countable admissible structures. If M
is admissible, we work with infinitary, axiomatized theories L in M-finitary logic, called ∈-
theories, with a fixed predicate ∈˙ and special constants denoted x for elements x ∈ M .
Our underlying axioms for these ∈-theories will always involve ZFC− and some basic axioms
ensuring that ∈˙ behaves nicely; the Basic Axioms are:
• Extensionality
• A statement positing the extensionality of ∈˙, which is a scheme of formulae defined for
each member of M . For each x ∈M , include an M-re sentence (meaning it quantifies
over M-finite sentence):
∀v
(
v ∈˙ x ⇐⇒
∨∨
z∈x
v = z
)
.
Here
∨
denotes an infinite disjunction in the language. ⊣
An important fact ensured by our Basic Axioms is that the interpretations of these special
constants in any solid model of the theory are the same as in M :
Fact 1.3.6 (Jensen). Let M be as in the above definition. Let A be a solid model of the
∈-theory L. Then for all x ∈M , we have that xA = x ∈ wfc(A).
Pf. Shown by ∈-induction.
CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARIES 17
Jensen uses the techniques of Barwise to come up with a proof system in this context,
in which consistency of ∈-theories can be discussed. In particular, ∈-theories are correct: if
we have a model of such a theory, then it is consistent.
Fact 1.3.7 (Barwise Correctness). Let L be an ∈-theory. If A is a set of L-statements
and A |= A, then A is consistent.
Furthermore, compactness and completeness are shown, relativized to the M-finite pred-
icate logics that are used here. In our context, for countable admissible structures M , we
will obtain solid models of consistent Σ1(M) ∈-theories. In particular, the form of Barwise
Completeness that we make use of here is stated below.
Fact 1.3.8 (Barwise Completeness). Let M be a countable admissible structure. Let
L be a consistent Σ1(M) ∈-theory such that L ⊢ ZF
−. Then L has a solid model A such
that
Ord ∩ wfc(A) = Ord ∩M.
We will need the following definition, which is a generalization of fullness.
Definition 1.3.9. A transitive ZFC− model N is almost full so long as ω ∈ N and there
is a solid A |= ZFC− with N ∈ wfc(A) and N is regular in A. ⊣
Clearly if N is full, then N is almost full.
A useful technique when showing a particular forcing is subcomplete, once many different
embeddings can be constructed that approximate the embedding required for subcomplete-
ness, is to be able to transfer the consistency of ∈-theories over one admissible structure to
another.
Definition 1.3.10. If N is a transitive ZFC− model, let δN be the least δ such that Lδ(N)
is admissible. ⊣
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Fact 1.3.11 (Transfer). Suppose that for M admissible, L(M) is a Σ1(M) infinitary ∈-
theory. Let N1 be almost full, and suppose that k : N1 ≺ N0 cofinally. If both L(LδN1 (N1)) is
Σ1 over parametersN1, p1, . . . , pn ∈ N1 and L(LδN0 (N0)) is Σ1 over parametersN0, k(p1), . . . , k(pn),
then if L(LδN1 (N1)) is consistent, it follows that L(LδN0 (N0)) is consistent as well.
1.4 Liftups
The following definitions are to describe a method to obtain emeddings, a technique that
is ostensibly the ultrapower construction. These embeddings facilitate the use of Barwise
theory to obtain the consistency of the existence of desirable embeddings. We follow [Jen14,
Chapter 1] here.
Definition 1.4.1. Let N and N be transitive ZFC− models. We say that an elementary
embedding σ : N ≺ N is cofinal so long as for each x ∈ N there is some u ∈ N such that
x ∈ σ(u).
Let α ∈ N . We say that σ is α-cofinal so long as every such u has size less than α as
computed in N . ⊣
Definition 1.4.2. Let α > ω be a regular cardinal in N , a transitive ZFC− model. Let
σ : HNα ≺ H cofinally,
where H is transitive. By a transitive liftup of 〈N, σ〉 we mean a pair 〈N∗, σ∗〉 such that
• N∗ is transitive
• σ∗ : N ≺ N∗ α-cofinally
• σ∗ ↾ HNα = σ ⊣
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Reminiscent of ultrapowers, transitive liftups can be characterized in the following way:
Lemma 1.4.3 (Jensen). Let N , N be transitive ZFC− models with σ : N ≺ N . Then, σ is
α-cofinal ⇐⇒ elements of N are of the form σ(f)(β) for some f : γ → N where γ < α
and β < σ(γ).
Proof. We show each direction of the equivalence separately.
“=⇒”: Let x ∈ N , and take u ∈ N with x ∈ σ(u) such that |u| < α in N . Let |u| = γ,
and take f : γ → u a bijection in N . Then σ(f) : σ(γ) → σ(u) is also a bijection in N
by elementarity. Since x ∈ σ(u) we also have that x has a preimage under σ(f), say β. So
σ(f)(β) = x as desired.
“⇐=”: Let x = σ(f)(β) be an element of N , for f : γ → N where γ < α in N and
β < σ(γ). Define u = f“γ. Then in N we have that |u| < α. In addition we have that
x ∈ σ(u), since σ(u) is in the range of σ(f), where x lies.
Furthermore, Jensen shows that transitive liftups exist so long as an embedding already
exists, using an ultrapower-like construction, and have a uniqueness property.
Fact 1.4.4 (Interpolation). Let σ : N ≺ N with N |= ZFC− transitive, and let α ∈ N
be a regular cardinal. Then:
1. The transitive liftup 〈N∗, σ∗〉 of 〈N, σ ↾H
N
α 〉 exists.
2. There is a unique k∗ : N∗ ≺ N such that k∗ ◦ σ∗ = σ and k∗ ↾
⋃
σ“HNα = id.
For the following useful lemma, we will need to define the following, more general, notion
of liftups. Of course the rich theory is established by Jensen, and is explored in detail in his
notes. We will only use this more general definition for the following lemma, which is why
we did not introduce liftups in this way from the beginning.
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Definition 1.4.5. Let A be a solid model of ZFC− and let τ ∈ wfc(A) be an uncountable
cardinal in A. Let
σ : HAτ ≺ H cofinally,
where H is transitive. Then by a liftup of 〈A, σ〉, we mean a pair 〈A∗, σ∗〉 such that
• σ∗ ⊇ σ
• A∗ is solid
• σ∗ : A→Σ0 A∗ τ -cofinally
• H ∈ wfc(A∗) ⊣
Fact 1.4.6 (Jensen). Let A be a solid model of ZFC−. Let τ > ω, τ ∈ wfc(A), and let
σ : HAτ ≺ H cofinally,
where H is transitive. Then 〈A, σ〉 has a liftup 〈A∗, σ∗〉.
The following lemma states that transitive liftups of full models are almost full.
Lemma 1.4.7 (Jensen). Let N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− and σ : N ≺ N where N is full. Suppose
that 〈N∗, σ∗〉 is a transitive liftup of 〈N, σ〉. Then N∗ is almost full.
Proof. Let Lγ(N) witness the fullness of N . We will now apply Interpolation (Fact 1.4.4) to
A = Lγ(N), which makes sense since certainly A is a transitive model ZFC
−. Additionally,
by Lemma 1.2.5 we have that N = HAτ , where τ = height(N). Since 〈N∗, σ∗〉 is a transitive
liftup, we have that
σ∗ : H
A
τ ≺ N∗ cofinally,
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where N∗ is transitive. Thus since A is transitive, 〈A, σ∗〉 has a liftup 〈A∗, σ∗∗〉, where
A∗ |= ZFC
− since A does, A∗ is solid, where
σ∗∗ : A ≺ A∗ τ -cofinally.
We have that N∗ ⊆ wfc(A∗) and τ∗ = σ∗∗(τ) = height(N∗) is regular since τ is. Furthermore,
we will show that N∗ = H
A∗
τ∗
, completing the proof:
Certainly it is the case that N∗ ⊆ HA
∗
τ∗
. But if x ∈ Hτ∗ in A∗, then by regularity we have
that x ∈ σ∗∗(u) in A∗, where u ∈ A, and |u| < τ in A. Let v = u ∩Hτ in A. Then v ∈ N ,
since N is regular in A. But then x ∈ σ∗(v) ∈ N∗. So x ∈ N∗.
Chapter 2
Subcomplete Forcing and Its Relatives
Before defining subproper forcing, it is useful to first give the relevant definition of proper
forcing. Then we will see how the prefix “sub” alters that definition to arrive at subproper
forcing. Later on, we will draw comparisons to complete forcing and subcomplete forcing;
showing how the “sub” prefix alters the definition of complete forcing to finally obtain
subcomplete forcing.
Subproper
Complete
(σ-cl.)
?
Proper
Subcomplete
The above diagram roughly represents the picture of how these forcing notions fit to-
22
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gether. We shall see in 2.2.1 that complete forcing gives rise to the same class of forcing
notions as countably closed forcing, so in particular, this means that countably closed forcing
notions are subcomplete, and complete forcings are proper.
From the diagram it looks as though there might be forcing notions that are both sub-
complete and proper but not countably closed. It is not clear whether this is the case, and
is a topic of future study.
Question 2.0.1. Is there a forcing notion that is both proper and subcomplete but not
countably closed?
2.1 Subproper Forcing
The following relevant characterization of properness, roughly speaking, replaces the notion
of genericity below a master condition with the lifting of an embedding below a master
condition.
First recall a standard definition of properness as in [Jec02]:
Definition 2.1.1. A forcing notion P is proper so long as for sufficiently large θ, for all
P ∈ X 4 〈Hθ, <〉 where X is countable and < is a well-order of Hθ, and all p ∈ P ∩X there
is a master condition p∗ ≤ p that is X-generic. Namely, whenever p∗ ∈ G is P-generic,
G ∩X is a P-generic filter over X .
Alternatively P is proper so long as there is a large enough θ for which there is a club of
such countable X 4 〈Hθ, <〉 where X ∈ P. ⊣
The following proposition shows how the definition of properness is understood in the
context of lifting embeddings on countable transitive structures.
Proposition 2.1.2. A forcing notion P is proper ⇐⇒ for sufficiently large θ we have that;
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letting:
1. P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
2. σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is transitive
3. σ(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s for some s ∈ N ;
for any p ∈ P there is p∗ ≤ σ(p) in P such that whenever G ∋ p∗ is P-generic, σ−1“G = G ⊆ P
is an N -generic filter.
Thus in particular, below p∗ we have that σ lifts to an elementary embedding σ∗ : N [G] ≺
N [G].
Proof. We show each direction of the biconditional separately.
“=⇒”: Let P be proper. In order to show that the alternative characterization is also
satisfied, let θ be large enough so that we are in the scenario in which items 1 − 3 hold,
where π : N ∼= X . Let p ∈ P. Then by the properness of P there is a master condition
p∗ ≤ π(p). Let G be generic for P with p∗ ∈ G. Then G ∩ X is a P-generic filter over X .
Since π is an isomorphism, it is clear that G = π−1“(G∩X) is P-generic over N since G∩X
is generic over X .
“⇐=”: Let θ be large enough so that the alternative characterization is satisfied for P. To
show that P is proper, we show that there are club-many countable X 4 〈Hθ, <〉 such that
P ∈ X and for all p ∈ P ∩X there is a master condition p∗ ≤ p that is X-generic.
To do this, first take 〈Hθ, <〉 ∈ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− with τ > θ and A ⊆ τ . We will show
that
C =
{
X 4 〈Hθ, <〉 | X is countable, P ∈ X , and Sk
N(X) ∩ P = X ∩ P
}
⊆ Pω1(Hθ) is club.
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Claim. C is club.
Pf. Let’s show that C is unbounded. Let Z be a countable subset of Hθ. We construct
X ⊇ Z such that X 4 〈Hθ, <〉, P ∈ X , and Sk N(X)∩ P = X ∩ P. We define X inductively,
by defining a sequence of Xn 4 Hθ and Yn = Sk N(Xn) 4 N . Let X0 = SkHθ(Z ∪ {P}).
Assuming Xn has been defined, let Xn+1 = SkHθ(Xn ∪ (Yn ∩ P)). Let X = ∪n<ωXn. Then
we claim that X ∈ C is as desired. Of course P ∈ X as P ∈ X0. Additionally, letting
Y := ∪n<ωYn, we have that Y = Sk N (X) as X ⊆ Y and Y is the smallest elementary
substructure of N containing X . So to show that Y ∩ P = X ∩ P, let y ∈ Y ∩ P. Then
y ∈ Yn ∩ P for some n < ω. Thus y ∈ Xn+1. And the same argument shows that x ∈ X ∩ P
means x ∈ Xn for some n < ω, meaning x ∈ Yn+1.
C is also closed, since supposing there is a countable elementary chain of Xn for n < ω,
the union Xω = ∪n<ω is also a countable, elementary substructure of Hθ. Furthermore,
P ∈ X as P ∈ X0, and Sk N (Xω) = ∪n<ωSk N (Xn), so in an argument similar to the above,
Sk N(Xω) ∩ P = Xω ∩ P as desired.
This completes the proof of the Claim.
To see that P is indeed proper, let X ∈ C, and let p ∈ P ∩X . We want to find a master
condition p∗ below p. We now use the alternative characterization. Indeed, let
• σ : N ∼= Sk N(X) = Y 4 N where N is transitive.
• σ(θ,P, p) = θ,P, p.
By the alternative characterization, there is p∗ ≤ p such that whenever p∗ ∈ G where G is
P-generic over N , we have that σ−1“G = G is P-generic over N . Then σ“G = G ∩ Y is
P ∩ Y -generic over Y . But since P ∩ Y = P ∩X , we have that G ∩X is P ∩X-generic over
X as desired.
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Subproperness is a weakening of properness which asks that below a condition, there
is some embedding in the extension that lifts, not necessarily the one we started with.
Extra conditions for the embedding and the structures it deals with are needed; namely the
replacement of transitivity with fullness is crucial, since otherwise there may not consitently
be more than one such elementary embedding.
While proper forcings satisfy the countable covering property, meaning that every
countable set of ordinals in V [G] is included in a set in V that is countable in V , subproper
forcings do not necessarily have to have this property in general. We shall see that subcom-
plete forcing notions are clearly all subproper, and there are subcomplete forcing notions
that do not satisfy the countable covering property, e.g. Prikry forcing.
Definition 2.1.3. A forcing notion P is subproper so long as for sufficiently large θ we
have that whenever we are in the following standard setup:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s for some s ∈ N ;
then, for any q ∈ P there is p ≤ σ(q) in P such that whenever G ∋ p is P-generic, there is an
embedding σ′ ∈ V [G] satisfying:
1. σ′ : N ≺ N
2. σ′(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s
3. Sk N(δ(P) ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N (δ(P) ∪X)
4. G = σ′−1“G is an N -generic filter.
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In particular, below the condition p the embedding σ′ ∈ V [G] lifts by 4, since σ“G ⊆ G, to
an embedding σ′∗ ∈ V [G] where σ′∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G].
We say that such a θ as above verifies the subproperness of P.
Often we write δ instead of δ(P) when there should be no confusion as to which poset P
we are working with.1 ⊣
Condition 3 ensures that subproper forcings may be iterated. Indeed, Jensen proves that
there is an iteration theorem for subproper forcing, and uses it to show the consistency of
SuPFA, the subproper forcing axiom, given the existence of a supercompact cardinal.
Theorem 2.1.4. Subproper forcings preserve stationary subsets of ω1.
Proof. Suppose not. Let S ⊆ ω1 be stationary. Let P be subproper, and suppose toward a
contradiction that we have C˙ ∈ V P such that there is p ∈ P,
p  “C˙ ⊆ ωˇ1 is club” ∧ Sˇ ∩ C˙ = ∅.
Choose θ large enough so that P ∈ Hθ, and suppose we have Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− for
some τ > θ and A ⊆ τ . Recall that
B =
{
ωN1 | where σ : N ≺ N and N is countable, full with σ(θ,P, S, C˙, p) = θ,P, S, C˙, p
}
⊆ ω1
contains a club by Lemma 1.2.8.
Take α ∈ S ∩ B. Thus α = ωN1 for some N such that:
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full.
• σ(θ,P, S, C˙, p) = θ,P, S, C˙, p.
1See Section 1.1 for more on δ(P).
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Furthermore by elementarity, we have in N that p  “C˙ ⊆ δ is club.” Apply subproperness
to obtain q ≤ σ(p) = p such that whenever G ∋ q is P-generic, there is σ′ ∈ V [G] satisfying:
• σ′ : N ≺ N
• σ′(θ,P, S, C˙, p) = θ,P, S, C˙, p
• G = σ′−1“G is an N -generic filter.
So σ′ lifts to an embedding σ∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G] in V [G]. Let C = C˙
G
, C = C˙G. Since q ∈ G
is stronger than p, we have that C ⊆ ω1 is club and S ∩ C = ∅ in N [G] by our original
assumption. However, α is the critical point of the embedding σ∗, so α is a limit ordinal and
below α, the club C is fixed. Thus C = C ∩ α is unbounded in α, in N [G]. Since C is club
and thus closed under limit points, this means α ∈ C, a contradiction since α was taken to
be in S.
Thus, we may make sense of writing SubPFA, the subproper forcing axiom, and we have
that Martin’s Maximum (MM) implies SubPFA.
2.2 Subcomplete Forcing
Subcomplete forcing is a class of forcing notions that we shall see do not add reals, but may
potentially alter cofinalities to ω. Examples of subcomplete forcing include Prikry forcing
and Namba forcing (under CH). This separates subcomplete forcings from proper forcings,
that have countable covering and thus cannot change cofinalities to ω.
Before giving the definition of subompleteness, as with the transition from properness
to subproperness, subcompleteness should be seen as a weakening of the class of complete
(or countably closed forcings, as we shall see in 2.2.1). We follow [Jen14, Chapter 3] for the
following definitions and the proofs that we cite as due to Jensen.
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Definition 2.2.1. A forcing notion P is complete so long as for sufficiently large θ we have;
letting:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is transitive
• σ(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s for some s ∈ N ;
if G is P-generic over N then there is p ∈ P forcing that whenever G ∋ p is P-generic,
σ“G ⊆ G.
In particular, below the condition p we have that σ lifts to an embedding σ∗ : N [G] ≺
N [G]. We say that such a θ as above witnesses the completeness of P. ⊣
The adjustment made to get subcomplete forcings is to not necessarily insist the the
original embedding lifts in the forcing extension. Instead subcompleteness asks for there to
be an embedding in the extension, an embedding that is sufficiently similar to the original
embedding, and lifts. However, as discussed earlier, the domain of the embedding must be
full to ensure that there can even consistently be more than one embedding. The definition
is given below.
Definition 2.2.2. A forcing notion P is subcomplete so long as, for sufficiently large θ we
have that whenever we are in a situation where:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s for some s ∈ N ;
then we have that if G is P-generic over N then there is p ∈ P such that whenever G ∋ p is
P-generic, there is σ′ ∈ V [G] satisfying:
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1. σ′ : N ≺ N
2. σ′(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s
3. Sk N(δ(P) ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N (δ(P) ∪X)
4. σ′“G ⊆ G.
In other words and in particular, the condition p forces that there is an embedding σ′ in the
extension V [G] that lifts, by 4, to an embedding σ′∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G] in V [G].
We say that such a θ as above verifies the subcompleteness of P.
Often we write δ instead of δ(P) when there should be no confusion as to which poset P
we are working with.2 ⊣
Condition 3 ensures that subcomplete forcings may be iterated, and is rarely used in the
following proofs. Thus we will tend to leave out of the discussion if we are showing properties
of subcomplete posets.
Immediately we obtain the following.
Proposition 2.2.3 (Jensen). Subcomplete forcing does not add countable subsets of count-
able sets. In particular, subcomplete forcing does not add reals.
Proof. Let P be subcomplete. Suppose toward a contradiction that P adds a new real, let
p ∈ P force that r˙ : ωˇ → ω is new. Let θ be large enough and let σ, N , and N satisfy:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, p, r˙) = θ,P, p, r˙.
2See Section 1.1 for more on δ(P).
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Let G ⊆ P be an N -generic filter with p ∈ G. By the subcompleteness of P, there is q ∈ P
forcing that whenever G ∋ q is P-generic, there is σ′ ∈ V [G] such that
• σ′ : N ≺ N
• σ′(θ,P, p, r˙) = θ,P, p, r˙
• σ′“G ⊆ G.
Thus σ′ lifts to σ′ : N [G] ≺ N [G] in V [G]. Let r = r˙G, r = r˙
G
. Then for each n < ω we
have that
r(n) = σ′(r(n)) = r(n).
So r = r ∈ V , contradicting our original assumption that p ∈ G forces r˙ to be new.
Proposition 2.2.4. Subcomplete forcings are subproper.
Proof. Let δ(P) = δ. If P is subcomplete, then to see that P is also subproper assume we
are in the standard setup from the definition of subproperness:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s for some s ∈ N .
Let q ∈ P. Then q = σ(q) ∈ X . Let G be generic for P over N such that q ∈ G. Then by
subcompleteness of P, we have that there is p ∈ P such that whenever G is generic and G
contains p, then there is σ′ ∈ V [G] satisfying:
1. σ′ : N ≺ N
2. σ′(θ,P, s, q) = θ,P, s, q
3. Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N(δ ∪X)
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4. σ′“G ⊆ G.
In particular,
q = σ(q) = σ′(q) ∈ G.
Thus q is compatible with p, and so there is r ∈ G satisfying r ≤ q and r ≤ p. But then this
r verifies the subproperness of P, since this r is also below p.
By Theorem 2.1.4, this means that subcomplete forcings also preserve stationary sub-
sets of ω1. Thus the class of subcomplete forcing is not the same as the class of countably
distributive forcing notions (those that don’t add new reals). The following lemma tells us
that the verification of subcompleteness is absolute to suitably large structures.
Lemma 2.2.5 (Jensen). Suppose that P ∈ Hθ and let η > |Hθ|.
P is subcomplete as verified by θ ⇐⇒ P is subcomplete in Hη as verified by θ.
Proof. If P is subcomplete in Hη then P is subcomplete in V because in the definition of
subcompleteness, only N = Lτ [A] ∈ Hη need to be considered. To see why, assume that P is
subcomplete as verified by θ in Hη. Then we show that P actually is subcomplete as verified
by θ.
Claim. Whenever we are in a situation where
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s for some s ∈ N ;
then we have that if G is P-generic over N then there is p ∈ P such that whenever G ∋ p is
P-generic, there is σ′ ∈ V [G] satisfying:
1. σ′ : N ≺ N
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2. σ′(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s
3. Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N(δ ∪X)
4. σ′“G ⊆ G.
Pf. We find a suitable embedding, similar to σ, but in Hη. Let π : N0 ∼= Sk N(Hθ ∪
X ∪ δ ∪ {s}) = Y 4 N . Then N0 ∈ Hη. Since X ⊆ Y and X 4 N , we have that X 4 Y .
Thus, letting X0 = π
−1“X , we have that X ∼= X0 4 N0. So taking the Mostowski collapse
N 0, we have that N 0 = N . Thus we have:
• σ0 : N ∼= X0 4 N0 in Hη
• σ0(θ,P, s) = σ(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s.
So by the subcompleteness of P in Hη, we have that if G ⊆ P is generic over N then there
is p ∈ P such that whenever G0 ∋ p is P-generic over Hη, there is σ′0 ∈ Hη[G0] = V
Hη [G0]
satisfying
1. σ′0 : N ≺ N0
2. σ′0(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s
3. Sk N0(δ ∪ range(σ′0)) = Sk
N0(δ ∪X0)
4. σ′0“G ⊆ G0.
If G ∋ p is P-generic over V , then G is also P-generic over Hη. We thus have that items
1 and 2 of the Claim hold, since letting σ′ = σ′0 ◦ π ∈ V [G] we have σ
′ : N ≺ N and
σ′(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s. Moreover item 3 holds since π“Sk N0(δ∪range(σ′0)) = Sk
N(δ∪range(σ′))
and π“Sk N0(δ ∪ X0) = Sk N(δ ∪ X). For property 4, the point is that π ↾ Hθ = id, so
π ◦ σ′0“G = σ
′
0“G ⊆ G. This finishes the proof of the Claim.
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Finally, if P is subcomplete in V as verified by Hθ, then P is subcomplete in Hη since
given σ ∈ Hη where σ : N ≺ N , we have of course that N,N ∈ Hη. Additionally σ ∈ V ,
and we may apply subcompleteness in V to obtain a condition p ∈ P such that whenever
p ∈ G, there is a σ′ ∈ V [G] having certain properties, namely 1 through 4 of the definition.
Such generic filters over V are also generic over Hη, and furthermore σ
′ ∈ Hη[G] = V Hη [G]
since N and N are in Hη. So the rest of the properties are also clear, and P is subcomolete
in Hη as desired.
Remark 2.2.6. If P is subcomplete as verified by θ, then P is subcomplete as verifed
by θ′ > θ since P ∈ Hθ obviously implies that P ∈ Hθ′. Thus if we are in a situation
where P ∈ Hθ′ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] for τ > θ′ then we may reduce down to the case where
P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] and τ > θ′ > θ using the same τ and apply subcompletenss. In
particular, P is subcomplete as long as it is verified to be subcomplete by some θ. So we
may replace “sufficiently large θ” with “some θ” in the definition of subcompleteness.3
In addition we have that subcomplete forcing is closed under lottery sums, which is also
true for subproper forcing. But since subcomplete forcing is the focus, we will only give the
proof for subcomplete forcing.
Definition 2.2.7. For a family of forcing notions P, the lottery sum poset is defined as
follows:
⊕P = {1} ∪ {〈P, p〉 | P ∈ P ∧ p ∈ P}
with 1 weaker than everything and 〈P, p〉 ≤ 〈P′, p′〉 if and only if P = P′ and p ≤P p′. ⊣
Lemma 2.2.8. Lottery sums of subcomplete forcings are subcomplete.
Proof. Let P be the lottery sum of Q = {Qα | α < κ}, where each Qα is subcomplete. Let θ
be large enough to verify the subcompleteness of each Qα.
3See [Jen14, Section 3.1 Lemma 2.4].
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• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P,Q, s) = θ,P,Q, s for some s ∈ N .
Let G be P-generic over N . Note that if p ∈ Qα, q ∈ Qβ, α 6= β, then 〈Qα, p〉 and 〈Qα, q〉
are incompatible. Since elements of G are pairwise compatible, it therefore must be the case
that G ⊆ {1} ∪ ({Qα} ×Qα) for some Qα in Q.
Since each poset in Q is subcomplete, there is p ∈ Qα such that whenever G ∋ p is
Qα-generic, there is σ′ ∈ V [G]:
1. σ′ : N ≺ N
2. σ′(θ,Qα,P,Q, s) = θ,Qα,P,Q, s
3. Sk N(δ(Qα) ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N (δ(Qα) ∪X)
4. σ′“G ⊆ G.
Now suppose that p ∈ G ⊆ P is generic over V . Then G ⊆ {1} ∪ ({Qα} × Qα), by
the same argument as above and as p ∈ Qα. Now all that’s left to show is that σ′ ∈ V [G]
satisfies
Sk N (δ(P) ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N(δ(P) ∪X). (2.1)
To see this, note that δ(Qα) ≤ δ(P), since any dense set in P of smallest size will have to con-
tain a dense set of the smallest cardinality in Qα. So by item 3 above and by Lemma 1.2.3,
we have that (2.1) holds as well.
Definition 2.2.9. Two posets P and Q are said to be forcing equivalent if whenever
G ⊆ P is generic, there is H ⊆ Q generic such that V [G] = V [H ], and similarly if H ⊆ Q is
generic, there is G ⊆ P generic such that V [G] = V [H ]. ⊣
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For example, if P densely embeds into Q, then P and Q are forcing equivalent.
Lemma 2.2.10. If κ > δ(P), then we may find a forcing equivalent poset Pκ such that
δ(Pκ) = κ.
Proof. Let Pκ = ⊕κP be the κ-sized lottery sum of P with itself. The lottery sum of a forcing
with itself is forcing equivalent to that forcing, but artificially will have larger dense sets.
Being subcomplete does not appear to always be closed under forcing equivalence. How-
ever, we have the following.
Proposition 2.2.11. If P is subcomplete and P densely embeds into Q, then Q is subcom-
plete.
Proof. Let π : P −→ Q be a dense embedding. We have that δ(P) = δ(Q) = δ, by Lemma
1.1.4. If P is subcomplete, then to see that Q is also subcomplete assume θ is large enough
to verify the subcompleteness of P and that we are in the standard setup:
• P,Q ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P,Q, π, s) = θ,P,Q, π, s for some s ∈ N .
We have by elementarity that π : P −→ Q is a dense embedding. Toward showing that Q is
subcomplete, let H ⊆ Q be generic for Q over N .
Claim. There is q ∈ Q such that whenever H ⊆ Q is generic and q ∈ H , then there is
σ′ ∈ V [H ] satisfying:
1. σ′ : N ≺ N
2. σ′(θ,Q, s) = θ,Q, s
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3. Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N(δ ∪X)
4. σ′“H ⊆ H .
Pf. Let G = π −1“H. Then G ⊆ P is generic over N . So by the subcompleteness of P
there is p ∈ P such that whenever G ⊆ P is generic satisfying p ∈ G there is an embedding
σ′ ∈ V [G] satisfying:
• σ′ : N ≺ N
• σ′(θ,P,Q, π, s) = θ,P,Q, π, s
• Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N(δ ∪X)
• σ′“G ⊆ G.
Indeed this is the σ′ that is required. Let q = π(p). Then for H = π“G we have that for
q ∈ H, q = π(p) for some p ∈ G. But then
σ′(q) = σ′(π(p)) ∈ π“G = H.
Since all of the other properties needed to satisfy the Claim are true of σ′, we are done.
Thus Q is subcomplete as desired.
2.2.1 Subcomplete Forcing and Countably Closed Forcing
In order to explore the relationship between countably closed, complete, and subcomplete
forcing, let’s define the following, seemingly weaker class of forcings than given by complete-
ness, where our countable transitive collapses are taken to be full as in the definition of
subcompleteness.
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Definition 2.2.12. A forcing notion P is weakly complete so long as for sufficiently large
θ we have; letting:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s for some s ∈ N ;
if G is P-generic over N then there is p ∈ P such that whenever G ∋ p is P-generic, σ“G ⊆ G.
In particular, below p we have that σ lifts to an embedding σ∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G]. We say
that θ as above verifies the weak completeness of P. As with subcomplete forcing (see
Remark 2.2.6), we may replace “sufficiently large θ” with “some θ”. ⊣
Lemma 2.2.13. If P is (weakly) complete, then BA(P) is (weakly) complete.
Proof. Let i : P −→ BA(P) be the canonical dense embedding from P to its Boolean algebra.
It is not hard to see that the proof of Proposition 2.2.11 gives us that if P is (weakly)
complete then BA(P) is (weakly) complete: instead of working with the lifted σ′ we may
work with σ by (weak) completeness and show the same properties hold, as desired.
In fact, weakly complete forcing and complete forcing give rise to the same class: that
of countably closed forcing. Our below proofs directly follow those of Jensen [Jen09b, Ch. 2
p. 3].
Theorem 2.2.14 (Jensen). The following give rise to the same classes of forcing notions,
up to forcing equivalence:
1. Countably closed
2. Complete
3. Weakly complete
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Proof. First we show that countably closed forcings are complete. Then we will show that
both complete forcings and weakly complete forcings are forcing equivalent to countably
closed posets.
If P is countably closed, then P is complete (and weakly complete):
Pf. Below we show that if P is countably closed, then P is complete, and the same proof
shows that P is weakly complete with the modifications in parentheses. Let θ be sufficiently
large so that:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is transitive (full)
• σ(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s for some s ∈ N .
Let G ⊆ P be generic over N . Since P is countable, we may generate G with a chain,
〈pn | n < ω〉. So use the countable closedness of P to take p ∈ P satisfying ∀n p ≤ σ(pn).
Then P is complete (weakly complete) as desired, since any generic G containing p must
contain σ“G as the sequence of pn’s generate G.
If P is complete, then P is weakly complete:
Pf. Suppose that P is complete. To show that P is weakly complete, we need to show that
if we are in a situation where
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
then there is p ∈ P such that below p, in the extension σ lifts. But this is already true
because if N is full then N is transitive, so the rest goes through as P is complete.
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If P is complete, then P is forcing equivalent to a countably closed poset:
Pf. Suppose that P is complete. Then its Boolean algebra B = BA(P) is also complete by
Lemma 2.2.13. We show that B is forcing equivalent to a countably closed poset. Let θ
verify the completeness of B. Define a poset Q consisting of conditions q = 〈Xq, Gq〉 such
that B, θ ∈ Xq 4 N where Xq is countable and Gq ⊆ B is Xq-generic. Let
q ≤ r ⇐⇒ Xq ⊇ Xr and Gr = Gq ∩Xr.
We may immediately see that Q is countably closed since each Xq is countable and the
generics cohere. Define a dense homomorphism π : Q → B from Q to B as follows: π(q) =∧
Gq (the meet of all elements of Gq). We show that π is as desired below:
π is well defined: Let q ∈ Q. That
∧
Gq 6= 0, where 0 is the bottom element, follows
from the completeness of B. Let Gq be the isomorphic copy of Gq, σ−1“Gq in N , where N
is the Mostowski collapse of Xq. The completeness of B guarantees that there is b ∈ B such
that whenever G ∋ b is B-generic, σ“G = Gq ⊆ G. This implies that b ≤
∧
Gq. (Otherwise
b ∧ ¬
∧
Gq is in some generic G
∗, contradicting Gq ⊆ G.)
q ≤ r =⇒
∧
Gq ≤
∧
Gr: If q ≤ r then Gr ⊆ Gq, so the desired result follows.
q ‖ r ⇐⇒
∧
Gq∧
∧
Gr 6= 0: For the forward direction, if s ≤ q, r then
∧
Gs ≤
∧
Gq∧
∧
Gr
since Gs ⊇ Gq, Gr. For the other direction, let
∧
Gq ∧
∧
Gr 6= 0. Then let X 4 N with X
countable, Xq ∪Xr ⊆ X , and
∧
Gq ∧
∧
Gr ∈ X . Since X is countable we may obtain G ⊆ P
that is X-generic, with
∧
Gq ∧
∧
Gr ∈ G. Then 〈X,G〉 ≤ q, r.
D = {∩Gq | q ∈ Q} is dense in P: Let b ∈ B. Let X 4 N with X countable and b ∈ X .
Then if G is X-generic and contains b, we have b ≥
∧
G and
∧
G ∈ D.
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If P is weakly complete, then P is forcing equivalent to a countably closed poset:
Pf. Suppose that P is weakly complete. Then its Boolean algebra B = BA(P) is also complete
by Lemma 2.2.13. We show that B is forcing equivalent to a countably closed poset. Let
θ be large enough to verify the weak completeness of P. Define a poset Q consisting of
conditions q = 〈Xq, Gq〉 such that there is a Yq 4 Lτ+ [A] countable where Xq = Yq ∩N and
Gq ⊆ B is Xq-generic, where B ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] with τ > θ and A ⊆ τ . Let
q ≤ r ⇐⇒ Xq ⊇ Xr and Gr = Gq ∩Xr.
We’ve guaranteed with our definition that if σ : N ∼= Xq is the Mostowski collapse, then N
is full, since then N = (Lτ [A])
L
τ+
[A] where L
τ+
[A] is the Mostowski collapse of Y , and we
may reason as in the proof of Lemma 1.2.8.
We wish to show that Q is countably closed. Define a dense homomorphism π : Q →
BA(P) as follows: π(q) =
∧
Gq (the meet of all of the elements of Gq). Now we show that
π is as desired:
π is well defined: Let q ∈ Q. That
∧
Gq 6= 0, where 0 is the bottom element, follows
from the weak completeness of B. Let Gq be the isomorphic copy of Gq, σ−1“Gq in N , where
N is the Mostowski collapse via σ of Xq as above. The weak completeness guarantees that
there is b ∈ B such that whenever G ∋ b is B-generic, σ“G = Gq ⊆ G. This implies that
b ≤
∧
Gq.
q ≤ r =⇒
∧
Gq ≤
∧
Gr: If q ≤ r then Gr ⊆ Gq, so the desired result follows.
q ‖ r ⇐⇒
∧
Gq∧
∧
Gr 6= 0: For the forward direction, if s ≤ q, r then
∧
Gs ≤
∧
Gq∧
∧
Gr
since Gs ⊇ Gq, Gr. For the other direction, let
∧
Gq ∧
∧
Gr 6= 0. Then let Y 4 Lτ+ [A] with
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Y countable, Yq∪Yr ⊆ Y , and
∧
Gq∧
∧
Gr ∈ Y . Then letting X = Y ∩N we may construct
G ⊆ P that is X-generic, with
∧
Gq ∧
∧
Gr ∈ G. Then 〈X,G〉 ≤ q, r.
D = {
∧
Gq | q ∈ Q} is dense in P: Let b ∈ B. Let X 4 N with X countable and b ∈ X .
Then if G is X-generic and contains b, we have b ≥
∧
G and
∧
G ∈ D.
Theorem 2.2.15. If P is subcomplete and |P| = ω1, then P is weakly complete, and is thus
equivalent to a countably closed poset.
Proof. We may assume that P ⊆ ω1, and note that δ(P) ≤ ω1. Let θ verify the subcomplete-
ness of P, and suppose we are in the standard setup:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s for some s ∈ N .
Toward showing that P is complete, let G be P-generic over N . By subcompleteness, there
is p ∈ P so that whenever G ∋ p is P-generic, there is σ′ ∈ V [G] such that:
• σ′ : N ≺ N
• σ′(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s
• Sk N(ω1 ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N(ω1 ∪X)
• σ′“G ⊆ G.
Of course G ⊆ P and thus |G| = ωN1 . However, because cp(σ) = cp(σ
′) = ωN1 we have that
σ“G = σ′“G so below p we have σ“G ⊆ G as desired.
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2.2.2 Levels of Subcompleteness
The notion of subcompleteness above µ is an attempt to measure where exactly subcom-
pleteness kicks in; in some sense it tells you at what level the forcing fails to be complete.
The following definition is from Jensen [Jen09c, Chapter 2 p. 47].
Definition 2.2.16. Let µ be a cardinal. We say that a forcing notion P is subcomplete
above µ so long as for sufficiently large θ > µ, whenever we are in the standard setup,
where:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− with τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and and N is full
• σ(θ, µ,P, s) = θ, µ,P, s for some s ∈ N ;
then, for any G ⊆ P, there is p ∈ P such that whenever G ∋ p is P-generic, then there is
σ′ ∈ V [G] satisfying:
1. σ′ : N ≺ N
2. σ′(θ,P, s) = θ,P, s
3. Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N(δ ∪X)
4. σ′“G ⊆ G
5. σ′ ↾HNµ = σ ↾H
N
µ .
As usual, this means that in particular below the condition p there is an embedding σ′ that
lifts by 4 to an embedding σ′∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G] in V [G]. As usual we say that such θ as above
verifies the subcompleteness above µ of P, and we may say that P is subcomplete if
there is a θ that verifies its subcompleteness above µ. ⊣
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Immediately we have the following:
Proposition 2.2.17. If P is subcomplete, then P is subcomplete above ωN1 .
Proof. By Fact 1.2.1, we have that for any elementary embedding such as σ or σ′ from
countable N to N , σ′ ↾HNω1 = σ ↾H
N
ω1
= id.
Theorem 2.2.18. If P is subcomplete above µ then P does not add new countable subsets
of µ.
Proof. Suppose not. Let P be subcomplete above µ. Let B˙ ⊆ µ be countable with
p  f˙ : ωˇ ∼= B˙ ∧ f˙ /∈ V.
Take θ > µ large enough to verify the subcompleteness of P.
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where N is countable and full
• σ(θ, µ,P, p, B˙, f˙) = θ, µ,P, p, B˙, f˙ .
Let G be P-generic over N with p ∈ G. By the subcompleteness of P above µ there is p ∈ P
such that whenever p ∈ G where G is P-generic, there is σ′ ∈ V [G] satisfying:
1. σ′ : N ≺ N
2. σ′(θ, µ,P, p, B˙, f˙) = θ, µ,P, p, B˙, f˙
3. Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N(δ ∪X)
4. σ′“G ⊆ G
5. σ′ ↾ µ = σ ↾ µ.
CHAPTER 2. SUBCOMPLETE FORCING AND ITS RELATIVES 45
Let f = f˙
G
and f = f˙G. By 4 and 5, for each n,
f(n) = σ′(f(n)) = σ(f(n)),
meaning that f ∈ V since σ ∈ V , which is a contradiction.
Thus if P is subcomplete above µ, then µ’s cardinality, and even its cofinality, cannot be
altered to be ω via P.
Chapter 3
Properties of Subcomplete Forcing
We’ve seen that countably closed forcings are subcomplete. Countably closed forcings have
many nice properties: they preserve branches through ω1-trees, or any particular ♦-sequence.
Both may be framed as as Π11-statements, using the sequence or the tree as predicate. In
Section 3.1 we explore questions related to the interactions between subcomplete forcing and
various properties of trees of height ω1. Section 3.1 is inspired by the work of Fuchs [Fuc08],
where it is shown that the maximality principle for closed forcings (an axiom that we will
define in Section 4.1) implies countably closed-generic Σ12(Hω1)-absoluteness (defined below).
In fact, Fuchs defines the generic absoluteness notion for < κ-closed forcing, where κ is
regular. Since the idea was to look at whether there are analogous results for subcomplete
forcing, we define the more general notion, for reasonable forcing classes (what is meant by
reasonable is described in the beginning of Chapter 4), below.
Definition 3.0.1. Let n,m be natural numbers, let Γ be a class of forcing notions, and letM
be a transitive set (usually either ω1 or Hω1). Then Γ-generic Σ
m
n (M)-absoluteness with
parameters in S ⊆ P(M) is the statement that for any Σmn -sentence ϕ(a) where a ∈ S ∩M
and predicate symbols ~˙A, the following holds: Whenever ~A ∈ S ∩ P(M), P ∈ Γ, and G is
46
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P-generic over V , then
(〈M,∈, ~A〉 |= ϕ(a))V ⇐⇒ (〈M,∈, ~A〉 |= ϕ(a))V [G],
where ~˙A is meant to be interpreted in M as ~A, and the satisfaction is order m+ 1.
The case where S = P(M) is the boldface version, which we will denote Γ-generic
Σmn (M)-absoluteness . Without parameters is the lightface version, which we shall denote
Γ-generic Σmn (M)-absoluteness .
We will refer to a Σ12(Hω1)-property of some object in Hω1 that is subcomplete-generic
absolute as being sc-absolute, using the object as a parameter, and meaning that whether
or not subcomplete forcing was performed does not affect whether this property holds or
not. ⊣
As a first approximation answering whether or not subcomplete forcing is available for
a comparable absoluteness result, in an attempt to perhaps further concretely differentiate
results about subcomplete forcing from countably closed forcing, it was only natural to look at
whether subcomplete forcing preserves various examples of Σ12(Hω1) properties that we know
to be preserved by countably closed forcing. As we see in the following two sections, many
of the combinatorial properties and properties of ω1-trees that are preserved by countably
closed forcing are also preserved by subcomplete forcing.
3.1 Subcomplete Forcing and Trees
Before we talk about how subcomplete forcing interacts with trees, we should first introduce
some (hopefully) familiar terminology.
Definition 3.1.1.
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• A tree is a partial order T = 〈T,<T 〉 in which the predecessors of any node are well-
ordered and there is a unique minimal element called the root. We will tend to conflate
the tree with its underlying set.
• The height of a node t ∈ T is the order type of its predecessors. We write Tα for the
αth level of T , the set of nodes having height α. The height of a tree T , height(T ),
is the strict upper bound of the height of its nodes.
• We write T ↾ α for the subtree of T of nodes having height less than α. An ω1-tree
is a normal tree of height ω1 where all levels are countable. A tree of height ω1 is
normal if every node has (at least) two immediate successors, nodes on limit levels
are uniquely determined by their sets of predecessors, and every node has successors
on all higher levels up to ω1.
• We write Tt to denote the subtree of T consisting of the nodes s ∈ T with s ≥T t. For
nodes t ∈ T , by succT (t) we mean the set of successors s ≥T t in the tree.
• A branch b in T is a maximal linearly ordered subset of T , and the length of the
branch is its order type. By b(α) we mean the node on level α of the branch. We write
[T ] for the set of cofinal branches , those branches containing nodes on every level. If
t ∈ T is a node, then we write bt to mean the “branch” below t; bt = {s ∈ T | t ≥T s}.
• An ω1-tree is Aronszajn if it has no cofinal branches. Two nodes t and s in T are
compatible, written s ‖ t, if there is r ∈ T such that r ≥T t and r ≥T s. With trees,
this is the same as demanding that either s <T t, s >T t, or s = t, or that s and t
are comparable. Otherwise, they are incompatible, written s ⊥ t. An antichain in a
tree is a set of pairwise incompatible elements. A Suslin tree is an ω1-tree with no
uncountable antichain. When forcing with a tree, we reverse the order, so that stronger
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conditions are higher up in the tree. Consequently, Suslin trees are ccc as notions of
forcing. A Kurepa tree is an ω1-tree with ω2-many cofinal branches. ⊣
Countably closed forcing does not add cofinal branches through ω1-trees, so it is natural to
wonder whether other subcomplete forcing cannot do this either. Indeed, we see below that
no subcomplete forcing can add a branch through a ground model’s ω1-tree. Subcomplete
forcing clearly cannot add a new branch of height less than ω1, since subcomplete forcing
can’t add reals (Proposition 2.2.3). Below we show that subcomplete forcing cannot add
cofinal branches either.
Theorem 3.1.2. Let T be an ω1-tree. If P is subcomplete and G is P-generic then [T ] =
[T ]V [G].
Proof. Assume not. Let b˙ be a name for a new cofinal branch through T ⊆ Hω1; let p be a
condition forcing that b˙ is a new cofinal branch through Tˇ . Let θ verify the subcompleteness
of P, and let’s place ourselves in the standard setup:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, T , p, b˙) = θ,P, T, p, b˙.
Let α = ωN1 . By elementarity, we have that p forces b˙ to be a new cofinal branch over N . As
we construct a generic G for P over N , we will use the countability ofN to diagonalize against
all “branches” through the tree as seen on level α of the tree T in N , thereby obtaining a
contradiction. The dotted branch in the diagram below is what we wish to construct.
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T
α = ωN1 σ
T
α
ω1
Toward this end, enumerate the dense sets 〈Dn | n < ω〉 of P that belong to N . Also
denote the sequence of downward closures of nodes on level α of T , the “branches” through
T ↾α that extend to have nodes of higher height in T , as 〈bn | n < ω〉. Now define a sequence
of conditions of the form pn for n < ω that decide values of b˙ in T differently from bn. Ensure
along the way that for all n,
• pn+1 ∈ Dn and
• pn+1 ≤ pn.
The construction (in V ) may go as follows:
Let p0 := p ∈ N . For each n < ω, note that there must be two conditions p
0
n+1 ⊥ p
1
n+1,
both extending pn, that decide the value of the branch b˙ to differ on some value. This always
has to be possible since these conditions always extend p, that forces b˙ to be new. Say
p1n+1  xˇn ∈ b˙ and p
0
n+1  xˇn /∈ b˙. Let pn+1 be a condition in Dn extending p
1
n+1 if xn /∈ bn,
or a condition in Dn extending p
0
n+1 otherwise.
Let G be the generic filter generated by the 〈pn | n < ω〉, let b˙
G
= b. Since P is
subcomplete, there is a condition q ∈ P such that whenever G is P-generic with q ∈ G, by
subcompleteness we have σ′ ∈ V [G] such that:
• σ′ : N ≺ N
• σ′(θ,P, T , p, b˙) = θ,P, T, p, b˙
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• σ′“G ⊆ G.
So below q there is a lift σ∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G] extending σ′ with σ∗(b) = σ′(b˙)G = b˙G = b, and
σ∗(T ) = σ′(T )G = T . The point is that since p ∈ G, we have N [G] |= p ∈ G, so b is a branch
through T .
Furthermore, α is the critical point of the embedding σ∗. So below α the tree T , and
thus the branch b, is fixed. In particular, in N [G], b ↾ α = b. However, b was constructed so
as to not be equal to any of the bns, so it cannot be extended to become a branch through
T , since it can’t have a node on the αth level.
b
T
α = ωN1 σ
∗
b
T
α
ω1
This is a contradiction.
Immediately we see the following.
Corollary 3.1.3. Subcomplete forcing preserves the properties of being Aronszajn and the
property of failing to be Kurepa of an ω1-tree.
Further investigating the motivating question of whether sc-genericΣ12(Hω1)-absoluteness
follows from the maximality principle for subcomplete forcing, one might look at the count-
ably closed case in order to simulate the argument for subcompleteness. Fuchs’ argument
used the fact that Σ11(ω1)-statements are absolute for countably closed forcings. This is true
because countably closed forcings cannot add branches through wider trees (as in, trees with
larger levels than κ-trees), and because Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness can be formulated as stating
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that branches cannot be added through such “wider” Aronszajn trees. More precisely, we
define what is meant by a “wide” tree below:
Definition 3.1.4. Let κ and λ be cardinals. We shall say that T is a (κ,≤ λ)-tree if T
is a tree of height κ with levels of size less than or equal to λ. We shall refer to the size
restriction on the levels in the tree in the second coordinate as the tree’s width.
An Aronszajn (κ,≤ λ)-tree is a (κ,≤ λ)-tree with no cofinal branch. A Kurepa
(κ,≤ λ)-tree is a (κ,≤ λ)-tree with κ+-many cofinal branches. ⊣
With this terminology, we can state the following lemma, giving an equivalent character-
ization of Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness.
Lemma 3.1.5. Assume CH. A forcing notion P adds no new reals and no new cofinal
branches to an (ω1,≤ ω1)-Aronszajn tree if and only if Σ
1
1(ω1)-statements are absolute for
P.
Proof. Clearly if Σ11(ω1)-statements are absolute for P, then P adds no new reals and no new
branches to an (ω1,≤ ω1)-Aronszajn tree.
For the other direction, suppose that P adds no new reals, and no new branches to any
(ω1,≤ ω1)-Aronszajn trees. Since we are assuming CH, we may assume that P adds no new
branches to any (ω1,≤ 2ω)-trees. Let G ⊆ P be generic. Upward absoluteness between
V and V [G] clearly holds for existential statements. To show downward absoluteness, let
A ⊆ ω1, A ∈ V .
Let ψ(A) be the following statement:
∃X (ω1, A,X) |= ϕ(a),
where ϕ(a) is a first order sentence in the language of set theory using A and X as predicates,
and a < ω1. Suppose that ψ(A) is true in In V [G], as witnessed by X .
CHAPTER 3. PROPERTIES OF SUBCOMPLETE FORCING 53
Let T be the tree consisting of nodes of the form (α, x) such that x ⊆ α, and (α,A∩α, x) |=
ϕ(a), where the tree ordering is defined so that
(α, x) ≤ (β, y) ⇐⇒ (α,A ∩ α, x) 4 (β,A ∩ β, y).
By a standard Lowenheim-Skolem style argument, the set
C = {α < ω1 | (α,A ∩ α,X ∩ α) 4 (ω1, A,X)}
is club in V [G]. Thus the set {(α,X ∩ α) | α ∈ C} defines a cofinal branch through T in
V [G], since for all countable α, we have X ∩α ∈ V as P doesn’t add reals. Since additionally
P can’t add new branches to T , it follows that T has a cofinal branch, call it b, in V . Finally,
let
X ′ =
⋃
{x | ∃α < ω1 (α, x) ∈ b} .
Since (ω1, A,X
′) is the union of an elementary chain of models satisfying ϕ(a), it must also
satisfy ϕ(a) in V , and thus ψ(A) holds in V as witnessed by X ′ as desired.
Thus it is natural to ask whether subcomplete forcing can add cofinal branches to wider
Aronszajn trees, in order to see if absoluteness results similar to those for countably closed
forcing hold for subcomplete forcing.
Question 3.1.6. Can subcomplete forcing add cofinal branches to (ω1,≤ ω1)-Aronszajn
trees?
If we omit the requirement that the wider tree is Aronszajn, we already know of some
trees of height ω1 that subcomplete forcing adds branches to:
Proposition 3.1.7. Subcomplete (or even countably closed) forcing may add a cofinal branch
to an (ω1,≤ 2ω)-tree.
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Proof. The point here is that the poset Add (ω1, 1) is subcomplete since it is countably
closed, but it may be viewed as a tree of height ω1 that has levels up to and including size
2ω. Of course this tree is not Aronszajn, it is Kurepa. Every cofinal branch through the tree
corresponds to a subset of ω1, which there are already more than ω1-many of in the ground
model.
In general, countably closed forcing can’t add a (cofinal) branch to any (ω1,≤ κ)-
Aronszajn tree for cardinals κ.
If we allow the size of the levels of the height ω1-Aronszajn tree to be large, then we can
obtain a slightly more complicated example of a tree that subcomplete forcing does add a
cofinal branch to, using the forcing denoted by Jensen as PA. This forcing is designed to
force Friedman’s principle for A, where A is a stationary subset of cofinality ω points in ω2,
which we shall denote as A ⊆ ω2 ∩ cof(ω) stationary.
Definition 3.1.8. Let κ > ω1 be regular, and let A ⊆ κ ∩ cof(ω). We write PA to denote
the forcing designed to shoot a cofinal, normal sequence of order type ω1 through A. The
conditions of PA consist of normal functions of the form p : ν + 1 → A, where ν < ω1, and
extension is defined in the usual way, where p ≤ q if and only if q ⊆ p. If (ω2 ∩ cof(ω)) \ A
is stationary in ω2 ∩ cof(ω), then PA is not countably closed.
Then if G is PA-generic, ∪G : ω1 → A is normal and cofinal in κ.
The forcing PA is used to show that Friedman’s Principle holds under the subcomplete
forcing axiom SCFA , where Friedman’s Principle at a regular cardinal κ > ω1 states
that if A ⊆ κ is any stationary set of ω-cofinal ordinals, then there is a normal function
f : ω1 → A. ⊣
Fact 3.1.9 (Jensen). PA is subcomplete.
Proposition 3.1.10. Suppose that Friedman’s Principle fails for ω2. Then subcomplete
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forcing may add a cofinal branch to an (ω1,≤ ω2 · 2ω)-Aronszajn tree.
Proof. Let A ⊆ cof(ω) ∩ ω2 witness the failure of Friedman’s Prinicple, meaning that A is
stationary. Consider the forcing poset PA as a tree. It has size ω1 ·ωω2 = ω
ω
2 , since it consists
of functions with domain in ω1, and each condition is from a countable ordinal to ω2.
Considering PA as a tree, it has height ω1. Each level has size less than or equal to
ωω2 = ω2 · 2
ω. Moreover, since Friedman’s Principle fails, the tree PA has no cofinal branches
and is thus Aronszajn, yet forcing with the tree will of course add a cofinal branch.
However, we may slightly tweak the proof of Theorem 3.1.2 to see that the levels of
trees of height ω1 could have size less than 2
ω and subcomplete forcing adds no branches
through them, via virtually the same argument. The argument showing that countably
closed forcing adds no branches through such trees is more or less a counting argument; refer
to Fuchs [Fuc08] for details, the proof is attributed to Silver. In the case of subcompleteness,
we will obtain a contradiction by counting the number of possible generics that could add
new branches and seeing that there are too many possibilities, similar to what is done in the
countably closed case.
Theorem 3.1.11. Subcomplete forcing cannot add (cofinal) branches to (ω1, < 2
ω)-trees.
Proof. Assume not. Let b˙ be a name for a new branch through T ⊆ Hω1 an (ω1, < 2
ω)-tree;
let p be a condition forcing that b˙ is a new cofinal branch through Tˇ . Let θ verify the
subcompleteness of P and let’s place ourselves in the standard setup:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full.
• σ(θ,P, T , p, b˙) = θ,P, T, p, b˙.
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Let α = ωN1 , the critical point of the embedding σ. By elementarity, we have that p forces
b˙ to be a new branch over N . We will construct continuum-many generics Gr for P over N ,
indexed by reals, each of which will correspond to continuum-many different values of the
generic branch on level α of the tree T in N , to obtain a contradiction.
Toward this end, enumerate the dense sets 〈Dn | n < ω〉 of P that belong to N , so that
p ∈ D0.
We would like to construct binary trees of conditions in P and branches in T : P =
〈px | x ∈ 2
<ω〉, B = 〈bx | x ∈ 2<ω〉 such that, letting |x| be the length of x, we have the
following:
• px ∈ D|x|
• x ⊆ y =⇒ py ≤ px ≤ p
• for some β > |x|, px  b˙ ↾ βˇ = bx
• bx⌢〈0〉 6= bx⌢〈1〉.
To do this, let p0 := p ∈ N . As we noted in the proof of Theorem 3.1.2, there must be
two conditions q01 ⊥ q
1
1, both extending p0, that decide the value of the branch b˙ differently.
This always has to be true since these conditions extend p, that forces that there is a new
cofinal branch b˙. In particular, by our reasoning there is β < ω1, and two conditions q
0
1 ≤ p0
and q11 ≤ p0 such that
q01  b˙(β) = t
0 and q11  b˙(β) = t
1,
where t0 6= t1. Let b〈0〉 be the branch in T below t
0 and b〈1〉 be the branch in T below t
1. It
must be that b〈0〉 6= b〈1〉. Moreover we may extend q
0
1 and q
1
1 to conditions p〈0〉, p〈1〉 ∈ D1.
Continuing in such a fashion, we may recursively continue to define px for x ∈ 2
<ω.
In particular, suppose px and bx are defined for x of length n. By our reasoning above
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there is β > |x|, and two conditions above each px, such that q
0
x ≤ px and q
1
x ≤ px so that
q0x  b˙(β) = t
0 and q1x  b˙(β) = t
1,
where t0 6= t1. Let bx⌢〈0〉 be the branch in T below t
0 and bx⌢〈1〉 be the branch in T below
t1. Extending each of these incompatible conditions so as to land in the (n + 1)th dense
set, we find px⌢〈0〉 ≤ q
0
x and px⌢〈1〉 ≤ q
1
x such that px⌢〈0〉, px⌢〈1〉 ∈ Dn+1. Then, as desired,
for each x of length n we have that px⌢〈0〉, px⌢〈1〉 ∈ Dn+1. We’ve also designed it so that
px⌢〈1〉 ≤ px ≤ p and px⌢〈0〉 ≤ px ≤ p. Since we know that there is some m
′ such that
px  b˙ ↾m
′ = bx we know that px⌢〈1〉 and px⌢〈0〉 force the same thing since they both extend
px. Thus our construction gives us that px⌢〈0〉  b˙ ↾m = bx⌢〈0〉 and px⌢〈1〉  b˙ ↾m
′ = bx.
So we have our binary trees P and B as desired. Any chain of conditions in the binary
tree P will generate a generic filter Gr; every real r : ω → 2 codes a path in the binary tree
of conditions generating the generic. This is because our conditions were chosen to meet all
of the dense sets in our list. Moreover, each generic filter Gr corresponds to a branch br,
where for each initial segment t of r satisfies that for some β > |x|, br ↾m = bx. Because of
how we chose P , this gives us that
N [G] |= b˙
G
= br.
For each r let b˙
Gr
= br. Since P is subcomplete, for each r there is a condition qr ∈ P
such that whenever G is P-generic with qr ∈ G, by subcompleteness we have σr ∈ V [G] such
that:
• σr : N ≺ N
• σr(θ,P, T , p, b˙) = θ,P, T, p, b˙
• σr“Gr ⊆ G.
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So below each qr there is a lift σ
∗
r : N [Gr] ≺ N [G] extending σr with σ
∗
r(br) = σr(b˙)
G = b˙G =
br, and σ
∗
r(T ) = σr(T )
G = T .
This means that we may force over N with P to obtain continuum many cofinal branches
through the tree, 〈br | r ∈ 2ω〉. Each of these branches must, of course, have a node on level
α. Since each cofinal branch br is unique, and since α is the critical point, this means that
there are 2ω-many nodes on level α of the tree T in N , a contradiction.
Corollary 3.1.12. The property of being Aronszajn of (ω1, < 2
ω)-trees is sc-absolute.
Thus if 2ω = ω2, this result is optimal in the sense that it answers Question 3.1.6 in the
affirmative.
3.1.1 Suslin Tree Preservation
As we saw in Theorem 3.1.2, ground-model Aronszajn trees are preserved by subcomplete
forcing. Using a slightly different method than that of the previous theorems, Jensen shows
in [Jen09b, Chapter 3 p. 10] that ground-model Suslin trees are also preserved by subcomplete
forcing. We give the proof below.
Fact 3.1.13 (Jensen). Subcomplete forcing preserves the property of being Suslin of ω1-
trees.
Proof. Let T be a Suslin tree. Let P be subcomplete. Suppose toward a contradiction that
p ∈ P forces that A˙ is a maximal antichain of size ω1. Let θ verify the subcompleteness of P
and as usual we place ourselves in the standard setup:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− with τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, T , p, A˙) = θ,P, T, p, A˙.
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Letting α = ωN1 , we have that T = T ↾ α as usual. Let M be a countable, transitive ZFC
−
model with both N, T ↾ (α + 1) ∈ M . Let G ⊆ P be generic over M with p ∈ G. So G is
also generic over N .
We can now work below a condition in G ⊆ P generic to obtain a σ′ ∈ V [G] such that:
• σ′ : N ≺ N
• σ′(θ,P, T , p, A˙) = θ,P, T, p, A˙
• σ′“G ⊆ G.
As usual we have a lift σ∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G]. Letting A = A˙
G
and A˙G = A we have that
σ∗(A) = A. Let 〈bt | t ∈ Tα〉 be the collection of partial branches below the nodes of level α
of the tree T .
Every node in T above level α has to have a predecessor in level α. For each t ∈ Tα, G
is P-generic over N [bt] since bt is T -generic over N - as cofinal branches through Suslin trees
are generic. By the product lemma, each bt is T -generic over N [G]. Since A is maximal,
bt ∩ A 6= ∅. Thus A is sealed in T = T ↾ α, meaning it has no elements above level α. But
since A ⊆ A and A is maximal, this means that A is countable, so T remains Suslin as
desired.
Immediately we have the following:
Corollary 3.1.14. The property of being Suslin of ω1-trees is sc-absolute.
The previous theorem of course also shows that forcing with a Suslin tree is not sub-
complete, even though it does not add a real. This is yet another example showing that
subcomplete forcing is not the same as countably distributive forcing. Furthermore, this
gives us the following, which was observed by Miha Habicˇ:
Corollary 3.1.15. Nontrivial ccc forcings are not subcomplete.
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Proof. Suppose instead toward a contradiction that P is both ccc and subcomplete. By
subcompleteness, P does not add a real, making P countably distributive (meaning it doesn’t
add countable sequences of ordinals). This is because ccc forcing notions have the countable
covering property: supposing instead P adds a countable sequence of ordinals, this sequence
can be covered by a countable set in the ground model. But using this cover, the new set
of ordinals can be coded as a new real. This contradicts the assumption that no reals are
added. Thus P doesn’t add countable sequences of ordinals, and is countably distributive.
But ccc countably distributive forcings are also known as Suslin algebras, which always
add a branch to to some Suslin tree 1, so P can’t be subcomplete.
Moreover, the method of proof showing that Suslin trees are preserved is optimal in the
sense that maximal antichains of ω1 trees are not necessarily preserved. Indeed the proof
seems to rely on the fact that the tree is Suslin, in particular using the fact that cofinal
branches through Suslin trees are always generic.
Proposition 3.1.16. If T is an ω1-tree that is not Suslin, then Add (ω1, 1) adds a new
maximal antichain to T . Indeed, any forcing adding a new subset to ω1 will add a new
maximal antichain to T .
Proof. Let A = {aα | α < ω1} be a maximal antichain in T . Let G ⊆ ω1 be Add (ω1, 1)-
generic. Let A′ = {aα | α /∈ G} ∪ {t ∈ T | ∃α ∈ G t ∈ succT (aα)}. Then A′ is a maximal
antichain in T and as we have that G = {α < ω1 | aα /∈ A′}, it must be that A′ /∈ V .
At this point one might wonder exactly how robust Suslin trees really are under sub-
complete forcing. Suppose that T is a Suslin tree. Then the following theorem shows that
not only is it the case that T is still Suslin after any subcomplete forcing, and not only are
there no new cofinal branches added to T , but even after forcing with T in a subcomplete
1This is stated in Jech [Jec02] after Definition 30.19.
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extension, there are no more branches than if you had forced with T without the presence
of the subcomplete forcing to begin with.
Theorem 3.1.17. If T is a Suslin tree and P is subcomplete, then [T ]V
P×T
= [T ]V
T
. In
other words, subcomplete forcing doesn’t add to the collection of generic branches through
ground-model Suslin trees.
Proof. Suppose not. Let T be a Suslin tree. Let P be subcomplete. Let b¨ be a P-name for a
Tˇ -name for a new branch through T and suppose we have p ∈ P, t ∈ T satisfying:
p P
(
tˇ Tˇ
(
b¨ ∈ [Tˇ ] ∧ b¨ /∈ [Tˇ ]Vˇ [ΓTˇ ]
))
where ΓTˇ is a (P-name for a) Tˇ -name for a generic branch for Tˇ . In other words, whenever
G × b ⊆ P × T is generic with 〈p, t〉 ∈ G × b we have that (b¨G)b ∈ [T ]V [G][b] \ [T ]V [b]. Let θ
verify the subcompleteness of P, and let’s get ourselves into the standard setup:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− with τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, T , p, b¨, t) = θ,P, T, p, b¨, t.
Let α = ωN1 , the critical point of σ. We have T = T ↾ α as usual.
Additionally by elementarity, we have that p satisfies the same property as the condition
p does but relativized to N :
p P
(
tˇ 
Tˇ
(
b¨ ∈ [Tˇ ] ∧ b¨ /∈ [Tˇ ]Vˇ [ΓˇT ]
))
Let ~b = 〈bn | n < ω〉 enumerate the branches below nodes on the αth level of T , chosen so
that t ∈ b0. Let 〈Dn | n < ω〉 enumerate the dense subsets of P in N .
CHAPTER 3. PROPERTIES OF SUBCOMPLETE FORCING 62
Again the idea is to carefully construct a generic G ⊆ P over N by diagonalizing against
branches in ~b. We construct a ≤P-sequence 〈pn | n < ω〉 satisfying, for each n < ω:
1. pn ∈ Dn
2. In N , pn P
(
tˇ′ 
Tˇ
b¨(γˇ) 6= ( ˇbn(γ))
)
, for some γ < α and t′ ∈ b0, σ(t′) = t
′ ≥T t. In
other words, pn forces that the canonical name for t
′ forces the value of the generic
branch to be different from one of the “branches” in our list in N .
In order to inductively define such a sequence ~p, let’s suppose pm have been defined for
m < n. To get pn, choose qn below each pm for all m < n, satisfying qn ∈ Dn.
As T is Suslin in N and cofinal branches are generic over Suslin trees, we have that
N [b0] forms a generic extension over N . Let G0, G1 be mutually P-generic over N [b0] so that
p, qn ∈ G0 ∩G1. Since both T ,P ∈ N we have that for i = 0, 1;
N [b0][Gi] = N [Gi][b0].
For i = 0, 1 let ci = (b¨
Gi
)b0 .
Since for each i, the condition p ∈ Gi and t ∈ b0, both of the ci are cofinal branches
through T and ci 6= b0 by our inductive assumption of item 2 since namely qn ≤ p0. It
follows from the mutual genericity of G0 and G1 that c0 6= c1; otherwise, suppose that
c = c0 = c1. Then we’d have
c ∈ N [G0][b0] ∩N [G1][b0] = N [b0][G0] ∩N [b0][G1] = N [b0]
so c ∈ [T ]V [b0], a contradiction.
So let c ∈ {c0, c1} be such that c 6= bn. Thus we may choose γ < α so that the value of c
on level α is not the same as bn(γ). Then this holds in some N [Gi][b0], and we can obtain a
condition pn ≤ qn forcing this.
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Now let G ⊆ P be generic over N , generated by ~p. We can from now on work below a
condition in G ⊆ P generic to obtain a σ′ ∈ V [G] such that:
• σ′ : N ≺ N
• σ′(θ,P, T , p, b¨, t) = θ,P, T, p, b¨, t.
• σ′“G ⊆ G.
As usual we have a lift σ∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G]. Now let c be T -generic over V [G], with t ∈ c, so
that b0 ⊆ c. Then (b¨G)c = b is a cofinal branch and c 6= b as before. So we have that for all
n, there is γ < α such that N [G][c] |= b(γ) 6= bn(γ), a contradiction.
The previous result yields the following result on Suslin trees with the unique branch
property. The unique branch property is explored in more detail by Hamkins and Fuchs
[FH09]. We give the definition here.
Definition 3.1.18. A normal ω1-tree T has the unique branch property (ubp) so long
as
1 T “Tˇ has exactly one new cofinal branch.”
That is, after forcing with the tree, T has exactly one cofinal branch that was not in the
ground model. ⊣
Theorem 3.1.19. Subcomplete forcing preserves the ubp of Suslin trees.
Proof. Let T be a normal Suslin tree with the ubp. Let P be subcomplete. Let b¨ be a P-name
for a T -name so that there is p ∈ P, t ∈ T satisfying:
p P
(
tˇ Tˇ “b¨ is a cofinal branch different from the canonical Tˇ -generic branch”
)
.
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In other words, P adds a new cofinal branch through the tree, so that
[T ]V
T
6= [T ]V
P×T
,
contradicting Theorem 3.1.17.
Corollary 3.1.20. The unique branch property of Suslin trees is sc-absolute.
We have seen that after subcomplete forcing, the set of generic branches through a Suslin
tree, obtained via forcing with the tree, is not effected. What about the set of maximal
antichains? We see below that the property of being Suslin off the generic branch is also
sc-absolute. This is another property of Suslin trees that has been explored by Hamkins and
Fuchs [FH09].
Definition 3.1.21. A Suslin tree is Suslin off the generic branch so long as after forcing
with T to add a generic branch b, for any node t not in b, the tree Tt remains Suslin. ⊣
Theorem 3.1.22. The property of being Suslin off the generic branch is sc-absolute. In
other words, if T is a Suslin tree that is also Suslin off the generic branch, then T is still
Suslin off the generic branch after subcomplete forcing.
Proof. Let P be subcomplete, and suppose that the desired result fails. Let p ∈ P, with
t, t′ ∈ T incompatible, and A¨ a P-name for a T -name, so that p forces that t forces that A¨
is a maximal antichain in Tˇt′ and that |A¨| = ωˇ1. Let θ verify the subcompleteness of P, and
assume we are in the following situation:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− with τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,P, T , A¨, t, t′, p) = θ,P, T, A¨, t, t′, p.
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Let α = ωN1 , of course α = cp(σ).
LetM be a countable, transitive ZFC− model, withN, T ↾(α+1) ∈M so that {bu | u ∈ T (α)} ⊆
M .
Let G ⊆ P be M-generic for P with p ∈ G. By subcompleteness we can from now on
work below a condition in G ⊆ P generic to obtain an elementary embedding σ′ ∈ V [G] such
that:
• σ′ : N ≺ N
• σ′(θ,P, T , A¨, t, t′, p) = θ,P, T, A¨, t, t′, p
• σ′“G ⊆ G.
As usual we have a lift σ∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G], and we have T = T ↾ α.
Let u ∈ T (α) be above the node t in the tree, such that bu ∈ M is a branch through
T = T ↾ α. Since N |= “T is Suslin”, it follows that bu is T -generic over N , since cofinal
branches through Suslin trees are generic.
Let b ⊆ T be generic over V [G], with u ∈ b. Then bu ⊆ b. Let A = (A¨
G
)bu . Then
N [G][bu] |= “A is a maximal antichain in T t′ of size ω1.”
This is by elementarity, as p ∈ G. Indeed, letting A = (A¨G)b, we have that (A∩ T ) ↾ α = A.
But the same can be done for t′; let u′ ∈ T (α), with u′ above t′ in the tree. Then bu′ ∈M .
So G is P-generic over N [bu][bu′ ] since both are in M . Moreover, bu and bu′ are mutually
T -generic over N , since
N |= “T is Suslin off the generic branch.”
Thus bu′ is T t′-generic over N [bu][G] = N [G][bu].
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But A is a maximal antichain in T t′ andA ∈ N [G][bu], so A∩bu′ 6= ∅. Thus {bu′ | u′ ∈ Tt′(α)}
seals A in Tt′ ; meaning that A is bounded in the tree by level α, which makes it countable.
Thus by the maximality of A and A, it must be that A is also countable, a contradiction.
Definition 3.1.23. Let n be a natural number. A Suslin tree T is n-fold Suslin off the
generic branch if after forcing with with the tree n times, or forcing with T n that adds n
branches b1, . . . , bn, then Tp remains Suslin for any p not on any bi. ⊣
It follows, by a similar argument to Theorem 3.1.22, that the property of an ω1-tree of
being n-fold Suslin off the generic branch is sc-absolute.
3.2 Iterating Subcomplete Forcing
The two-step iteration of subcomplete forcings is subcomplete, as is shown by Jensen [Jen14,
Chapter 4]:
Fact 3.2.1 (Jensen). If P is subcomplete and P “Q˙ is subcomplete”, then P ∗ Q˙ is sub-
complete.
However, we can see now from previous results that the converse does not hold for sub-
complete forcing, even though the converse does hold for countably closed forcing. Namely,
we have the following:
Proposition 3.2.2. Suppose that P ∗ Q˙ is subcomplete. Then it is not necessarily true that
P “Q˙ is subcomplete”, even if P is subcomplete.
Proof. Let P be the forcing to add a Suslin tree, where the conditions are normal subtrees
of successor height. Let T˙ denote the forcing that adds a branch through the tree added by
P (forcing with the tree). By a result of Kunen, which is explained in detail by Gitman and
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Welch [GW11, Lemma 6.11], we have that there is a countably closed forcing Q such that:
π : Q −→ P ∗ T˙ is a dense embedding.
Recall that by Proposition 2.2.11, since Q is countably closed and thus subcomplete
(indeed, Q is complete), we have that P ∗ T˙ is thus also subcomplete. (However it is not
countably closed, as countably closed forcings aren’t preserved under dense embeddings.)
In particular, we have a scenario in which P ∗ T˙ is subcomplete but it is not the case that
P “T˙ is subcomplete”, since as we have seen earlier with Fact 3.1.13, forcing with a Suslin
tree is never subcomplete.
For infinite iterations of subcomplete forcing we use revised countable support, which is
required to get a sensible iteration theory. If we used only purely countable support and,
for example, if Namba forcing was involved in the iteration, then the cofinality of ω2 would
become ω and reals would be added at stages of cofinality ω2, making the iteration not
subcomplete by Proposition 2.2.3. Indeed, revised countable support has been used to
iterate Namba forcing, which is semiproper under CH. Revised countable support iterations
were originally invented by Shelah, but the definition worked with by Jensen is due to Donder,
and works with iterations of complete Boolean algebras.
Definition 3.2.3. A sequence B = Bκ = 〈Bα | α < κ〉 is an iteration of complete Boolean
algebras so long as Bα ⊆ Bβ for α ≤ β < α and for limit ordinals λ < κ we have that
Bλ is a complete Boolean algebra generated by
⋃
α<λ Bα. By a thread in B we mean a
sequence b = 〈bα | α < λ〉 in B such that bβ ∈ Bβ \ {0} and for α ≤ β < κ we have that
bα =
∧
{a ∈ Bα | bβ ≤ a}.
A revised countable support iteration (rcs iteration) considers revised countable
threads, such that for each thread b and for every limit stage λ ≤ κ, we have that either the
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support of b is bounded in λ or the cofinality of the limit stage is collapsed to ω, i.e., there
is α < λ with bα Bα cof(λˇ) = ωˇ. The rcs limit is then defined as is done for inverse limits,
using rcs threads, and an rcs iteration uses the rcs limit at all limit points. ⊣
I will not give the proof here, but Jensen [Jen14, Chapter 4] shows that the iteration
theorem for subcomplete forcing holds, if rcs is used. Here we state it for forcing notions
instead of Boolean algebras.
Fact 3.2.4 (Subcomplete Iteration Theorem). Let P = Pκ = 〈(Pα, Q˙α) | α < κ〉 be an
rcs-iteration such that for all α < κ:
1. Pα Q˙α is subcomplete.
2. Pα+1 δ(Pˇα) ≤ ω1
Then P is subcomplete.
The following is a consequence of Proposition 16.30 from Jech’s Set Theory [Jec02]:
Fact 3.2.5. Let κ be inaccessible. Let P = Pκ = 〈(Pα, Q˙α) | α < κ〉 be an rcs-iteration
such that each Pα has the κ-cc. Let Gα be Pα-generic, and let G = Gκ. Then if X ⊆ κ and
|X| < κ in V [G], we have that X ∈ V [Gβ] for some β < κ.
Proof sketch. This is because Pκ satisfies the κ-chain condition, by a ∆-system argument.
The following defintion is a kind of blueprint for the sort of iterations we will be using in
the following chapter. We will want to force various axioms and principles about subcomplete
forcing, which will require the use of a specific large cardinal. The following definition is
specifically useful when forcing SCFA from a supercompact cardinal.
Definition 3.2.6. Suppose P is a proposition about subcomplete forcing that we would
like to show is consistent relative to ZFC. Let κ be inaccessible. The subcomplete least-
counterexample to P lottery sum rcs iteration of length κ is of the form: P = Pκ =
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〈(Pα, Q˙α) | α < κ〉, a revised countable support iteration of length κ, defined so that at
stage α, letting P be the collection of subcomplete forcing posets in V Pα of minimal rank
for which the proposition P fails, we take
Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α ∗ Coll (ω1, |Pα|) where Q˙α is a term for the lottery sum ⊕P. ⊣
Due to Lemma 2.2.10 we have that lottery sums of subcomplete forcings are subcom-
plete, so it follows that subcomplete least-counterexample lottery sum rcs-iterations of length
κ are subcomplete.
Lemma 3.2.7. Let κ be inaccessible. Then nontrivial subcomplete least-counterexample
lottery sum rcs-iterations of length κ collapse κ to be ω2. Moreover, these iterations will
force CH.
Proof. It is dense in the nontrivial lottery sum poset to collapse cardinals between ω1 and
κ to be ω1, since this is done for every subcomplete poset of throughout the iteration by
definition.
Meanwhile, ω1 cannot be collapsed by subcomplete forcing. Subcomplete least-counterexample
lottery sum rcs-iterations will force CH to hold in the extension, since at some point CH will
be forced by the collapse forcing, but since no reals are added by subcomplete forcing, this
CH will remain true after that point.
Many results are comparable to those for proper and semiproper forcing. The difference
is that with subcomplete iterations, we will obviously never choose Cohen forcing - indeed
no Cohen reals will ever appear since the whole iteration is itself subcomplete.
Chapter 4
Axioms about Subcomplete Forcing
In this chapter we will discuss various axioms about subcomplete forcing. Forcing axioms
and bounded forcing axioms are well known. As subcomplete forcing axioms have been
already explored elsewhere in Jensen [Jen09b], [Jen14] and Fuchs [Fuc16], they will not
be the focus of our discussion. We dive more deeply into comparing and contrasting the
subcomplete maximality principle and the subcomplete resurrection axiom in the next few
sections. In particular, we would like to compare the axioms for subcomplete forcing to those
for countably closed forcing, in order to further elucidate the differences between properties
of these forcing classes.
In the following we will let Γ be a class of notions of forcing that is defined by some
formula ψΓ(x, p), where p is a parameter. We will generally refer to the classes that contain
trivial forcing and that have a two-step iteration theorem as reasonable. Specifically we
will be concerned mainly with the class of subcomplete forcing, but we may sometimes be
interested in countably closed forcing. Of course one may also consider forcing classes such
as ccc, properness, semiproperness, etc.
We shall write SCFA to stand for the subcomplete forcing axiom FAsc, or FAΓ where Γ =
{P | P is subcomplete} . Much like SPFA and PFA, the subcomplete forcing axiom SCFA may
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be forced from the existence of a supercompact cardinal. Jensen [Jen14] gives a Baumgartner-
style argument for this.
Fact 4.0.1 (Jensen). If there is a supercompact cardinal κ, then there is a forcing extension
satisfying SCFA.
As Jensen elaborates, SCFA has some similarities to SPFA and MM since it implies Fried-
man’s Principle (discussed in Section 3.1).
Another well-known axiom about forcing is the bounded forcing axiom. Bounded forcing
axioms were introduced by Martin Goldstern and Saharon Shelah [GS95].
Definition 4.0.2. The Bounded Forcing Axiom for a class of forcing notions Γ, denoted
BFAΓ, states that for any forcing P ∈ Γ and A, a collection of maximal antichains of P such
that |A| = ω1 and furthermore for all A ∈ A we have |A| ≤ ℵ1, there exists a A-generic filter
on P - meaning that there is a filter G ⊆ P meeting every antichain in A. ⊣
It is useful to give characterizations of the bounded forcing axiom in terms of generic
absoluteness, which has been given by Bagaria [Bag00, Theorem 5]. The following charac-
terization will be useful to keep in mind throughout the next few sections, since both the
resurrection axiom and the maximality principle have connections to different characteriza-
tions of the bounded forcing axiom.
Fact 4.0.3 (Bagaria). For a class of forcing notions Γ, the following are equivalent:
1. BFAΓ
2. For every P ∈ Γ, G ⊆ P generic, Hω2 4Σ1 H
V [G]
ω2 .
3. Γ-generic Σ1(Hω2)-absoluteness.
1
1See Definition 3.0.1.
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We shall write BSCFA to stand for BFAΓ where Γ = {P | P is subcomplete} .
The consistency strength of the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom is exactly that of a
reflecting cardinal, shown by Fuchs [Fuc16].
Definition 4.0.4. A regular cardinal κ is reflecting so long as for any formula ϕ(x) and
any a ∈ Hκ, if there is a cardinal θ > κ with Hθ |= ϕ(a), then there is a cardinal γ < κ with
a ∈ Hγ and Hγ |= ϕ(a). ⊣
Fact 4.0.5 (Fuchs). The axiom BSCFA is equiconsistent (over ZFC) with the existence of
a reflecting cardinal.
A key ingredient in showing that the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom is equiconsistent
with a reflecting cardinal is the following fact about the definition of subcomplete forcing,
Fact 4.0.6 (Fuchs). The statement “P is subcomplete” is expressible by a Σ2-formula.
4.1 The Maximality Principle
The Maximality Principle (MP) was originally defined by Stavi and Va¨a¨na¨nen [SV02] for the
class of ccc forcings. Maximality principles were defined in full generality by Hamkins [Ham03],
and expanded upon for different classes of forcing notions by Fuchs [Fuc08], [Fuc09], and
Leibman [Lei].
One motivation behind maximality principles is their connection to modal logic. In the
realm of set theory, as introduced by Hamkins [Ham03], one interprets “possible” as force-
able, or true in some forcing extension, and “necessary” as true in every forcing extension.
Maximality principles have a strong connection to the Euclidean frame condition, which
posits that if a statement is possible then it is necessarily possible. In modal terms, using
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the necessary (✷) and possible (♦) modal operators, this would state that for a sentence ϕ,
♦ϕ =⇒ ✷♦ϕ.
Assuming the modal theory S4, which requires some basic conditions on the language, like
the duality between ✷ and ♦, by taking the contrapositive, the Euclidean frame condition
is equivalent to adding the frame condition stating that if a sentence is possibly necessary,
then it is necessary, i.e.:
♦✷ϕ =⇒ ✷ϕ.
Modulo S4, these two frame conditions are equivalent, so I will refer to them interchange-
ably as the Euclidean frame condition. Adding the Euclidean frame condition to S4 yields
the modal theory S5. Since Hamkins and Leibman were exploring the realm of models of
set theory as Kripke models, with the accessibility relation given by the forcing extension
relation, it was naturally asked whether S5 would be satisfied. It is not hard to see that S4
is satisfied in this realm. Moreover, if trivial forcing is available, if a sentence ϕ is necessary,
it must be true in the trivial forcing extension, and is therefore true. The Euclidean frame
condition was simplified to the following, coined as The Maximality Principle (MP):
♦✷ϕ =⇒ ϕ.
We have just shown that if the Euclidean frame condition holds in the realm of models of
set theory with the forcing extension relation, so does MP. In fact, the two axioms are
equivalent while considering any class of forcings including trivial forcings. To see why the
other direction holds, suppose ♦✷ϕ holds for a sentence ϕ, i.e. ϕ may be forced in such a way
so as to hold in every further forcing extension. This is equivalent to saying that ✷ϕ can be
forced to hold in every forcing extension. Since under S4 it is clear that ♦✷ϕ =⇒ ♦✷(✷ϕ),
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and since MP holds, ♦✷(✷ϕ) =⇒ ✷ϕ, putting this together we arrive at one of our
equivalent formulations of the Euclidean frame conditions: ♦✷ϕ =⇒ ✷ϕ as desired.
We give the precise definition below, where the maximality principle is restricted to a par-
ticular class of forcings, thus enabling us to define the axiom restricted to only subcomplete
forcings.
Definition 4.1.1. Let Γ be a class of notions of forcing that is defined by some formula
ψΓ(x, p), where p is a parameter. In cascaded modal operator useages, this ψΓ(x, p) is to be
evaluated in the forcing extensions.
We say that a sentence ϕ(a) is Γ-forceable if there is P ∈ Γ such that for every q ∈ P,
we have that q  ϕ(a). In other words, a statement is Γ-forceable if it is forced to be true
in an extension by a forcing from Γ.
A sentence ϕ(a) is Γ-necessary if for all P ∈ Γ and all q ∈ P, we have that q  ϕ(a). So
a sentence is Γ-necessary if it holds in any forcing extension by a forcing notion from Γ. If
Γ contains the trivial forcing then being Γ-necessary implies that ϕ(a) is true.
If S is a term in the language of set theory, then MPΓ(S) is the scheme of formulae
stating that every sentence with parameters from S that is Γ-forceably Γ-necessary, i.e., the
sentence “ϕ(a) is Γ-necessary” is Γ-forceable, is true.
Let ✷MPΓ(S) be the necessary form of the principle itself, stating that MPΓ(S) holds in
every forcing extension obtained by a forcing notion in Γ. ⊣
Here we focus on the maximality principle for subcomplete forcing notions. We are
especially interested in comparing the subcomplete maximality principle to that for countably
closed forcings. The maximality principle for closed forcings, (including countably closed)
was explored by Fuchs [Fuc08], and we use many of the same techniques and results used
there.
We write MP
sc
to stand for MPΓ where Γ = {P | P is subcomplete}, and MP<ω1-closed
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in the case where Γ = {P | P is countably closed}. From our previous comments, since
both of these classes of forcings Γ contain trivial forcing, MPΓ is equivalent to one of our
characterizations of the Euclidean frame condition in this context, which would state that
every sentence that is Γ-forceably Γ-necessary is Γ-necessary.
Before moving on, it should be noted that since the maximality principle is a scheme, it
does not technically make sense to write MPΓ =⇒ P for some proposition P in the language
of set theory. When something like this is written, it should be interpreted as saying instead
ZFC+MPΓ ⊢ P .
First we analyze the parameter set S that may be allowed in the definition. As in the
case where we consider MP<ω1-closed as in [Fuc08], the natural parameter set to use in our
case, when considering subcomplete forcing, is Hω2. The next lemma follows Fuchs [Fuc08,
Theorem 2.4].
Lemma 4.1.2. The subcomplete maximality principle cannot be consistently strengthened
by allowing parameters that aren’t in Hω2. In particular,
MP
sc
(S) =⇒ S ⊆ Hω2.
Proof. The point is that for any set a, it is sc-forceably sc-necessary for a ∈ Hω2 . Indeed,
after forcing with Coll (ω1,TC({a})), which is subcomplete since it is countably closed, we
have that a ∈ Hω2 in the forcing extension. This must remain true in every further forcing
extension. Thus, if MP
sc
({a}) holds, it follows that a ∈ Hω2 .
Of course the same proof works for countably closed forcing, since the only forcing con-
sidered was the collapse forcing to ω1, which is also countably closed.
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4.1.1 Consistency of the Maximality Principle
In order to show the consistency of the maximality principle for subcomplete forcing, we use
a proof technique that adapts arguments of Hamkins [Ham03, Lemma 1.22]. Hamkins has
described the proof as “running through the house and turning on all the lights”, in the sense
that the posets that are forced are those that push “buttons”, sentences that can be “switched
on” and stay on, in all forcing extensions. We will adopt the “button” terminology in the
following, where a button in our case is a sentence ϕ(a) that is sc-forceably sc-necessary.2
We show that the subcomplete maximality principle holds in a forcing extension, assum-
ing there is a regular cardinal δ satisfying Vδ 4 V . As Hamkins [Ham03] discusses in detail,
the existence of a regular cardinal δ such that Vδ 4 V is a scheme of formulas sometimes
referred to as the “Le´vy scheme,” and is equiconsistent with the statement that “Ord is
Mahlo”: the scheme insisting that every definable closed unbounded class of ordinals con-
tain a regular cardinal. We will also refer to the Le´vy scheme as positing the existence of
what we refer to as a fully reflecting cardinal.
Theorem 4.1.3. Let δ be fully reflecting. Then there is a subcomplete iteration P of length
δ such that whenever G ⊆ P is generic, we have that δ = ω2 in the extension and:
V [G] |= MP
sc
(Hω2).
Proof. First note that δ must be inaccessible since it is regular and Vδ 4 V .
Define the δ-length subcomplete lottery sum rcs-iteration P = Pδ as follows: for α < δ
let
Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α ∗ Coll (ω1, |Pα|),
where Q˙α is a Pα-name for the lottery sum of all minimal rank posets that force some
2Here one might imagine that the buttons are as you find in an elevator or crosswalk, where once the
button is pushed it may not be subsequently undone by pushing it again, like an “on/off” button.
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sentence to be sc-necessary. In particular, let Φ be the collection of sentences ϕ(a) that use
parameters from H
V
Pα
δ
ω2 such that:
V Pαδ |= “ϕ(a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary.”
So Φ is the set of all possible buttons available at stage α. Define Q˙α =
⊕
ϕ(a)∈ΦQ where:
Q =
{
Q˙ ∈ V Pαδ | In V
Pα
δ , Q˙ is of least rank such that Q˙ is sc and forces ‘ϕ(a) is sc-necessary.’
}
Since we will want the full iteration P to remain relatively small in size and to have the δ-cc,
notice that here we insist that the parameters for our sentences come from a fragment HPαω2
of the universe Vδ, up to the stage we are in. We have also ensured that this iteration is
always defined, since for any name for a set a˙ in V Pαδ the sentence “|a˙| = ω1” is sc-forceably
sc-necessary.
Now suppose that G ⊆ P is generic over V . Let’s see that V [G] |= MP
sc
(Hω2). Assume
ϕ(x) and a ∈ Hω2 satisfies:
V [G] |= “ϕ(a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary.”
Let p ∈ G force that ϕ(a˙) is sc-forceably sc-necessary.
Since P has the δ-cc, at no stage in the iteration could δ be collapsed. This means that
there has to be some stage where the parameter a appears. This is given by Theorem 3.2.5:
a can be coded as a subset of ω1 and thus has size less than δ. So there is some earliest
stage in the iteration, say α < δ, where a is in V [Gα] and so that α is larger than the
support of the condition p, which forced ϕ(a) to be a button. This implies that ϕ(a) is an
available button at stage α, since after the rest of the subcomplete iteration Ptail, ϕ(a) is
sc-forceably sc-necessary, so already ϕ(a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary at this stage. Since
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Vδ[Gα] 4 V [Gα], as Pα is a bounded part of the iteration satisfying Pα ∈ Vδ, we have:
Vδ[Gα] |= “ϕ(a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary” as well. Moreover, ϕ(a) remains a button past
the support of p. Thus it is dense, in P, for ϕ(a) to be “pushed” at some point after stage
α, say β. In other words, there is a β < δ such that there is a least rank subcomplete Q
forcing ϕ(a) to be sc-necessary in Vδ[Gβ]. Let H ⊆ Q be generic over V [Gβ] so that there is
some Gtail generic for the rest of the forcing satisfying V [Gβ][H ][Gtail] = V [G]. The sentence
ϕ(a) is now sc-necessary in Vδ[Gβ][H ]. But then since Vδ[Gβ ][H ] 4 V [Gβ][H ], this means
that ϕ(a) is sc-necessary in V [Gβ][H ], by elementarity. Thus since the rest of the iteration
is subcomplete, ϕ(a) is true in V [Gβ][H ][Gtail] as desired.
In fact, we can analyze V [G] further to see that since for any name for a set a˙ the sentence
“|a˙| = ω1” is sc-forceably sc-necessary, we have that every element of Vδ gets collapsed to
have size ω1 - in the next stage, by the definition of the rcs iteration being used. Since δ
isn’t collapsed by the iteration (it has the δ-cc) it must be that δ = ω2 in V [G]. If CH did
not already hold at the beginning of the iteration, it will hold by the end, since then the
sentence “|c˙| = ω1” is sc-forceably sc-necessary.
As for the other direction of the relative consistency of MP
sc
(Hω2), we have the follow-
ing result. Here we follow closely the analogous result for other classes of forcing notions,
originally due to Hamkins [HJ14b].
Lemma 4.1.4. Assume that MP
sc
(Hω2) holds. Then Lω2 4 L. Thus, in particular, we have
that ωV2 is fully reflecting in L.
Proof. Assume ~a ∈ Lω2 and L |= ∃z ϕ(z,~a). Consider the sentence:
“The least ordinal γ such that there is b ∈ Lγ with ϕ
L(b,~a) has cardinality at most ω1.”
The parameters for the sentence come from Hω2 and it is sc-forceably sc-necessary, since
CHAPTER 4. AXIOMS ABOUT SUBCOMPLETE FORCING 79
we can force γ to have size ω1, and once the function witnessing this cardinality change is
there, it cannot be altered by further forcing without adding a real. So the statement is true,
meaning that there is a witness for the existential statement ∃z ϕ(z,~a) in Lω2 as desired.
This implies that ZFC+MP
sc
(Hω2) is equiconsistent with ZFC plus “Ord is Mahlo”. Also,
it means that MP
sc
(Hω2) cannot hold in L, since then L would think that ω2 is inaccessible
in L, a contradiction.
Earlier, the necessary maximality principle was introduced, which posits that the maxi-
mality principle itself persists in every forcing extension. Like the situation with countably
closed forcing, which is shown in Theorem 3.16 from [Fuc08], this form is not consistent for
subcomplete forcing, which we show below.
Proposition 4.1.5. Assume MP
sc
(S). Then there are no Kurepa trees in S. So if S = Hω2
then there are no Kurepa trees.
Proof. Assume that T ∈ S is a Kurepa tree with λ-many branches, where λ ≥ ω2. Then
forcing with Coll (ω1, λ) doesn’t add branches to T , since the forcing is of course countably
closed. But now T has ω1-many branches in the extension, so T is no longer a Kurepa
tree in the forcing extension. Indeed, T can never become a Kurepa tree in any extension
by a subcomplete forcing since subcomplete forcings cannot add branches to ω1-trees by
Theorem 3.1.2. So T is sc-forceably sc-necessarily not a Kurepa tree. As T is assumed to
be in S and is thus allowed as a parameter in MP
sc
(S), it follows that T is not a Kurepa
tree, a contradiction.
Proposition 4.1.6. ✷MP
sc
(Hω2) is inconsistent with ZFC.
Proof. Work in ZFC + ✷MP
sc
(Hω2). There is a generic extension obtained by subcomplete
forcing in which there is a Kurepa tree (since the forcing to add one is countably closed.) In
this extension, MP
sc
(Hω2) has to still hold, since we are assuming the necessary form of the
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principle. But this is a contradiction to Proposition 4.1.5.
4.1.2 The Local Maximality Principle
Here we define the local version of the maximality principle, where the truth of a forceably
necessary sentence will be checked not in V but in a much smaller structure. This should
be compared to one of the equivalent ways of defining the bounded forcing axiom, namely
the third characterization given in Fact 4.0.3.
Definition 4.1.7. Let Γ be a reasonable class of forcing notions, and let S be a set of
parameters. Let M be a defined term for a structure to be evaluated in forcing extensions,
and S ⊆M . The Local Maximality Principle relative to M (MPMΓ (S)) is the statement
that for every a ∈ S and every formula ϕ(x), if ϕM(a) is Γ-forceably Γ-necessary, then ϕM(a)
is true. ⊣
We consider MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2), which stands for the local version of MPsc(Hω2), where Γ is the
class of subcomplete forcing notions, and M and S are both Hω2. As discussed in Lemma
4.1.2, our choice of Hω2 makes sense for the parameter set for the subcomplete maximality
principle, and since the smallest model M that makes sense to use for the local version has
to at least contain the parameter set, Hω2 is a natural choice.
Clearly, the following implication holds:
Lemma 4.1.8. MP
sc
(Hω2) =⇒ MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2).
And the following expresses the relationship between the local maximality principles and
bounded forcing axioms, here stated for subcomplete forcing.
Proposition 4.1.9. MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) =⇒ BSCFA.
Proof. Assume thatMP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) holds. We use characterization 3 of BSCFA from Fact 4.0.3.
To show that sc-generic Σ1(Hω2)-absoluteness holds, let ϕ(x) be a Σ1-formula and let a ∈ Hω2
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and let P be subcomplete, satisfying P ϕ(aˇ). Let G ⊆ P be generic. Since ϕ(x) is Σ1 and
Hω2 4Σ1 V , we have that ϕ
Hω2 (a) = ϕHω2 ((aˇ)G) holds in all future forcing extensions. Thus
ϕHω2 (a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary, which means that ϕHω2 (a) is true (in V ). Thus ϕ(a)
holds in V as desired.
So in particular, we have thatMP
sc
(Hω2) implies BSCFA. What do models ofMP
Hω2
sc (Hω2)
look like? Below we see that models of the local subcomplete maximality principle naturally
have Suslin trees, and imply CH.
Proposition 4.1.10. The theory ZFC+MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) proves the following:
1. There is a Suslin tree.
2. ♦ holds.
3. CH holds.
Proof. First we need to see that Hω2 is enough to verify each of these properties.
For 1 , note that the forcing to add a Suslin tree is countably closed, and thus is subcom-
plete. But Suslin trees are also preserved by subcomplete forcing, by Fact 3.1.13. In fact, any
particular Suslin tree will continue to be a Suslin tree after any subcomplete forcing. Thus
the existence of a Suslin tree is sc-forceably sc-necessary, and hence true by MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2).
For 2 note that Jensen [Jen09b, Chapter 3 p. 7] shows that ♦ will hold after performing
subcomplete forcing if it held in the ground model (we haven’t yet seen that any particular
instance of a ♦-sequence will be preserved). Since forcing to add a ♦-sequence is countably
closed, and it will continue to hold after any subcomplete forcing. Of course then 3 follows,
since ♦ implies CH.
We’ve seen that MP
sc
(Hω2) is consistent with ZFC and with any reasonable value of 2
ω1.
In light of Lemma 4.1.8, we have the following result about models of MP
sc
(Hω2).
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Corollary 4.1.11. ZFC+MP
sc
(Hω2) prove the following:
1. There is a Suslin tree.
2. ♦ holds.
3. CH holds.
4.1.3 Separating and Combining the Subcomplete and Countably
Closed Maximality Principles
Up until this point, it looks as though MP<ω1-closed and MPsc are very similar; all of the
previous results about MP
sc
also hold for MP<ω1-closed. Indeed, we have the following, which
is a straightforward consequence of a result of Fuchs [Fuc08, Theorem 2.10]:
Fact 4.1.12. Assume that δ is regular and Vδ 4 V . Then MP<ω1-closed(Hω2) holds in V [G],
where G is generic for Coll (κ,< δ).
Perhaps, one might think, it is just the case that the subcomplete and countably closed
maximality principles imply each other? As it turns out, this is simply not the case, as we
shall show through a sequence of results below. In this section we look at ways in which the
principles may consistently be separated, ultimately summed up by the following diagram:
MP<ω1-closed(Hω2) MPsc(Hω2)
MP<ω1-closed(∅) MPsc(∅)
upslope upslope
It is easy to see that MP
sc
(Hω2) implies MPsc(∅), since sentences without parameters are
always available when considering sentences that potentially have a larger pool of parameters
to draw from. The same of course is true for the maximality principle for countably closed
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forcing. We shall see below that it is not generally the case that MP<ω1-closed implies MPsc.
However, we will see that it is consistent for MP<ω1-closed(Hω2) and MPsc(∅) to both hold.
The following two lemmas exploit the fact that subcomplete forcing, unlike countably
closed forcing, can add countable sequences. This will be relied upon to elucidate the differ-
ence between the countably closed and subcomplete maximality principles. The key tool of
our analysis will be Namba forcing. We give the precise definition later inDefinition 4.1.25,
but for now let us just state that Namba forcing is a poset that adds a cofinal ω-sequence
to ω2 and is subcomplete if CH holds.
Lemma 4.1.13. It is sc-forceably sc-necessary that
Ordω 6= Ordω ∩ L.
Proof. This is because after using countably closed forcing, namely Add (ω1, 1), to force CH
if it doesn’t already hold, Namba forcing is subcomplete, and adds a countable subset of ω2,
which cannot be removed by further subcomplete forcing.
Lemma 4.1.14. If V = L, then it is < ω1-closed-forceably < ω1-closed-necessary that
Ordω = Ordω ∩ L.
Proof. This is because countably closed forcings are countably distributive, and don’t add
countable sequences.
From these two observational lemmas, we can now say something about what models of
the combined maximality principles would have to look like. The following proposition is
one more ingredient we will use to show the non-implications in the above diagram:
Proposition 4.1.15. If MP
sc
(Hω2) +MP<ω1-closed(∅) holds, then V 6= L[a] for any set a.
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Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that V = L[a] for some set a and both MP
sc
(Hω2)
and MP<ω1-closed(∅) hold. Then it is < ω1-closed-forceably < ω1-closed-necessary that V
is a countably closed forcing extension of a model of the form L[a], where a is a bounded
subset of ω2 - indeed, a can be used as a parameter in MPsc(Hω2). To see this, first force
with Coll (ω1,TC({a})), then every further countably closed extension will always look as
described. In particular, by MP<ω1-closed(∅), it follows that V = L[a][G], where G is a generic
for a countably closed forcing and a ⊆ α < ω2 for some ordinal α. However, it is also
sc-forceably sc-necessary that there is a countable sequence not in L[a], since we have CH
in L[a] and so Namba forcing is subcomplete, thus Namba forcing over L[a] will give rise to
such a sequence. This is a contradiction to V = L[a][G], whch does not contain a countable
sequence not in L[a].
In other words,
Corollary 4.1.16. If V = L[a], then it is not the case that MP
sc
(Hω2) and MP<ω1-closed(∅)
both hold.
We will now show both of the crossed out implications in the above diagram.
Theorem 4.1.17. It is consistent for MP
sc
(Hω2) to hold while MP<ω1-closed(∅) fails.
Proof. Let δ be fully reflecting in L. Force MP
sc
(Hω2) over L to obtain L[G] |= MPsc(Hω2).
By Corollary 4.1.16, this means that MP<ω1-closed(∅) fails.
Moreover, if we allow parameters for the countably closed maximality principle but not
for the subcomplete maximality principle, it is possible for the subcomplete maximality
principle to fail while the countably closed principle holds, as shown below.
Theorem 4.1.18. It is consistent for MP<ω1-closed(Hω2) to hold while MPsc(∅) fails.
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Proof. We work over L, with δ fully reflecting in L. We force over L in order to make
MP<ω1-closed(Hω2) hold in L[G]. Then L[G] has the same countable sequences of ordinals as
L does, by Lemma 4.1.14. Thus MP
sc
(∅) fails; in particular, the sentence
∃~a ∈ Ordω \ L
is sc-forceably sc-necessary by Lemma 4.1.13, but false in L[G].
However, it is relatively consistent for MP<ω1-closed(Hω2) and MPsc(∅) hold at the same
time.
Theorem 4.1.19. It is consistent for MP<ω1-closed(Hω2) and MPsc(∅) to both hold.
Proof. Let Lδ 4 Lδ 4 L, with δ regular. Force MPsc(∅) with a δ-length iteration of subcom-
plete forcings. To do this, the iteration is the same as in Theorem 4.1.3, except simpler
since we don’t have to worry about parameters for our available sentences. Call the result
L[G]. This gives us Lδ[G] 4 L[G], since δ is small relative to δ. Then force MP<ω1-closed(Hω2)
by forcing with P = Coll (ω1, < δ) over L[G], which works by Fact 4.1.12. Letting G ⊆ P be
generic over L[G], in L[G][G] we certainly have that MP<ω1-closed(Hω2) holds. The question
is whether we have somehow killed MP
sc
(∅). To see that this does not happen, let ϕ be a
sentence without parameters in L[G][G] that is sc-forceably sc-necessary. This means that
there is a subcomplete forcing Q = Q˙G in L[G][G] such that
L[G][G] |= “Q is subcomplete” and “ Q ‘ϕ is sc-necessary.’”
But this means that there is a condition p ∈ G such that
L[G] |= “p  ‘Q˙ is subcomplete’ and ‘ Q˙ “ϕ is sc-necessary.”’”
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In other words, letting P≤p denote the forcing P below the condition p,
L[G] |= “ P≤p∗Q˙ ‘ϕ is sc-necessary.’”
We have that P≤p ∗ Q˙ is subcomplete by the two-step iteration theorem, since also
L[G] |= “ P≤p ‘Q˙ is subcomplete.’”
Thus, by MP
sc
(∅) in L[G], ϕ is sc-necessary. Hence ϕ is true in L[G][G], since it is a
subcomplete forcing extension of L[G].
We can generalize part of the above proof to see that MP
sc
(Hω2) will continue to hold
in further forcing extensions so long as the extensions are subcomplete and do not add
any new parameters. This is equivalent to the claim that ✷MP
sc
(∅) is equiconsistent with
MP
sc
(∅). The analogous result stating that ✷MP<ω1-closed(∅) is consistent is implied by work
of Fuchs [Fuc08, Lemma 4.2].
However, it remains unclear how to answer the following question:
Question 4.1.20. Is it consistent for MP
sc
(Hω2) and MP<ω1-closed(∅) to both hold?
The reason this would be trickier is because subcomplete forcings are certainly not nec-
essarily countably closed. Already we see from the result of Corollary 4.1.16 that the
same proof technique we have used say in Theorem 4.1.18 does not seem to work in this
example.
In fact, we can use our proof of Proposition 4.1.15 and set-theoretic geology to go
a bit further. Set-theoretic geology was explored by Fuchs, Hamkins, and Reitz [FHR15].
The authors make precise the notion of the definability of ground models for models of ZFC.
Moreover, Usuba [Usu16] has shown that if there are set-many grounds for a model of ZFC,
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then the intersection of these grounds, called the mantle, is itself a ground (in particular, it
is a model of ZFC).
Theorem 4.1.21. If MP
sc
(Hω2) + MP<ω1-closed(∅) holds, then there is a proper class of
grounds.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that there is not a proper class of grounds, and that
both MP
sc
(Hω2) and MP<ω1-closed(∅) hold. By Usuba’s work on set-theoretic geology and
proof of the downward directed grounds hypothesis [Usu16], this means that V = M[G],
where M is the intersection of all of the grounds (the mantle). Define the statement ϕ as
follows:
ϕ : “For some α < ω2, there is a g ⊆ α such that V =M[g][h], where h is generic for a
countably closed forcing.”
Then ϕ is < ω1-closed-forceably < ω1-closed-necessary, since we already have that V =M[G]
but by taking g = G ∗ H in the above sentence, where H ⊆ Coll (ω1,TC({G})) is generic
over V =M[G], it is then < ω1-closed-necessary for V to be of the formM[g][h] for h generic
for a countably closed forcing.
So without loss of generality we can assume G is like that, ie. let V = M[g][h] = M[G].
Since MP<ω1-closed(∅) (or indeed MPsc(Hω2) holds) in V , we also have CH. Thus Namba
forcing, which we shall denote as N, is subcomplete. However, N adds a new ω-sequence,
call it S. In particular, the sentence ψ holds in V [S] = M[G][S] = M[g][h][S], where ψ is
defined as follows:
ψ: “There is an ω-sequence not in M[g].”
Since there is an ω-sequence not in M[G] = V , and h couldn’t have added it as h is
countably closed. Moreover, the sentence ψ holds in V by MP
sc
(Hω2), since it is sc-forceably
sc-necessary. But this means that ψ is true in M[G] = M[g][h], a contradiction as M is
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forcing invariant and since g and h come from countably closed forcing that don’t add new
ω-sequences.
This immediately yields the following corollary, in light of Usuba’s results.
Corollary 4.1.22. If there is a hyper-huge cardinal, then MP
sc
(Hω2)+MP<ω1-closed(∅) fails.
Proof. By [Usu16, Theorem 1.6], once is a hyper-huge cardinal there are only set many
ground models. This contradicts Theorem 4.1.21.
To bring further doubt that the lightface version of the countably closed maximality
principle and the boldface subcomplete maximality principle can be combined, we have the
following result comparing the local subcomplete and countably closed maximality principles.
Theorem 4.1.23. If MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) and MP
Hω2
<ω1-closed
(∅) both hold, then V is closed under
sharps.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) and MP
Hω2
<ω1-closed
(∅) both hold and
V is not closed under sharps; in particular suppose there is a set of ordinals X such that
¬X♯. Then we first claim that there is a Y such that L[Y ] contains all countable sets of
ordinals.
Claim 1. There is Y ⊆ Ord such that [Ord]ω ⊆ L[Y ].
Pf. Let X˜ code all of the countable subsets of ω2, so that [ω2]
ω ⊆ L[X˜ ]. Let Y = X ⊕ X˜ .
Then Y is as desired. To see this, let a ∈ [Ord]ω. By ¬X♯, Jensen’s Covering Lemma holds
in L[X ], so let b ∈ L[X ] with a ⊆ b, where b is a set of ordinals satisfying |b| ≤ ω1. Let
f ∈ L[X ] be order preserving, satisfying
f : b −→ otp(b) < ωV2 ,
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and let a = f“a. Then a ∈ L[X˜ ]. Thus both a, f ∈ L[Y ] and so a = f−1“a ∈ L[Y ] as
desired.
Moreover we claim that the statement of Claim 1 will necessarily hold in the Hω2 of any
countably closed forcing extension after a suitable collapse forcing.
Claim 2. It is < ω1-closed-forceably < ω1-closed-necessary that
Hω2 |= “there is a set Y such that every countable set of ordinals is in L[Y ]” (4.1)
Pf. Let G ⊆ Coll (ω1, supY ) be generic and let Q be a countably closed poset. Let H ⊆ Q
be generic over V [G]. We have to show (4.1) in V [G][H ].
The main point is that Y ∈ HV [G][H]ω2 . Moreover let κ = ω
V [G][H]
2 , and let a ∈ [κ]
ω in
V [G][H ] . Then since countably closed forcing doesn’t add countable sets of ordinals, a ∈ V .
Thus a ∈ L[Y ], so a ∈ Lκ[Y ] as both a and Y are bounded subsets of κ, which is a cardinal
in L[Y ]. But Lκ[Y ] = (L[Y ])
H
V [G][H]
ω2 .
By MP
Hω2
<ω1-closed
(∅), let Y ⊆ ω2 satisfy (4.1) in V . Perform Namba forcing, N, and let
g ⊆ N be generic. Then
HV [g]ω2 |= [Ord]
ω * L[Y ],
and this persists to further forcing extensions. So it is sc-forceably sc-necessary, and thus
true in V . So
Hω2 |= [Ord]
ω * L[Y ]
a contradiction to Claim 1.
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4.1.4 More on the Modal Logic of Subcomplete Forcing
While we are using maximality principles to compare the classes of countably closed forcing
and subcomplete forcing, one might wonder whether the property of a poset being subcom-
plete is itself sc-forceably sc-necessary. Certainly, the property of being countably closed is
< ω1-closed-forceably < ω1-closed-necessary, by the following basic fact:
Fact 4.1.24. If P and Q are countably closed, then P “Qˇ is countably closed.”
However, the analogous statement for proper forcings is not even true. Letting T be
a poset that forces with a Suslin tree (in other words T is a Suslin tree) and S is the
canonical ccc specialization forcing, then T × S is not proper, since after adding a cofinal
branch the specialization function will collapse ω1. Indeed, both T and S are ccc so this
very argument shows that the analogous statement is not true for ccc forcings either. In
the case of subcompete forcing, we cannot perform a similar argument using Suslin trees
and ccc specialization forcing since forcing with them is not subcomplete by Fact 3.1.13 and
Corollary 3.1.15. Instead we will work with Namba forcing.
Definition 4.1.25. Namba forcing, denoted by N, a forcing notion consisting of subtrees
T 6= ∅ of ω<ω2 ordered by inclusion, such that T is downward closed in ω
<ω
2 and where each
node in T has ω2-many eventual successors in T . ⊣
Each condition in N has size ω2. Namba forcing adds a cofinal sequence S : ω → ωV2 to
the extension, a cofinal branch through ω<ω2 , so there is no way it can be countably closed or
proper. We will refer to such S as a Namba sequence. Under CH, Namba forcing adds no new
reals. Furthermore Namba forcing is subcomplete, which Jensen shows in [Jen14, Section
3.3].
Jensen [Jen09a, Appendix: Lemma 1] shows the following fact:
Fact 4.1.26 (Jensen). Let S be a Namba sequence. Let S ′ ∈ V [S] be a cofinal ω-sequence
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in ωV2 . Then S
′ is a Namba sequence and V [S ′] = V [S].
Theorem 4.1.27. The forcing N× N adds a new real, and is thus not subcomplete.
Proof. I will think of N × N = N ∗ Nˇ as an iteration. Let S1 : ω → ωV2 be the first cofinal
Namba sequence added by N, and make sure that S1 increasing, which we can do by the
Namba fact (Fact 4.1.26). Let S2 : ω → ωV2 be the second Namba sequence. In V [S1] we
may define a function f : ωV2 −→ ω by letting
f(α) = the least m < ω such that S1(m) ≥ α.
Note that f(S1(n)) = n since S1 is increasing, and f is surjective since S1 has domain ω.
We would like to compare S1 and S2 by tracking how S2 threads through the tree labeled
by f . In particular, define the real r : ω → ω in V [S1][S2] by the following:
r(n) = f(S2(n)).
On each level, the idea is to have the real r pick out the levels where S1(n) ≥ S2(n).
It must be that r is new. To see why, let c : ω → ω be an arbitrary ground model
real. For any Namba condition T , there has to be a level, say n < ω, with ω2-many nodes
(otherwise, there is no way the condition could have size ω2). Moreover for any β < ω2,
it is dense for conditions T to satisfy that there is an n such that T  S˙2(n) > β, where
S˙2 is the name for the generic sequence S2. This is because it is always dense for Namba
conditions to so-to-speak veer to the right; it is dense for some node in a condition to have
a value greater than any fixed β < ω2, again since conditions must have size ω2. So the set
of ground-model Namba conditions that force that for some n, f(S˙2(n)) > c(n), is dense.
Indeed, letting T ∈ N, we may find a strengthening T ∗ forcing that the least m such that
S1(m) ≥ S˙2(n) is larger than c(n). To do this, find a level of T with ω2-many nodes, say
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level α. Let T ∗ strengthen T so that T ∗α = Tα \ S1(c(n)), restricting level α of T to a tail of
ω2 thus forcing S˙2(n) > S1(c(n)) and indeed S1(m) for all m < c(n). Thus below T
∗, the
least m such that S1(m) exceeds S˙2(n) must be larger than c(n), as desired. Thus r is new,
since r = (f ◦ Γ)S2 differs from any arbitrary ground-model real somewhere.
Corollary 4.1.28. Let N name a parameter for ground-model Namba forcing. We have that
N “Nˇ is not subcomplete.” So “N is not subcomplete” is sc-forceable.
Even after countably closed forcing, it is possible for the ground model’s version of Namba
forcing to fail to be subcomplete anymore.
Theorem 4.1.29. Forcing with Coll (ω1, ω2)×N adds a new real and is thus not subcomplete.
Proof. Let S : ω → ωV2 be a cofinal Namba sequence added by N. Let P = Coll (ω1, ω2),
as defined in V . Let G ⊆ P be generic. Thus in V [G], there is a cofinal, normal function
f : ωV1 −→ ω
V
2 . Thus in V [G][S] we may define a cofinal function g : ω −→ ω
V
1 by letting
g(n) = the least α < ω1 such that f(α) > S(n).
To see that g is cofinal, let β < ω1. Then there is n < ω such that S(n) > f(β), since both S
and f are cofinal. But again, since f is cofinal, there is α < ω1 such that f(α) > S(n) > f(β);
indeed we may take the least such α satisfying f(α) > S(n). But by normality of f , we have
that g(n) = α > β, as desired.
So in V [G][S], we have that ωV1 is collapsed to ω as witnessed by g. Thus a real has been
added as desired. (So we may see that in the extension, there is a bijection h : ω ∼= ω1. Now
define a real r by letting
r = {(m,n) | h(m) < h(n)} ⊆ ω × ω.
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Then r codes h since each h(n) is an ordinal, and so it is determined exactly by its order-type,
in V [G][S].)
Of course in the above theorem, we have also shown that Coll (ω1, ω2)× N collapses ω1,
so it is no longer subproper either and doesn’t preserve stationary subsets of ω1.
Corollary 4.1.30. We have that N “Pˇ is not subcomplete.” So the statement “ Coll (ω1, ω2)
is not subcomplete” is sc-forceable, where Coll (ω1, ω2) is a parameter for the ground model’s
version of the collapse forcing.
Corollary 4.1.31. Let P be a parameter for a poset in V . The sentence “P is subcomplete”
is not sc-forceably sc-necessary.
Proof. Above we gave examples of subcomplete forcing notions that necessarily force that
another subcomplete forcing is not subcomplete.
The following theorem is in contrast with the previous results. It states that if a ground-
model forcing is sc-forceably subcomplete, then it is subcomplete.
Theorem 4.1.32. Suppose both P,Q are forcing notions in V satisfying δ(Q) ≥ δ(P), such
that P is subcomplete and P “Qˇ is subcomplete.” Then Q is subcomplete (in V ).
Proof. Let P be subcomplete and suppose P “Qˇ is subcomplete.” We may assume that
δ(P) = δ(Q) = δ, since we can always increase the size of δ(P) by replacing P with an ap-
propriately sized lottery sum, as is seen in Lemma 2.2.10. To show that Q is subcomplete,
let θ verify the subcompleteness of P and that θˇ verifies the subcompleteness of Qˇ in V P, so
that we are in the standard setup where we have an embedding σ ∈ V as follows:
• P,Q ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
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• σ(θ,Q,P, s) = θ,Q,P, s for some s ∈ N .
Toward showing subcompleteness, let H be Q-generic over N . We would like to find a
generic H ⊆ Q such that in V [H ] there is an embedding σ′ : N 4 N , where N and N are
the same as above, and where σ′ is sufficiently similar to σ but satisfying that σ′ has a lift
in V [H ], i.e., σ′“H ⊆ H .
Let G ⊆ P be generic over N . Of course N is countable, so we may build such a generic
in V [H]. Then G is also generic over N [H]. By subcompleteness of P, we may let G ⊆ P be
generic over N so that we have that there is σ0 ∈ V [G] satisfying:
• σ0 : N ≺ N
• σ0(θ,Q,P, s) = θ,Q,P, s
• Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ0)) = Sk
N(δ ∪X)
• σ0“G ⊆ G.
As the last bullet tells us that σ0 lifts in V [G], let σ
∗
0 : N [G] ≺ N [G] denote the lift of σ0,
which is also an elementary embedding in V [G]. In V [G] we have that Q is subcomplete by
our assumption. Furthermore, in V [G] we have that
• Q ∈ HV [G]θ ⊆ N [G] = Lτ [A][G] |= ZFC
−
• σ∗0 : N [G]
∼= range(σ∗0) 4 N [G] where range(σ
∗
0) is countable and N [G] is full
• σ∗0(θ,Q, s) = θ,Q, s.
We have fullness of N [G] since N is full: indeed, as N is transitive, so is N [G], and addi-
tionally we have that there is a γ such that N is regular in Lγ(N) |= ZFC
− by fullness of N .
But this clearly means that N [G] is regular in Lγ(N [G]) |= ZFC
−.
So by subcompleteness of Q in V [G] let H ⊆ Q be generic over N [G] so that there is
σ1 ∈ V [G][H ] satisfying:
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• σ1 : N [G] ≺ N [G]
• σ1(θ,Q, s) = θ,Q, s
• Sk N [G](δ ∪ range(σ1)) = Sk N [G](δ ∪ range(σ∗0))
• σ1“H ⊆ H .
Note that here we take H generic over N [G], which implies that H is generic over N , and
furthermore H ⊆ N as Q ∈ N .
Toward defining the embedding we ultimately need, let σ = σ1 ↾N .
Claim 1. The map σ ∈ V [G][H ] satisfies:
1. σ : N ≺ N
2. σ(θ,Q, s) = θ,Q, s
3. Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ)) = Sk N(δ ∪X)
4. σ“H ⊆ H .
Pf. In order to see 1, let’s say that ϕ[σ(a)] holds in N . Then ϕ[a] holds in N , since σ1 is
elementary. Also 2 is clear, since θ, Q, and s are all elements of N . Item 4 must hold, since
H ⊆ N and since H is a subset of N . All that is left to be shown is item 3: that
Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ)) = Sk N (δ ∪ range(σ)).
We already have that
Sk N [G](δ ∪ range(σ1)) = Sk
N [G](δ ∪ range(σ∗0)) (4.2)
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and
Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ0)) = Sk
N(δ ∪X). (4.3)
The following hold by Lemma 1.2.9:
(i) Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ)) = Sk N [G](δ ∪ range(σ1)) ∩N
(ii) Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ0)) = Sk
N [G](δ ∪ range(σ∗0)) ∩N .
Item 3 follows:
Sk N (δ ∪ range(σ)) = Sk N [G](δ ∪ range(σ1)) ∩N by (i)
= Sk N [G](δ ∪ range(σ∗0)) ∩N by (4.2)
= Sk N (δ ∪ range(σ0)) by (ii)
= Sk N (δ ∪X) by (4.3)
This finishes the proof of Claim 1.
Although σ has all of the properties that we desire, σ is alas only in V [G][H ]. We need
such an embedding to exist in V [H ], in order to show that Q is really subcomplete in V
not just in V [G]. To find the required embedding, we shall use Barwise theory, and show
that, roughly speaking, the existence of such an embedding is consistent. Using Barwise
Completeness (Fact 1.3.8), we will obtain our desired embedding. First we shall define the
infinitary language we will be using to analyze consistency of the existence of the embedding.
Refer to Section 1.3, especially Definition 1.3.5, for a review of the terminology (such as
∈-theories and the Basic Axioms).
Let M be an admissible structure. We define the infinitary ∈-theory L(M) as follows:
predicates ∈
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constants σ˚, x for x ∈M
axioms • ZFC− and Basic Axioms
• σ˚ : N ≺ N
• σ˚(θ,Q, s) = θ,Q, s
• Sk N (δ ∪ range(˚σ)) = Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ))
• σ˚“H ⊆ H
This ∈-theory is Σ1(M), as the only axioms that are M-re are the Basic Axioms, everything
else is M-finite.
Let µ be regular in V [H ] with N ∈ Hµ, so that
M = 〈Hµ;N,H, θ,Q, δ, s; σ〉 is an admissible structure.
In fact, by Claim 1 we have that 〈M,σ〉 models the consistency of L(M); that is to say that
letting M be M and σ˚ be σ, the axioms will be satisfied, since all of hte required constants
are then available to M . So the theory L(M) is consistent by Barwise Correctness (Fact
1.3.7). However this is still in V [G][H ] that we have σ available. In order to produce a model
in V [H ] we shall use Barwise Completeness, which requires a countable admissible structure
in the place of M . In fact, using the countable Mostowski collapse of M works.
Take π : M˜ ≺M where M˜ is countable transitive. Then the corresponding theory L(M˜)
is a consistent, Σ1(M˜) ∈-theory. In other words, using M˜ as our source of special constants is
consistent, since any inconsistency could be mapped via π to be an inconsistency for L(M).
Thus by Barwise Completeness , we have a solid model A˜ = 〈A˜, σ˚A˜〉 in V such that there is
agreement between M˜ and A on the ordinals.
Ord ∩ wfc(A˜) = Ord ∩ M˜.
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We shall show that σ′ = π ◦ σ˚A˜ ∈ V [H ] is as desired.
Claim 2. The map σ′ ∈ V [H ] satisfies:
1. σ′ : N ≺ N
2. σ′(θ,Q, s) = θ,Q, s
3. Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N(δ ∪X)
4. σ′“H ⊆ H .
Pf. We shall use the agreement between A˜ and M˜ on the special constants of M˜ and on the
ordinals. In order to see 1, suppose that ϕ[σ′(a)] holds in N . So ϕ[π(˚σA˜(a))]N holds in M .
Thus ϕ[˚σA˜(a)]π
−1(N) holds in M˜ , and thus also in A˜. Indeed we know that N
A˜
= N , since
M˜ has the correct interpretation of N as N is transitive and countable, and thus A˜ has the
correct interpretation of N as well. This means that ϕ[a] holds in N , as desired. To see 2,
we have σ′(θ,Q, s) = π(θA˜,QA˜, sA˜) = θ,Q, s. For item 3, let N˜ = N A˜, δ˜ = δA˜, and σ˜ = σA˜.
So π(δ˜) = δ and π(σ˜) = σ. We already have that
Sk N˜(δ˜ ∪ range(˚σA˜)) = Sk N˜(δ˜ ∪ range(σ˜)). (4.4)
We show that Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) = Sk N(δ ∪X).
To see Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) ⊆ Sk N(δ ∪ X), suppose x ∈ Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)). Then we
have that N sees that there is some formula ϕ, z ∈ N , and ξ < δ where x is unique such that
ϕ(x, π(˚σA˜(z)), ξ). In particular, x is in the range of π. Thus x˜ = π−1(x) ∈ N˜ and ξ˜ < δ˜ such
that ϕ(x˜, σ˚A˜(z), ξ˜) holds. Thus by (4.4), we have that x˜ is unique such that ϕ(x˜, σ˜(y), ζ˜) for
some y ∈ N and ζ˜ < δ˜. Thus pushing back up through π, letting ζ = π(ζ˜), we have that
x = π(x˜) is unique such that ϕ(x, σ(y), ζ) holds, so x ∈ Sk N(δ ∪X).
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To see that Sk N(δ∪X) ⊆ Sk N(δ∪range(σ′)) works similarly. Let x ∈ Sk N(δ∪X). Then
there is z ∈ N and ξ < δ such that ϕ(x, σ(z), ξ) holds. So in particular, x is in the domain
of π. So we may find ξ˜ < δ˜ such that x˜ = π−1(x) is unique such that ϕ(x˜, σ˜(z), ξ˜). So by
(5.1), we have that there is y ∈ N and ζ˜ < δ˜ such that x˜ is unique satisfying ϕ(x˜, σ˚A(y), ζ˜).
Finally, by pushing back up through π, letting π(ζ˜) = ζ , we have that x = π(x˜) is unique
such that ϕ(x, σ′(y), ζ), so x ∈ Sk N (δ ∪ range(σ′)) as desired.
To see item 4, let h ∈ H. Then M˜ sees that σ˜(h) ∈ H˜ . Thus M sees that σ′(h) ∈ H as
desired. This completes the proof of Claim 2.
So σ′ ∈ V [H ] certifies the subcompleteness of Q, completing the proof of the theorem.
4.2 The Resurrection Axiom
Joel David Hamkins and Thomas Johnstone [HJ14a] first introduced the notion of resurrec-
tion in set theory. The idea behind resurrection axioms is to look at the model-theoretic
concept of existential closure in the realm of forcing, because, as Hamkins and Johnstone
point out, the notions of resurrection and existential closure are tightly connected in model
theory. In model theory, a submodel M⊆ N is existentially closed in N if existential state-
ments in N using parameters from M are already true in M, i.e., M is a Σ1-elementary
substructure of N . Many forcing axioms can be expressed informally by stating that the uni-
verse is existentially closed in its forcing extensions, since forcing axioms posit that generic
filters, which normally exist in a forcing extension, exist already in the ground model. It
turns out that in set theory the appropriate notion of resurrection implies the truth of its
associated forcing axiom, but not the other way around. So what is obtained with resur-
rection axioms is described by Hamkins and Johnstone as a more “robust” formulation of
forcing axioms for various forcing classes.
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Definition 4.2.1. Let Γ be a fixed, definable class of forcing notions. Let τ be a term
for a cardinality to be computed in various models; e.g. c, ω1, etc. The Resurrection
Axiom RAΓ(Hτ) asserts that for every forcing notion Q ∈ Γ there is a further forcing R˙
with Q R˙ ∈ Γ such that if g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is V -generic, then
HVτ 4 H
V [g∗h]
τ .
Just like with the maximality principle, we will write RA
sc
to denote the resurrection axiom
for the class of subcomplete forcing notions, and RA<ω1-closed for the class of countably closed
forcing notions.
We may define ✷RA
sc
(Hτ ) as the necessary form of the principle itself, asserting that
RA
sc
(Hτ ) holds in every forcing extension obtained by subcomplete forcing, with Hτ inter-
preted in the extension. ⊣
Hamkins and Johnstone [HJ14a] examine the resurrection axiom for various forcing no-
tions, which is a great reference for an array of similar results on other forcing classes. In
particular, they looked at RAΓ(Hc) for various classes Γ such as that of proper, ccc, countably
closed, and so on.
The reason Hc is required in general is that if some forcing notion in Γ adds new reals,
then Hκ, where κ > c in V , simply cannot be existentially closed in the forcing extension;
the added real itself is witnessing the lack of existential closure. So certainly RAΓ(Hκ) for
any class of forcing notions Γ that potentially add new reals, cannot hold. However, by the
following result (due to [HJ14a, Theorem 6]) we see that RAΓ(Hc) is in fact equivalent to CH,
if Γ is any class of forcing notions necessarily closed under finite iterations and containing a
poset forcing CH without adding reals. So in particular, RA<ω1-closed(Hc) and RAsc(Hc) are
both equivalent to CH. Below I give the argument for subcomplete forcing, but it is the same
proof as given by Hamkins and Johnstone [HJ14a, Theorem 6].
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Proposition 4.2.2. CH ⇐⇒ RA
sc
(Hc).
Proof. For the forward implication, suppose that CH holds. Then since subcomplete forcing
doesn’t add new reals, Hω1 is unaffected by subcomplete forcing, and moreover, c remains
ω1 in every subcomplete extension.
For the backward direction, assume RA
sc
(Hc) holds. Let P be the canonical forcing to
force CH, which is countably closed and hence subcomplete. By the resurrection axiom
RA
sc
(Hc), there is a further forcing R˙ such that P “R˙ is subcomplete” such that letting
g ∗h ⊆ P ∗ R˙ be generic, we have Hc 4 H
V [g∗h]
c . We know that CH has to hold still in V [g ∗h]
since subcomplete forcing cannot add new reals to make c larger. Thus CH holds in V by
elementarity, as desired.
Indeed, CH is equivalent to the statement that Hc contains only one infinite cardinal,
which can be expressed in Hc.
This result is certainly interesting in its own right, but it also indicates that the RA
sc
(Hc),
or indeed RA<ω1-closed(Hc), is not necessarily the right axiom to look at. So what is the correct
axiom to examine? I will discuss two reasonable possibilities: RA
sc
(Hω2) and RAsc(H2ω1 ), and
the same for the countably closed resurrection axiom. First we will look at what RA
sc
(H2ω1 )
and RA<ω1-closed(H2ω1 ) imply about the size of 2
ω1.
Proposition 4.2.3. RA
sc
(H2ω1 ) =⇒ 2ω1 = ω2. Indeed, RA<ω1-closed(H2ω1 ) =⇒ 2
ω1 = ω2.
Proof. We show the contrapositive. Let 2ω1 ≥ ω3. Let κ = ωV2 . Then H2ω1 can see that
κ = ω2. But after forcing with Coll (ω1, κ), which is subcomplete since it is countably closed,
we have that H
V [g]
2ω1 |= “κ < ω2” where g ⊆ Coll (ω1, κ) is generic. Moreover, if R is any
further subcomplete (or countably closed) forcing, we will still have that for h ⊆ R generic,
H
V [g][h]
2ω1 |= “κ < ω2”. So RAsc(H2ω1 ) (or RA<ω1-closed(H2ω1 )) must fail.
The next proposition gives a relationship between RA
sc
(H2ω1 ) and RAsc(Hω2). However,
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the answer to the following question is unknown.
Question 4.2.4. Is it the case that RA
sc
(H2ω1 ) ⇐⇒ RAsc(Hω2)? Indeed, is it the case
that RA<ω1-closed(H2ω1 ) ⇐⇒ RA<ω1-closed(Hω2)?
Proposition 4.2.5. RA
sc
(H2ω1 ) ⇐⇒ 2ω1 = ω2 + RAsc(Hω2).
Indeed, RA<ω1-closed(H2ω1 ) ⇐⇒ 2
ω1 = ω2 + RA<ω1-closed(Hω2).
Proof. For the forward direction for the subcomplete resurrection axiom, we already have
that RA
sc
(H2ω1 ) =⇒ 2ω1 = ω2 by the previous proposition. Moreover, if RAsc(H2ω1 ) holds,
so does RA
sc
(Hω2), since even if some subcomplete forcing makes 2
ω1 ≥ ω3 hold in the
extension, we can always then force again to make 2ω1 = ω2 in a further collapse (and thus
countably closed, so subcomplete) extension.
For the backward direction, suppose that RA
sc
(Hω2) holds and 2
ω1 = ω2. We would like
to show that RA
sc
(H2ω1 ) holds. Toward that end, suppose that Q is subcomplete and let
g ⊆ Q be generic. Then we have that there is some forcing R with h ⊆ R generic over V [g],
such that
HV2ω1 = H
V
ω2
4 HV [g∗h]ω2 .
So if in V [g ∗ h] we have that 2ω1 = ω2, then we are done. If not, i.e. if 2ω1 > ω2 in V [g],
then let G ⊆ Coll (ω2, 2ω1) be generic over V [g ∗ h]. Then H
V [g∗h]
ω2 = H
V [g∗h∗G]
ω2 = H
V [g∗h∗G]
2ω1 ,
so we are done.
Since the ony forcing used in this proof is the collapse forcing, we also have the desired
result for countably closed forcing.
In comparison to Proposition 4.2.2 and [HJ14a, Theorem 6], the lack of any obvious
restraints for the size of 2ω1 which is witnessed by both RA
sc
(Hω2) and RA<ω1-closed(Hω2) lend
credibility to Hω2 being the right parameter set to consider for our purposes. So this is what
we will be using.
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In the following we show that necessary form of the resurrection axiom is false, using the
same argument as with the inconsistency of the necessary form of subcomplete maximality
principle (Proposition 4.1.6) that was originally demonstrated for countably closed forcings
by Fuchs [Fuc08].
Proposition 4.2.6. Assume RA
sc
(Hτ ). Then there are no Kurepa trees in Hτ . Indeed, in
the case Hτ = Hω2, there are no Kurepa trees.
Proof. Assume that T ∈ Hτ is a Kurepa tree with λ-many branches, where λ ≥ ω2. Then
forcing with Coll (ω1, λ) doesn’t add branches to T , since the forcing is of course countably
closed. But now T has ω1-many branches in the extension V [G], so T is no longer a Kurepa
tree in V [G]. Indeed, T can never become a Kurepa tree in any further extension by a sub-
complete forcing since subcomplete forcing does not add branches to ω1-trees by Theorem
3.1.2. Furthermore, the Hτ of any further extension of V [G] may verify that “T does not
have set-many branches.” As T is assumed to be in Hτ and is thus allowed as a parameter in
RA
sc
(Hτ ), it follows that T is not a Kurepa tree in further extensions, a contradiction.
Proposition 4.2.7. ✷RA
sc
(Hω2) is inconsistent with ZFC.
Proof. Work in ZFC + ✷RA
sc
(Hω2). There is a generic extension obtained by subcomplete
forcing in which there is a Kurepa tree (since forcing to add one is countably closed.) In
this extension, RA
sc
(Hω2) has to still hold, since we are assuming the necessary form of the
principle. But this is a contradiction to Proposition 4.2.6.
4.2.1 Consistency of the Resurrection Axiom
Hamkins and Johnstone [HJ14a, Section 5] show that the resurrection axiom for various
classes of forcings is equiconsistent with the existence of an uplifting cardinal. By adapting
their methods, we show that the large cardinal strength of RA
sc
(Hω2) is also that of an
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uplifting cardinal.
Definition 4.2.8. An inaccessible cardinal κ is uplifting so long as for every ordinal θ it
is θ-uplifting, meaning that there is an inaccessible γ ≥ θ such that Vκ 4 Vγ is a proper
elementary extension. ⊣
In the remarks after defining uplifting cardinals, Hamkins and Johnstone add that when-
ever Vκ 4 Vγ for large enough γ, where κ and γ are not necessarily inaccessible, it must
be that κ and thus γ are i-fixed points. This gives rise to the following useful equivalent
characterization of uplifting cardinals:
Fact 4.2.9. A cardinal κ is uplifting iff κ is regular and for arbitrarily large regular cardinals
γ we have Hκ 4 Hγ.
In terms of consistency strength, if κ is Mahlo, then Vκ contains a proper class of uplifting
cardinals. If κ is uplifting, then letting Vκ 4 Vγ, we have that Vγ is a transitive set model of
the existence of a fully reflecting cardinal. For more details, see [HJ14a, Theorem 11].
We define some “niceness” properties of class forcing, which will be needed in the following
argument.
Definition 4.2.10. A forcing notion P ⊆M is nice for a class forcing overM = 〈M,∈, A〉
if P is definable in M and the truth lemma - stating that a sentence is true in a forcing
extension if and only if it is forced by a condition in the generic filter - holds for forcing with
P over M.
If P is nice for class forcing over M then we say that the niceness of P is preserved to
M∗ = 〈M∗,∈, A∗〉 if P∗ is nice for class forcing overM∗, is defined by the same formula over
M∗, and the forcing relation for forcing with P∗ over M∗ are defined in M∗ by the same
formulas and same parameters as those for forcing with P over M. ⊣
We will make use of the following fact from [HJ14b, Lemma 17], allowing the lifting of
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embeddings to generic extensions while performing class forcing.
Fact 4.2.11 (Lifting Lemma). Suppose that 〈M,∈ A〉 4 〈M∗,∈, A∗〉 are transitive models
of ZFC, that P is a definable class in 〈M,∈, A〉 that is nice for forcing and that the niceness
of P is preserved to the analogous class P∗ defined in 〈M∗,∈, A∗〉. If G ⊆ P is an M-generic
filter and G∗ ⊆ P is M∗-generic with G = G∗ ∩ P, then
〈M [G],∈, A,G〉 4 〈M∗[G∗],∈, A∗, G∗〉.
We deviate slightly from the proofs presented by Hamkins and Johnstone that use an up-
lifting cardinal to force specific resurrection axioms. Instead of using an ordinal-anticipating
uplifting Laver function, we use a least-counterexample lottery sum iteration.
Theorem 4.2.12. If κ is an uplifting cardinal, then there is a subcomplete iteration of length
κ such that in the forcing extension, RA
sc
(Hω2) holds and κ = ω2.
Proof. Let κ be uplifting. Suppose that RA
sc
(Hω2) fails. We shall define P to be the subcom-
plete least-counterexample to RA
sc
(Hω2) lottery sum rcs iteration of length κ. The iteration
is of the form: P = Pκ = 〈(Pα, Q˙α) | α < κ〉, and is a revised countable support iteration
of length κ, defined so that at stage α: first let Q be the collection of subcomplete forcing
posets in V Pα of minimal rank for which resurrection fails, and define
Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α ∗ Coll (ω1, |Pα|) where Q˙α is a term for the lottery sum ⊕Q.
So at each stage α, we ask whether the resurrection axiom has been forced yet in V Pα. If
not, i.e., if there is a further subcomplete forcing in V Pα that is of least rank that cannot be
resurrected, then force with such a poset.
We shall refer to this definition as the subcomplete least-counterexample to RA
sc
(Hω2)
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lottery sum iteration of length κ.
Notice that this iteration may as well have been defined in Hκ, since κ is uplifting.
3 In
particular, if V Pα thinks that Q˙ is a least rank counterexample to resurrection at stage α+1,
let γ be large enough so that Q˙ ∈ Hγ and HPαγ |= “Q˙ is subcomplete.” Since κ is uplifting,
this means that there is a Q˙′ in HPακ which is a counterexample to resurrection. But since
Q˙ is chosen to be of least rank, it must in fact be that Q˙ has rank at most that of Q˙′, which
means that Q˙ is in HPακ , and so Hκ is enough to recognize least-rank counterexamples to
resurrection. Furthermore each of the posets Pα, for α < κ, are in Hκ, and Hκ agrees that
these posets are subcomplete and cannot be resurrected. Indeed, if instead it were possible
for Hκ to think that there is some subcomplete forcing Q′ that cannot be resurrected, i.e.,
all further subcomplete R˙ have the property that if g ∗ h ⊆ Q′ ∗ R˙ then Hω2 = H
Hκ
ω2
is
not elementary in H
V [g][h]
ω2 = H
Hκ[g][h]
ω2 , then it is correct. For the only way that Hκ could
possibly be wrong is that instead there is some subcomplete R˙ that in fact does resurrect
Q′ in V . But this implies that there must be such a poset that is an element of Hκ. To
see why, take γ to be large enough so that R˙ ∈ Hγ, where γ is larger than the verification
of R˙’s subcompleteness in HQ
′
γ . Then Hγ sees that there is a further subcomplete forcing R˙
that resurrects Q′, namely, letting H ⊆ R be generic over V [g], we have that HVω2 = H
Vκ
ω2
is
elementary in H
V [g][H]
ω2 = H
Hγ [g][H]
ω2 . As κ is uplifting, Hκ 4 Hγ, so there must be a witness to
resurrection in Hκ. Thus least rank counterexamples of the iteration fall in Hκ. So each of
the iterants of P are in Hκ, as they are always assumed to have least rank. This also shows
that the forcing P is κ-cc, since each Pα is relatively small and κ is inaccessible.
We then have that letting M = 〈Hκ,∈〉, the subcomplete least-counterexample to
RA
sc
(Hω2) lottery sum iteration of length κ, P ⊆ Hκ, is nice for class forcing over M.
Let us now show that this iteration P actually works as planned, and shows that RA
sc
(Hω2)
holds in the extension. Let G ⊆ P be generic. Suppose toward a contradiction that RA
sc
(Hω2)
3Indeed, uplifting cardinals are Σ3-reflecting, as Hamkins and Johnstone show.
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does not hold in V [G]. Then there is a subcomplete forcing Q of least rank in V [G] for which
resurrection fails. Let Q˙ be a name for Q such that there is p ∈ G forcing that resurrection
fails for this Q˙: in particular, p forces that Q is a subcomplete poset of least rank so that after
any further forcing R˙ satisfying Q “R˙ is subcomplete”, letting h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ be V [G]-generic,
it is not the case that H
V [G]
ω2 4 H
V [G∗h]
ω2 . Let H ⊆ Q be generic over V [G].
We will use the uplifting property of κ to argue thatQ appears at stage κ of the same exact
iteration, except the iteration as defined in some larger inaccessible γ, toward a contradiction.
To find a suitable γ we use the fact that κ is highly uplifting. In particular we may let
γ > θ, where θ verifies the subcompleteness of P. Also let γ be larger than the verification
of Q’s subcompleteness. Then any such γ will also verify the subcompletenes of P and Q
by Lemma 2.2.5. Moreover, to make sure that Hγ[G] will agree that Q is of least rank,
make sure that γ is large enough so that Hγ[G] contains the further, set-many subcomplete
posets R˙, which provide the reasons that lower-rank posets are not in fact counterexamples to
RA
sc
(Hω2) in V [G]. In particular, for every subcomplete poset Q
′ ∈ V [G] of lower rank than
Q, make sure that there is a further forcing R˙ in Hγ [G] such that Q′ “R˙ is subcomplete”
in Hγ[G], such that letting h ⊆ Q′ ∗ R˙ be V [G]-generic, it is the case that H
V [G]
ω2 4 H
V [G∗h]
ω2
– in other words, in Hγ[G], we have that R˙ resurrects Hω2. This ensures that Hγ[G] agrees
with V [G] that Q is a least-rank counterexample. This follows since for any stage α < κ,
we have Hκ[Gα] 4 Hγ [Gα] where Gα ⊆ Pα. Finding such an inaccessible γ is possible, since
this process is bounded by the size of the iteration P and the size of the poset Q.
Let P∗ = Pγ be defined in the same way as the least-rank counterexample to RAsc(Hω2)
lottery sum rcs iteration of length κ as we defined above, except with length γ instead of κ.
Above, we ensured that P and P∗ agree below stage κ.
Thus letting M∗ = 〈Hγ,∈〉, we have that the niceness of P is preserved to M∗, as
Pγ ⊆ Hγ is defined the same way over Hγ as P is over M.
Above we have shown that Q˙ may be chosen at stage κ. Thus we may say that below
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a condition picking Q˙ at stage κ, namely p ∈ P, we have that P∗ factors as P ∗ Q˙ ∗ Ptail.
Let G∗ = G ∗H ∗Gtail ⊆ P ∗ Q˙ ∗ Ptail be generic over V . Then by the Lifting Lemma (Fact
4.2.11), as we have argued that the iteration is defined over Hκ, we have that Hκ 4 Hγ given
by κ uplifting lifts to
Hκ[G] 4 Hγ[G
∗]
in V [G∗].
Note that we already have that Hκ[G] = H
V [G]
κ = H
V [G]
ω2 , since κ is regular and P has the
κ-cc, and by Lemma 3.2.7 the length of the iteration is collapsed to ω2. We can argue the
same way to get that Hγ [G
∗] = H
V [G∗]
γ = H
V [G∗]
ω2 .
Thus we have that H
V [G]
ω2 4 H
V [G∗H∗Gtail]
ω2 , contradicting the choice of Q. So RAsc(Hω2)
holds as desired.
The same proof may of course be used to show that RA<ω1-closed(Hω2) may be forced from
the existence of an uplifting cardinal. For the other direction in showing the equiconsistency
of RA
sc
(Hω2) (or indeed RA<ω1-closed(Hω2),) with an uplifting cardinal, we shall use the same
methods as in [HJ14a] to see that if the resurrection axiom holds, then ω2 is uplifting in L.
Theorem 4.2.13. RA
sc
(Hω2) implies that ω
V
2 is uplifting in L.
Proof. Let κ = ωV2 . To see that κ is uplifting in L, we need to show that for arbitrarily
large ordinals γ that are regular cardinals in L, we have that HLκ 4 H
L
γ . Since κ is regular,
κ is regular in L. For any θ > κ, let Q be the poset forcing Coll (ω1, θ), which is of course
subcomplete. By RA
sc
(Hω2) we have a further forcing R˙ such that g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is generic
over V and letting γ = ω
V [g][h]
2 , we have that
HVκ 4 H
V [g∗h]
γ .
Since θ was forced to have cardinality ω1 in V [g], θ < γ. Since γ is regular in V [g ∗ h] we
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have that γ is regular in L. Thus by relativizing formulas to the constructible universe, we
have that
HLκ = (H
V
κ ∩ L) 4 (H
V [g∗h]
γ ∩ L) = H
L
γ .
Thus κ is uplifting in L as desired.
Of course we may also show using a virtually identical proof that RA<ω1-closed(Hω2) implies
ωV2 is uplifting in L.
What do models of RA
sc
(Hω2) look like? Many similar results shown in models of the
maximality principle for subcomplete forcing also hold in models of the resurrection axiom
for subcomplete forcing. One can view this as a consequence of the fact that both of these
axioms imply the local maximality principle.
Lemma 4.2.14. RA
sc
(Hω2) =⇒ MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2).
Proof. Suppose that subcomplete resurrection RA
sc
(Hω2) holds. To see that the local sub-
complete maximality principle holds, suppose that ϕ(a) is a sentence such that the sentence
“Hω2 |= ϕ(a)” is sc-forceably sc-necessary. So there is a subcomplete forcing P such that
after any further forcing, we have that “Hω2 |= ϕ(a)” holds in the extension. By resurrection,
there is a further R˙ such that P “R˙ is sc” such that letting G∗h ⊆ P∗ R˙ be generic we have
Hω2 4 H
V [G∗h]
ω2 . Since H
V [G∗h]
ω2 |= ϕ(a), this means that Hω2 |= ϕ(a) holds by elementarity,
so MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) holds as desired.
Proposition 4.2.15. RA
sc
(Hω2) implies the following:
1. There is a Suslin tree.
2. ♦ holds.
3. CH holds.
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Proof. By the above Lemma 4.2.14, RA
sc
(Hω2) implies MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2), the local subcomplete
maximality principle. Indeed, looking at Fact 4.0.3 we see that the resurrection axiom is
a kind of generalization of the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom. So we are done by
Proposition 4.1.10.
Just as in the case of the maximality principle, cf. Proposition 4.1.15, if V = L[a] for
some set a, then it is not possible for both RA<ω1-closed(Hω2) and RAsc(Hω2) to both hold.
Theorem 4.2.16. If V = L[a] where a is a set, and RA<ω1-closed(Hω2) holds, then RAsc(Hω2)
fails.
Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume that the set a is a set of ordinals, a ⊆ θ
for some θ. Let V = L[a], and assume that RA<ω1-closed(Hω2) holds.
Let G ⊆ Coll (ω1, θ) be generic. Then as V = L[a] we have that
HV [G]ω2 |= “There is a set b ⊆ Ord such that every countable set of ordinals is in L[b].”
Namely, this sentence is witnessed by b = a. In particular, letting κ = ω
V [G]
2 , we have that
κω ∩ L[a] = κω ∩ Lκ[a] = (Ord
ω ∩ L[a])H
V [G]
κ .
Then by RA<ω1-closed(Hω2), letting H be generic for some countably closed forcing over V [G],
we have that HVω2 4 H
V [G][H]
ω2 . So
HVω2 |= “There is a set b ⊆ Ord such that every countable set of ordinals is in L[b].”
Let b be such a set in HVω2. Then b is a bounded subset of ω2, and in particular, we have
that ωω2 = (ω
ω
2 )
Lω2 [b], i.e., countable subsets of ω2 of V are the same as those of Lω2 [b]. But
this means that Namba forcing, which adds a new countable ω2-sequence not in V , can’t be
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resurrected, so RA
sc
(Hω2) fails.
As with the maximality principle, cf. Theorems 4.1.17, 4.1.18, it is not surprising
that it is possible for the subcomplete resurrection axiom to hold while the countably closed
resurrection axiom fails.
Corollary 4.2.17. It is consistent for RA
sc
(Hω2) to hold while RA<ω1-closed(Hω2) fails, and
vice-versa.
Proof. Force RA
sc
(Hω2) to hold over L, with δ an uplifting cardinal. Then we obtain L[G],
which models the subcomplete resurrection axiom. Thus by the previous Theorem 4.2.16,
we have that RA<ω1-closed(Hω2) fails, as desired. The same proof may be used to show that
it is possible for RA
sc
(Hω2) to fail while RA<ω1-closed(Hω2) holds.
It is then reasonable to ask whether it is possible for the subcomplete resurrection axiom
and the countably closed resurrection axiom to hold at the same time.
Question 4.2.18. Is it consistent for RA
sc
(Hω2) and RA<ω1-closed(Hω2) to both hold?
This question is similar to the question for the local maximality principle, since if the
above resurrection axioms did both hold, then both MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) and MP
Hω2
<ω1-closed
(Hω2) hold,
meaning that MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) and MP
Hω2
<ω1-closed
(∅) both hold. This would imply that V is
closed under sharps (Theorem 4.1.23). Furthermore, we know that if there is a hyper-
huge cardinal, then MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) and MP
Hω2
<ω1-closed
(∅) do not both hold, by relativizing the
proof of Theorem 4.1.21 to Hω2. Additionally, if the above resurrection axioms both
hold, then MP
Hω2
sc (∅) and MP
Hω2
<ω1-closed
(Hω2) both hold. This is consistent, for example if
MP<ω1-closed(Hω2) and MPsc(∅) both hold, as in Theorem 4.1.19. Thus we leave this ques-
tion to future research.
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4.2.2 Consistency of the Local Maximality Principle
We will now introduce the large cardinal property that is equiconsistent with the local
maximality principle. We give the proof after showing the equiconsistency of the resurrection
axiom because of the similarities in method and large cardinal used. When showing the
consistency of the subcomplete resurrection axiom in 4.2.1, we defined the notion of an
uplifting cardinal, of which the following property is the suitable “local” version.
Definition 4.2.19. An inaccessible cardinal δ is locally uplifting so long as for every
formula ϕ(x) and a ∈ Vδ, for every θ we have that θ-locally uplifting, meaning that there is
an inaccessible γ > θ such that Vδ |= ϕ(a) ⇐⇒ Vγ |= ϕ(a). ⊣
Note that if a regular cardinal δ has the property of being locally uplifting, without
necessarily being inaccessible, then δ must be inaccessible, since otherwise if 2α ≥ δ for some
α < δ, this is seen by some larger Vγ, i.e., Vγ |= ∃β 2α = β. So by elementarity there is some
β ′ = 2α in Vδ, a contradiction.
We have the following relationship between locally uplifting and reflecting cardinals.
Proposition 4.2.20. If κ is locally uplifting then κ is reflecting.
Proof. Suppose that κ is locally uplifting. To show that κ is reflecting, let ϕ(x) be a formula
and let a ∈ Hκ, and that there is θ > κ where Hθ |= ϕ(a). Define ψ as follows:
ψ(a) : ∃δ Hδ |= ϕ(a).
Then if we take γ > θ satisfying Hθ ∈ Hγ, we have that Hγ |= ψ(a). As κ is locally uplifting,
this implies that Hκ |= ψ(a). Thus there is δ < κ such that Hδ |= ϕ(a) as desired.
It is not hard to see that the local maximality principle is implied by the resurrection
axiom, as has been pointed out before in Lemma 4.2.14. Here we show that the local
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maximality principle is equiconsistent with the existence of a locally uplifting cardinal, using
the same method as with the proof of the maximality principle but with some care in
relativizing to Hω2.
Theorem 4.2.21. If δ is locally uplifting, then there is a subcomplete forcing extension in
which MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) holds and δ = ω2.
Proof. Let δ be locally uplifting. Define the δ-length subcomplete lottery sum rcs iteration
P = Pδ as follows: for α < δ let
Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α ∗ Coll (ω1, |Pα|),
where Q˙α is a Pα-name for the lottery sum of all minimal rank subcomplete posets that force
some sentence relativized to HV
Pα
ω2
to be sc-necessary. In particular, let Φ be the collection
of formulas ϕ(x) with parameter a ∈ HV
Pα
ω2
such that:
V Pα |= “ϕHω2 (a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary,” in other words,
V Pα |= “‘Hω2 |= ϕ(a)’ is sc-forceably sc-necessary.”
So Φ is the set of all possible Hω2-buttons available at this point in the iteration. Then we
let
Q˙α =
⊕
ϕ∈Φ
{
Q˙ ∈ V Pα | Q˙ is least rank, V Pα |= “Q˙ is sc and forces ‘ϕ(a)Hω2 is sc-necessary.’”
}
Since we will want the full iteration P to remain relatively small in size and to have the
δ-cc, notice that here we insist that the parameters for our sentences come from HV
Pα
ω2
, and
that the iteration may as well have been defined in Vδ. To see why amounts to the same
argument as given in the proof of Theorem 4.2.12. Firstly, as δ is inaccessible, it is large
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enough so that HVω2 = H
Vδ
ω2
, and moreover this remains true in each subsequent extension
in the iteration, i.e., V Pαδ = V
V Pα
δ , so Hω2 in the subsequent extensions gets interpreted the
same in V Pαδ as in V
Pα. If at stage α + 1 we have that Q˙′ ∈ V Pα is subcomplete and forces
that a sentence ϕ(a)Hω2 is sc-necessary, where a ∈ Hω2 , then take θ large enough so that
Q˙′ ∈ V Pαθ and θ verifies the subcompleteness of Q˙
′. Then for all γ > θ we have by Lemma
2.2.5 that
V Pαγ |= “There is a subcomplete forcing Q˙ forcing that ‘ϕ(a)
Hω2 is sc-necessary.’”
As δ is locally uplifting, this means that we have γ > θ satisfying the above, which implies
that
V Pαδ |= “There is a subcomplete forcing Q˙ forcing that ‘ϕ(a)
Hω2 is sc-necessary.’”
So since each of the iterants of the forcing P are taken to be of least rank, they are all in Vδ.
If on the other hand at stage α+ 1 we have that Q˙′ ∈ V Pαδ is subcomplete and of least rank
forcing that a sentence ϕ(a)Hω2 is sc-necessary, then the only way it could be wrong is that
there is some further subcomplete forcing R˙′ that is not in V Pα∗Q˙
′
δ that forces the sentence
to be false. But then we may take γ larger than the verification of this forcing R˙′, and use
the fact that δ is locally uplifting to see that
V Pα∗Q˙
′
δ |= “There is a subcomplete forcing R˙ forcing ¬ϕ(a)
Hω2 .’
This contradicts the choice of Q˙′ in Vδ, which means that Vδ is correct. Thus the iteration
is the same as if it were defined over Vδ as claimed.
Of course P is always defined, and for any name for a set x˙ in HV
Pα
ω2
the sentence “Hω2 |=
|x˙| = ω1” is sc-forceably sc-necessary in V Pα via collapse forcing.
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We shall refer to this definition as the subcomplete least-rank MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) lottery sum
iteration of length δ.
Now suppose that G ⊆ P is generic over V . Let’s see that V [G] |= MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2). Assume
toward a contradiction that it fails: namely ϕ(x) is a formula and a ∈ HV [G]ω2 are such that
in V [G]:
“ϕHω2 (a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary,” in other words,
“‘Hω2 |= ϕ(a)’ is sc-forceably sc-necessary,”
however, ϕ(a)Hω2 is not true in V [G]. Let us also take p ∈ G forcing the above to be the
case.
Note that H
V [G]
δ = H
V [G]
ω2 , since δ is regular and P has the δ-cc, and by Lemma 3.2.7
the length of the iteration is collapsed to ω2.
Let Q˙ be a name for Q, a least rank poset in V P and a˙ be a name for a such that in V P,
we have that “ϕ(a˙)Hω2 is sc-necessary.”
Since P has the δ-cc, at no stage in the iteration could δ be collapsed. This means that
there is some stage where the parameter a˙ appears, as with the proof of the Maximality
Principle from a fully reflecting cardinal (Theorem 4.1.3). Thus we may find a stage in
the iteration where the parameter a is available, past the support of p, say a ∈ Vδ[Gα].
Now we let θ be larger than the verification needed for P and Q˙’s subcompleteness, and
so that P ∈ Vθ and Q˙ ∈ V Pθ . Then as δ is locally uplifting, we have that there is γ > θ
satisfying
Vγ[Gα] |= “ϕ(a)
Hω2 is sc-forceably sc-necessary.”
Namely, Ptail ∗ Q˙ makes ϕ(a)Hω2 necessary, and as γ is larger than the verification needed
for the subcompleteness of P and Q˙, we have that this is true in Vγ . So by the fact that δ is
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uplifting, we have that
Vδ[Gα] |= “ϕ(a)
Hω2 is sc-forceably sc-necessary.”
Moreover, ϕ(a)Hω2 must continue to be sc-forceably sc-necessary in later stages, as ϕ(a)Hω2
continues to be a button in Vγ in later stages of the iteration since we took α larger than
the support of p. Thus it is dense for the button to be pushed, so that we have ϕ(a)Hω2 is
forced to be sc-necessary at some stage Vδ[Gβ]. But this means that ϕ(a)
Hω2 is sc-necessary
in Vδ[Gβ], since the rest of the iteration is subcomplete. Thus ϕ(a)
Hω2 is true in V [G], a
contradiction as it was chosen as evidence of the failure of MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) in V [G].
For the other direction of the equiconsistency of MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) with a locally uplifting
cardinals, we show that in L there is a locally uplifting cardinal if the local maximality
principle for subcomplete forcing holds.
Theorem 4.2.22. If MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2) holds, then ω2 is locally uplifting in L.
Proof. Let κ = ω2 and suppose that the subcomplete local maximality principle holds.
Firstly, κ is a limit cardinal in L, since for γ < κ, the statement Hω2 |= “there is a
cardinal in L greater than γ” is sc-forceably sc-necessary (by taking Coll (ω1, κ)) and thus
true in Hω2. So we have that κ is inaccessible.
Assume Lκ |= ϕ(a). In other words, Hω2 |= ϕ
L(a). We need to show that there is a larger
γ such that Lγ |= ϕ(a). In order to do this, let’s work in L and first see that the following
is sc-forceably sc-necessary:
Hω2 |= (ϕ
L(a) ∧ “there are unboundedly many cardinals in L”). (4.5)
This holds since otherwise it is sc-forceably sc-necessary that Hω2 |= ¬ϕ
L(a), so Hω2 |=
¬ϕL(a) holds, a contradiction.
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So, given some γ > κ, we may use subcomplete (indeed, countably closed) forcing over
L to collapse γ to ω1. Then by (4.5), there is further forcing to reach a model V [G][H ] such
that
HV [G][H]ω2 |= ϕ
L(a).
Thus in V [G][H ], ϕLω2 (a) holds. Since ω
V [G][H]
2 = γ
′ > γ > κ in this extension now, and
furthermore by (4.5)
Lγ′ |= ϕ(a) and “there are unboundedly many cardinals”,
we now have a suitable γ′ = ω
V [G][H]
2 that is inaccessible in L and Lγ′ |= ϕ(a) as desired.
Of course, this theorem would also work to show that if the countably closed, proper,
or semiproper local maximality principle holds, then ω2 is uplfiting in L, since all we use is
countably closed forcing for the proof.
4.3 Combining Resurrection and Maximality
Hamkins and Johnstone [HJ14a, Section 6] combine the resurrection axiom with forcing
axioms, like PFA for example, to hold after a forcing iteration. The same proof techniques
show that the subcomplete forcing axiom can hold alongside the subcomplete resurrection
axiom.
This section focuses on a different question in a similar vein: is it possible for the res-
urrection axiom and the maximality principle to hold at the same time? The axioms do
not imply each other directly, MP
sc
(Hω2) surely does not imply RAsc(Hω2), since the consis-
tency strength of MP
sc
(Hω2) is that of a fully reflecting cardinal, while RAsc(Hω2) has the
consistency strength an uplifting cardinal. If κ is fully reflecting, take the least γ such that
Vκ 4 Vγ. If there isn’t such a γ, then κ isn’t uplifting anyway. Then in Vγ , we have that κ is
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not uplifting. There is no implication in the other direction as well. This is because working
in a minimal model of
T = ZFC + “V = L” + “there is an uplifting cardinal”
(i.e., no initial segment of the model satisfies this theory), we may force over this minimal
model to obtain RA
sc
(Hω2). Now MPsc(Hω2) can’t hold in the extension, since letting κ be
the ω2 of the extension, if MPsc(Hω2) were true, then that would imply that Lκ is elementary
in L, i.e., Lκ would be a model of T - contradicting the minimality of the model we started
with.
However, both MP
sc
(Hω2) and RAsc(Hω2) imply the local version of the maximality prin-
ciple, MP
Hω2
sc (Hω2).
Here we show that it is possible for subcomplete maximality and resurrection to both
hold, by combining the techniques showing the consistency of each principle, all in one
minimal counterexample iteration. To do this, we need a combination of two large cardinal
properties. Although showing the maximality principle will again need the length of the
iteration to be fully reflecting, we will need a stronger notion of uplifting than we have
previously stated. This is because as before, proving that the resurrection axiom holds relies
upon being able to define the iteration in some larger class. However, the iteration designed
to force the maximality principle from a fully uplifting cardinal κ is not first order definable
over Vκ, which is what we would need to use the uplifting criterion. It is definable over V ,
but not Vκ, as the sentences have parameters in Vκ and truth is evaluated over Vκ. But this
is remedied by using the methods of Hamkins and Johnstone in [HJ14b], where they show
the consistency of strongly uplifting cardinals is exactly that of the boldface resurrection
axiom, which we will define below. Here we are allowed to carry around predicates in our
structures.
CHAPTER 4. AXIOMS ABOUT SUBCOMPLETE FORCING 119
Definition 4.3.1. An inaccessible cardinal κ is strongly uplifting fully reflecting so
long as:
• κ is fully reflecting, i.e. Vκ 4 V
• κ is strongly uplifting ; meaning that it is strongly θ uplifting for every ordinal θ.
This means that for every A ⊆ Vκ there is an inaccessible cardinal γ ≥ θ and a set
A∗ ⊆ Vγ such that 〈Vκ,∈, A〉 4 〈Vγ,∈, A∗〉 is a proper elementary extension.4 ⊣
Combining these two large cardinal notions is almost natural. If κ is uplifting then there
are unboundedly many γ such that Vκ 4 Vγ, and if on top of that κ is reflecting, we add
that Vκ 4 V as well, where V is in some sense the limit of the Vγ ’s.
Definition 4.3.2. A cardinal δ is subtle so long as for any club C ⊆ δ and for any sequence
A = 〈Aα | α ∈ C〉 with Aα ⊆ α, there is a pair of ordinals α < β in C such that
Aα = Aβ ∩ α. ⊣
Fact 4.3.3. If a cardinal δ is subtle, then δ is inaccessible.
Proposition 4.3.4. If δ is subtle, then it is consistent that there is a strongly uplifting fully
reflecting cardinal. Namely, {κ < δ | Vδ |= “κ is strongly uplifting and Vκ 4 V ”} is station-
ary in δ.
Proof. Hamkins and Johnstone [HJ14b, Theorem 7] show that if δ is subtle, then the set of
cardinals κ below δ that are strongly uplifting in Vδ is stationary. But since δ is subtle, it must
also be inaccessible by Fact 4.3.3. Thus in Vδ, by the proof of the downward Lowenheim-
Skolem theorem, there is a club C ⊆ δ of cardinals κ such that Vκ 4 Vδ; meaning that κ is
fully reflecting in Vδ. This means that there is some α < κ that is both strongly uplifting
and fully reflecting in Vδ, giving us the required consistency.
4As described by Hamkins and Johnstone in the comments on page 5 of their paper, we may let γ be
regular, uplifting, weakly compact, etc. Additionally, if κ is strongly uplifting then κ is inaccessible.
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Since we will be using the stronger large cardinal notion while showing that the subcom-
plete maximality principle and the subcomplete resurrection principle can hold at the same
time, we might as well show that the stronger subcomplete resurrection principle holds as
well, which we define below.
Definition 4.3.5. Let Γ be a fixed, definable class of forcing notions. Let τ be a term for a
cardinality to be computed in various models; e.g. c, ω1, etc. The Boldface Resurrection
Axiom RAΓ(Hτ ) asserts that for every forcing notion Q ∈ Γ and A ⊆ Hτ there is a further
forcing R˙ with Q R˙ ∈ Γ such that if g∗h ⊆ Q∗R˙ is V -generic, then there is an A∗ ∈ V [G∗h]
such that 〈HVτ ,∈, A〉 4 〈H
V [g∗h]
τ ,∈, A∗〉. ⊣
As discussed in the previous section, it doesn’t make too much sense to talk about the
subcomplete resurrection axiom at the continuum, like is done in [HJ14b], so as before we
will be relativizing the notion to subcomplete forcing using ω2 instead. Thus the notion we
will be looking at is RA
sc
(Hω2). We will be following the proof of [HJ14b, Theorem 19] to
show that the boldface resurrection axiom holds from a strongly uplifting cardinal. Of course
the following theorem may be tweaked to work for for other classes of forcing notions such
as proper forcing, but our focus here is on subcomplete forcing.
Theorem 4.3.6. Let κ be a strongly uplifting fully reflecting cardinal. Then there is a
forcing extension in which both RA
sc
(Hω2) and MPsc(Hω2) hold, and κ = ω2.
Proof. Let κ be strongly uplifting fully reflecting. Below we define P to be the subcomplete
least-counterexample to RA
sc
(Hω2) + MPsc(Hω2) lottery sum rcs iteration of length κ. In
particular, generically pick, using the lottery sum, whether at each stage to force with the
least-rank counterexamples to the maximality principle or the least-rank counterexamples
to the boldface resurrection axiom.
In particular, we are defining the poset P = Pκ = 〈(Pα, Q˙α) | α < κ〉 as follows:
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At stage α + 1, look at all the formulas with parameters in HV
Pα
ω2
that are not true
in V Pακ , but can be forced by some subcomplete poset Q˙ to be sc-necessary, where Pα
“Q˙ is subcomplete.” Let M be the collection of such possible subcomplete forcing notions
Q˙ in V Pακ of minimal rank in Vκ for which the above holds. SoM contains the minimal rank
counterexamples to the maximality principle.
Additionally, letR be the collection of subcomplete forcings of minimal rank, Q˙, such that
there is A˙ ⊆ HV
Pα
ω2
where after any further forcing R¨ satisfying Pα∗Q˙ “R¨ is subcomplete”,
it is not the case that 〈HV
Pα
ω2
,∈, A˙〉 4 〈HV
Pα∗Q˙∗R¨
ω2
,∈, A˙∗〉 for all A˙∗. Thus R contains the
minimal rank counterexamples to the boldface resurrection axiom.
Then take:
Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α ∗ Coll (ω1, |Pα|)
where Q˙α is a term for the lottery sum ⊕R
⊕
⊕M.
Let G ⊆ P be generic. We need to show that both RA
sc
(Hω2) and MPsc(Hω2) hold in
V [G].
First we show that MP
sc
(Hω2) holds in V [G], by assuming toward a contradiction that it
fails. Assume ϕ(a) satisfies that:
V [G] |= “ϕ(a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary but ϕ(a) is false.”
Additionally choose a condition p ∈ G that forces the above statement. P has the κ-cc, which
follows from arguing that the separate iterations are (see Theorems 4.1.3 and 4.2.12), so
at no stage in the iteration is κ collapsed. This means that there has to be some stage where
a appears. So there is some stage in the iteration beyond the support of p, say α < κ, where
a ∈ Vκ[Gα]. Specifically ϕ(a) is an available button at stage α+1, since after the rest of the
iteration, P ↾ [α + 1, κ) where P = Pα ∗ P ↾ [α + 1, κ), which is subcomplete, we have that
ϕ(a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary. Thus V [Gα] sees that ϕ(a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary, so
CHAPTER 4. AXIOMS ABOUT SUBCOMPLETE FORCING 122
as κ is fully reflecting,
Vκ[Gα] |= “ϕ(a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary”.
From that point on, ϕ(a) continues to be a button, since we have that α is beyond the support
of p, so P↾[α+1,κ) “ϕ(a) is sc-forceably sc-necessary.” Thus it is dense, in P, for ϕ(a) to be
“pushed” at some point after stage α, say β. So we have β < κ such that there is Q forcing
ϕ(a) to be sc-necessary in Vκ[Gβ]. Let H ⊆ Q be generic over V [Gβ] so that there is some
Gtail generic for the rest of P satisfying V [Gβ][H ][Gtail] = V [G]. The sentence ϕ(a) is now
sc-necessary in Vκ[Gβ][H ]. But then since Vκ[Gβ][H ] 4 V [Gβ][H ], as we are still in an initial
segment of the full iteration, we have that ϕ(a) is sc-necessary in V [Gβ ][H ], by elementarity.
Thus since the rest of the iteration is subcomplete, ϕ(a) is true in V [Gβ ][H ][Gtail] = V [G],
contradicting our assumption that ϕ(a) is false in V [G].
Thus MP
sc
(Hω2) holds in V [G].
In order to show that RA
sc
(Hω2) holds in V [G], assume toward a contradiction that it
fails. This means we can choose a least rank counterexample, a subcomplete forcing Q in
V [G] that supposedly cannot be resurrected. Let A ⊆ Hκ, where κ = ω
V [G]
2 , be its associated
predicate. Let Q˙ be a name for Q of minimal rank that necessarily yields a subcomplete
poset. Since P has the κ-cc, there must be a name for the predicate in the extension such
that A˙ ⊆ Hκ with A = A˙G.
We will argue that Q˙ appears at stage κ of the same exact iteration, except defined in
some larger Vγ[G] = V
V [G]
γ where γ is inaccessible. Use the strong uplifting property of κ,
and code the iteration P as a subset of κ, to find a sufficiently large inaccessible cardinal γ
so that
〈Vκ,∈,P, A˙〉 4 〈Vγ,∈,P
∗, A˙∗〉,
where P∗ is the subcomplete least-counterexample to RA
sc
(Hω2) lottery sum rcs iteration
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of length γ as defined in Vγ. However, obtaining a large enough γ again requires a process
of closing under least-rank counterexamples, as was done in the proof of Theorem 4.2.12.
The difference in this proof is that not only does Vγ need to agree about the rank of least-
rank counterexamples to the resurrection axiom throughout the iteration P, it must also
compute the least-rank counterexamples to the maximality principle appropriately as well.
Since Vκ ∈ Vγ, and the ranks throughout the maximality iteration were computed in Vκ, the
minimal ranks are guaranteed to be computed properly in Vγ . And so we obtain:
Vγ |= “P is a sc least-counterexample to RAsc(Hω2) lottery sum iteration”
and
“Q˙ is sc of minimal rank witnessing the failure of RA
sc
(Hω2).”
Indeed we have argued above that P∗ is defined the same way as P below stage κ, so we may
assume below a condition that Q˙ may be picked at stage κ. So below a condition that opts
for Q˙ at the stage κ lottery we may say that P∗ factors as P ∗ Q˙ ∗ Ptail.
Let H ∗ Gtail ⊆ Q ∗ Ptail be V [G]-generic. Letting G∗ = G ∗ H ∗ Gtail, this means that
G∗ ⊆ P∗ generic is over V . Moreover, by Fact 4.2.11 the strongly uplifting embedding
〈Vκ,∈,P, A˙〉 4 〈Vγ,∈,P
∗, A˙∗〉
lifts to
〈Vκ[G],∈,P, A˙, G〉 4 〈Vγ[G
∗],∈,P∗, A˙∗, G∗〉
in V [G∗]. Since A is definable from A˙ and G, we may say that
〈Vκ[G],∈,P, A〉 4 〈Vγ[G
∗],∈,P∗, A∗〉.
CHAPTER 4. AXIOMS ABOUT SUBCOMPLETE FORCING 124
As we had in the proof of RA
sc
(Hω2) from an uplifting cardinal, again we have that
Vκ[G] = H
V [G]
κ = H
V [G]
ω2
,
since κ is inaccessible and P has the κ-cc, and by Lemma 3.2.7. We can argue the same
way as above, replacing κ with γ, to get that
Vγ[G
∗] = HV [G
∗]
γ = H
V [G∗]
ω2
.
This establishes
〈HV [G]ω2 ,∈, A〉 4 〈H
V [G∗]
ω2
,∈, A∗〉,
so RA
sc
(Hω2) in fact holds as desired.
In fact RA
sc
(Hω2)+MPsc(Hω2) is equiconsistent with the existence of a strongly uplifting
fully reflecting cardinal.
Theorem 4.3.7. If both RA
sc
(Hω2) and MPsc(Hω2) hold, then ω2 is strongly uplifting fully
reflecting in L.
Proof. Assume that both RA
sc
(Hω2) and MPsc(Hω2) hold.
We already have established that since MP
sc
(Hω2) holds, ω2 is fully reflecting in L by
Lemma 4.1.4.
Furthermore we claim that κ = ωV2 is strongly uplifting in L. Fix any subset A ⊆ Hκ
in L, and let θ be a large ordinal in L. So A ⊆ Lκ and A ∈ L. Thus A ∈ Lξ for some
ξ < (κ+)L. We need to find a regular κ′ > θ and a set A∗ ⊆ HLκ′ such that
〈HLκ ,∈, A〉 4 〈H
L
κ′,∈, A
∗〉
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is an elementary extension. Note that here we are using the characterization of strongly
uplifting using Hκ and Hκ′, and as is outlined after the proof of Theorem 3 in [HJ14b], we
do not have to ensure that κ′ is inaccessible.
Code Lξ by a relation E ⊆ κ × κ, so that we have πE : 〈κ,E〉 ∼= 〈Lξ,∈〉. Let Q =
Coll (ω1, θ). By RAsc(Hω2) we have a further forcing R˙ with Q “R˙ is subcomplete” such
that if g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is V -generic, then there is an E ′ ∈ V [g ∗ h] such that
〈HVω2,∈, E〉 4 〈H
V [g∗h]
ω2
,∈, E ′〉. (4.6)
Since θ was forced to have cardinality ω1 in V [g], it must be that θ < κ
′ = ω
V [g∗h]
2 . Since κ
′
is regular in V [g ∗ h] we have that κ′ is regular in L.
We have that E ′ ⊆ κ′ × κ′ is well founded, and we have πE′ : 〈κ′, E ′〉 ∼= 〈Lξ′,∈〉. Thus
there is an elementary embedding
πE′ ◦ π
−1
E = σ : 〈Lξ,∈〉 ≺ 〈Lξ′ ,∈〉.
By (4.6) we have that π−1E ↾ κ = π
−1
E′ ↾ κ, and thus σ ↾ Lκ = id. Therefore σ ↾ Lκ gives rise to
the elementary embedding: 〈HLκ ,∈, A〉 4 〈H
L
κ′,∈, A
∗〉, where A∗ = σ(A), as desired.
Chapter 5
Generalized Diagonal Prikry Forcing
Jensen [Jen14, Section 3.3] shows that Prikry forcing and Namba forcing (under CH) are
subcomplete. Below we use an adaptation of Jensen’s proof showing that Prikry forcing
is subcomplete to see that some kinds of generalized diagonal Prikry forcing, in particular
those Prikry forcings that we refer to here as generalized diagonal Prikry forcing, studied by
Fuchs [Fuc05], are subcomplete.
Definition 5.0.1. Let D be an infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals, meaning a set
of measurable cardinals that does not contain any of its limit points. For κ ∈ D let U(κ) be
a normal measure on κ, and let U denote the sequence of the U(κ)’s.
Define D = D(U), generalized diagonal Prikry forcing from the list of measures U ,
by taking conditions of the form (s, A) satisfying the following:
• The stem of the condition, s, is a function with domain in [D]<ω taking each measurable
cardinal κ ∈ dom(s) to some ordinal s(κ) < κ.
• The upper part of the condition, A, is a function with domain D \ dom(s) taking each
measurable cardinal κ ∈ dom(A) to some measure-one set A(κ) ∈ U(κ).
The extension relation on conditions in D is defined so that (s, A) ≤ (t, B) so long as
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• s ⊇ t.
• The points in s not in t come from B, i.e., for all κ ∈ dom(s) \ dom(t), s(κ) ∈ B(κ).
• For all κ ∈ dom(A), A(κ) ⊆ B(κ).
If G is a generic filter for D, then its associated D-generic sequence is
S = SG =
⋃
{s | ∃A (s, A) ∈ G} . ⊣
Note that our definition of D(U) differs from that as in Fuchs [Fuc05]. The main difference
is that here we only add one point below each measurable cardinal κ ∈ D, which is done
for simplicity’s sake. It is not hard to see that the following theorem showing generalized
diagonal Prikry forcing is subcomplete also shows that the forcing adding countably many
points below each measurable cardinal in D (where the conditions consist of finite stems)
is subcomplete. Adding countably many points below each measurable cardinal in D would
collapse the cofinality of each κ ∈ D to be ω, as one expects of a Prikry-like forcing.
Also in the above definition we haven’t enforced that the stem of our conditions only
consist of ordinals that are wedged between successive measurables in D; ie. for κ ∈ D,
we do not explicitly insist that s(κ) ∈ [sup(D ∩ κ), κ). However, it is dense in D(U) for
the conditions to be that way, since we can always strengthen conditions by restricting their
upper parts to a tail. Thus in the following characterization, we may freely add the condition
to the following genericity condition on D(U). Thie following is a genericity criterion on
generalized diagonal Prikry forcing similar to the Mathias criterion for Prikry forcing. It
was shown in [Fuc05, Theorem 1].
Fact 5.0.2 (Fuchs). Let D be an infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals, with U a
corresponding list of measures 〈U(κ) | κ ∈ D〉. Then an increasing sequence of ordinals
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S = 〈S(κ) | κ ∈ D〉, where for each κ ∈ D
sup(D ∩ κ) < S(κ) < κ,
is a D(U)-generic sequence if and only if for all X = 〈Xκ ∈ U(κ) | κ ∈ D〉, the set
{κ ∈ D | S(κ) /∈ Xκ} is finite.
Theorem 5.0.3. Let D be an infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals. Let U = 〈U(κ) | κ ∈
D〉 be a list of measures associated to D. Then D = D(U) is subcomplete.
Proof. Let θ >> δ(D) = δ be large enough, so that [δ]<ω1 ∈ Hθ.
It must be the case that δ ≥ supD: to see this, suppose instead that there is a dense
E ⊆ D such that supD ≥ κ∗ > |E| for some κ∗ ∈ D. Then for each condition (s, A) ∈ E
either κ∗ ∈ dom s or κ∗ ∈ domA. So taking E∗ = {(s, A) ∈ E | κ ∈ dom s} ⊆ E, since
|E∗| < κ∗ as well, there is an α < κ∗ such that sup(s,A)∈E∗ s(κ
∗). Let p = (t, B) ∈ D be
defined so that t(κ∗) = α and B(κ) = κ for all κ ∈ D \{κ∗}. Then p cannot be strengthened
by any condition in E since κ∗ is not in any of the stems of conditions in E. So dense subsets
of D must have size at least supD.
Let ν = δ+. Let κ(0) be the first measurable cardinal in D.
In order to show that D is subcomplete, suppose we are in the following situation:
• D ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full
• σ(θ,D,U , c) = θ,D,U , c for some c ∈ N .
By our requirement on θ, we’ve ensured that N is closed under countable sequences of
ordinals less than δ.
CHAPTER 5. GENERALIZED DIAGONAL PRIKRY FORCING 129
In what follows, we will be taking a few different transitive liftups of restrictions of σ, and
it will useful to keep track of embeddings between N and N pictorially. Although it’s not
extraordinarily illuminating at this point in our discussion, the following figure shows the
situation we are currently in, where σ(δ) = δ, ν = δ
+N
, D is the discrete set of measurables
in N that each measure in U comes from, and κ(0) is the first measurable in D, in the sense
of N .
N
⌢
κ(0) ∈ D -
δ -
ν -
κ(0) ∈ D-
δ-
ν-
N
⌢
σ
Toward showing that D is subcomplete, we are additionally given some G ⊆ D that is
generic over N . Rather than working with G, we will work with S = 〈S(κ) | κ ∈ D〉, its
associated D-generic sequence. We must show following, where C = Sk N (δ ∪X):
Claim (Main). There is a D-generic sequence S and a map σ′ ∈ V [S] such that:
1. σ′ : N ≺ N
2. σ′(θ,D,U , c) = θ,D,U , c
3. Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) = C
4. σ′“S ⊆ S
Pf. This proof uses Barwise theory (key definitions, facts, and theorems are summarized
Section 1.3) heavily, and ultimately amounts to showing that a certain ∈-theory, T , which
posits the existence of such a σ′, is consistent. Such an embedding σ′ can only possibly
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exist in a suitable generic extension, V [S], where S is D-generic sequence that we will find
later. Once we have such a suitable V [S], we will use Barwise theory to find an appropriate
admissible structure in V [S] for which the theory T , positing the existence of such a suitable
σ′, defined below, has a model.
For an admissible structure M with S, S, σ,N, θ,D,U , c ∈ M let the infinitary ∈-theory
T (M) be defined over M as follows:
predicates ∈
constants σ˙, x for x ∈M
axioms • ZFC− and Basic Axioms.
• σ˙ : N ≺ N
• σ˙(θ,D,U , c) = θ,D,U , c
• Sk N (δ ∪ range(σ˙)) = Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ))
• σ˙“S ⊆ S.
The ∈-theory is Σ1(M), since all of the axioms are M-finite except for the Basic Axioms,
which altogether are M-re as each of them are M-finite.
We need to find an appropriate D-generic sequence S and a suitable admissible structure
M containing S so that T (M) is consistent. To do this we use transitive liftups and Barwise
theory. Transitive liftups will give us the consistency of certain embeddings that approximate
the one we are looking for, and we will rely on Barwise Completeness (Fact 1.3.8) to obtain
the existence of a model with our desired properties.
Toward this end, let’s take what will turn out to be our first transitive liftup, which is in
some sense ensuring the consistency of having property 3 of our main claim.
Let k0 : N0 ∼= C where N0 is transitive, and set σ0 = k
−1
0 ◦ σ and σ0(θ,D,U , c) =
θ0,D0,U0, c0. Since δ ⊆ C and N0 is transitive, σ0(δ) = δ.
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Indeed N0 is actually a transitive liftup:
Claim 1. 〈N0, σ0〉 is the transitive liftup of 〈N, σ ↾ HNν 〉.
Pf. Recall that ν = δ+, and ν = δ
+N
. It must be shown that the embedding σ0 : N ≺ N0 is
ν-cofinal and that σ0 ↾ H
N
ν = σ ↾ H
N
ν .
To see that σ0 is ν-cofinal, let x ∈ N0. Then k0(x) ∈ C = Sk N(δ∪X) so k0(x) is uniquely
N -definable from ξ < δ and σ(z) where z ∈ N . In other words,
k0(x) = that y such that N |= ϕ(y, ξ, σ(z)).
Let u ∈ N be defined as
u =
{
w ∈ N | w = that y such that N |= ϕ(y, ζ, z) for some ζ < δ
}
.
Certainly u is non-empty by elementarity, since k0(x) ∈ σ(u). Furthermore, |u| ≤ δ < ν
since every w ∈ u is unique, and needs a corresponding ζ < δ to satisfy the formula ϕ with.
Thus x ∈ k−10 (σ(u)) = σ0(u) with |u| < ν in N , as desired.
Since X∪δ ⊆ C, the Skolem hull in N , we know that σ“HNν ⊆ C. Thus k
−1
0 ↾ σ“H
N
ν = id.
Therefore σ0 ↾H
N
ν = σ ↾H
N
ν , finishing the proof of the claim.
Since ν is regular in N , in N0 so is ν0 = σ0(ν) = sup σ0“ν. By Interpolation (Fact 1.4.4),
we may say that k0 is defined by
k0 : N0 ≺ N where k0 ◦ σ0 = σ and k0 ↾ ν0 = id.
In particular, ν0 is the critical point of k0, which is continuous below ν0. Thus we are in a
situation that we will represent with the following diagram:
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N
⌢
κ(0) ∈ D -
δ -
ν -
-
-
ν0
•
N0
⌢
κ(0) ∈ D-
δ-
ν-
N
⌢
σ0 k0
σ
Already, we can say that σ0 looks like it has one nice property: Sk N0(δ∪ range(σ0)) = C,
which somewhat looks like 3 of the main claim. However, we have not yet performed forcing,
σ0 is definable in V , and we still need to find a way to extend the generic sequence S to a
D-generic sequence over N . We still have a lot more work to do before finding σ′.
We shall define another ∈-theory, L∗ that will assist us in obtaining the diagonal Prikry
extension V [S] we need to satisfy our main claim. In order to do this, we will take another
transitive liftup and apply Transfer (Fact 1.3.11), in order to see that this new ∈-theory is
consistent over an admissible structure on N0.
Since we will be referring to the same ∈-theory over two different transitive liftups, I
would like to think of “ ∗ ” as a kind of placeholder for a transitive liftup in the following
definition.
Suppose that 〈N∗, σ∗〉 is a transitive liftup of N along with some reasonable restriction
of σ, ie. the liftup of 〈N, σ ↾HNα 〉, where α ≥ κ(0) is regular in N , and say
σ∗(θ,D,U , c) = θ∗,D∗,U∗, c∗.
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Recall that δN∗ is the least such that LδN∗ (N∗) is admissible.
Define the infinitary ∈-theory L(N∗, σ∗) = L∗ as follows:
predicates ∈
constants σ˚, S˚, x for x ∈ LδN∗ (N∗)
axioms • ZFC− and Basic Axioms
• σ˚ : N ≺ N∗ is κ(0)–cofinal
• σ˚(θ,D,U , c) = θ∗,D∗,U∗, c∗
• S˚ is a D∗-generic sequence over N∗
• σ˚“S ⊆ S˚.
As defined, we have that L∗ is a Σ1(LδN∗ (N∗))-theory, since altogether the Basic Axioms
are Σ1(LδN∗ (N∗)).
We claim that the theory is consistent.
Claim 2. L0 = L(N0, σ0) is consistent.
Pf. Of course, it is not the case that σ0 is κ(0)-cofinal - all we know is that it is ν-cofinal.
However, we know how to find an elementary embedding that is κ(0) cofinal: by taking a
suitable transitive liftup.
Let 〈N1, σ1〉 be the transitive liftup of 〈N, σ ↾HNκ(0)〉, which exists by Interpolation (Fact
1.4.4). So we have that σ1 ↾H
N
κ(0) = σ ↾H
N
κ(0). Let
σ1(θ,D,U , c) = θ1,D1,U1, c1.
Since σ1 ↾H
N
κ(0) = σ ↾H
N
κ(0) = σ0 ↾H
N
κ(0), we also have a unique
k1 : N1 ≺ N0 where k1 ◦ σ1 = σ0 and k1 ↾ κ1(0) = id where k1(0) = k1(κ(0)).
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Indeed k1 is continuous below κ1(0). We illustrate the final picture below, with σ and all
of the relevant transitive liftups.
N
⌢
κ(0) ∈ D -
δ -
ν -
N1
⌢
•
κ1(0) ∈ D1
N0
⌢
-
-
ν0
•
κ(0) ∈ D-
δ-
ν-
N
⌢
σ0
σ
σ1 k1 k0
We first show that L1 = L(N1, σ1) is consistent, by seeing that it has a model. To do this,
we will find a sequence extending σ1“S that is D1-generic over N1. Then we will use the
Transfer Lemma to see that this transfers to the consistency of L0.
First, force with D1, which is diagonal Prikry over N1, to obtain a diagonal Prikry
sequence S ′1. Define, in V [S
′
1], a new sequence S1 as follows:
S1(κ) =


S ′1(κ) if κ ∈ D1 \ σ1“D
σ1(S(κ)) if κ = σ1(κ) ∈ σ1“D.
Claim. The sequence S1 is a D1-generic sequence over N1.
Pf. We will show that S1 satisfies the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion (Fact
5.0.2) over N1. To do this, let X = 〈Xκ ∈ U1(κ) | κ ∈ D1〉, with X ∈ N1, be a sequence of
measure-one sets in the sequence of measures U1.
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Note first that S ′1 is a generic sequence, it already satisfies the generalized diagonal Prikry
genericity criterion, namely:
{κ ∈ D1 | S
′
1(κ) /∈ Xκ} is finite.
Recall that S = 〈S(κ) | κ ∈ D〉 is a D-generic sequence as well. We need to see that in
addition, {
κ ∈ D | σ1(S(κ)) /∈ Xσ1(κ)
}
is finite,
since then
{κ ∈ D1 | S1(κ) /∈ Xκ} =
{
κ ∈ D1 \ σ1“D | S
′
1(κ) /∈ Xκ
}
∪
{
κ = σ1(κ) ∈ σ1“D | σ1(S(κ)) /∈ Xκ
}
is finite as well, completing the proof as desired.
By the κ(0)-cofinality of σ1, there is some w ∈ N such that X ∈ σ1(w), where |w| < κ(0)
in N . Thus in N1, we have that |σ1(w)| < κ1(0). We may assume that w consists
of functions f ∈
∏
κ∈D U(κ). So for each κ ∈ σ1“D, we have that Xκ ∈ σ1(w)κ ={
σ1(f)(κ) | f ∈
∏
κ∈D U(κ) ∧ f ∈ w
}
and also |σ1(w)κ| < κ1(0). So all κ ∈ σ1“D of course
satisfy κ ≥ κ1(0) and thus by the κ-completeness of U1(κ), we have that Wκ := ∩ σ1(w)κ ∈
U1(κ). So we have established that W, the sequence of Wκ for κ ≥ κ1(0), is also a sequence
of measure-one sets in N1. Note in addition that for κ ∈ σ1“D, we have that Wκ ⊆ Xκ.
By elementarity, for each κ ∈ D, we have W κ = ∩
{
f(κ) | f ∈
∏
κ∈D U(κ) ∧ f ∈ w
}
is
a measure-one set in U(κ) and we also have that σ1(W κ) = Wσ1(κ). Moreover,
{
κ ∈ D | S(κ) /∈ W κ
}
is finite
by the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion for D, which must be satisfied by S.
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Thus by elementarity,
{
κ ∈ D | σ1(S(κ)) /∈ Wσ1(κ)
}
⊇
{
κ ∈ D | σ1(S(κ)) /∈ Xσ1(κ)
}
is finite,
as is desired, completing the proof of our claim.
Moreover we have now shown that L(N1, σ1) = L1 is consistent by Barwise Correctness
(Fact 1.3.7), since we have just shown that 〈Hδ; σ1, S1〉 is a model of L1.
Let’s check that we may now apply Transfer (Fact 1.3.11) to the embedding k1 : N1 ≺ N0.
By Lemma 1.4.7 we have that N1 is almost full. We also have that L1 = L(LδN1 (N1)) is
Σ1 over parameters
N1 and θ,D,U , c, θ1,D1,U1, c1 ∈ N1
while L0 = L(LδN0 (N0)) is Σ1 over parameters
N0 and k1(θ,D,U , c, θ1,D1,U1, c1) ∈ N0.
Furthermore k1 is cofinal, since for each element x ∈ N0, as σ0 is cofinal, there is u ∈ N such
that x ∈ σ0(u). Thus σ1(u) ∈ N1, and moreover x ∈ k1(σ1(u)) = σ0(u). Therefore, we have
that since L1 is consistent, L0 is consistent as desired. This completes the proof of Claim
2.
From the consistency of L0, we would now like to use Barwise Completeness (Fact 1.3.8)
to obtain a model of L0. To do this, we need the admissible structure the theory is defined
over to be countable. So let’s work in V [F ], a generic extension that collapses LδN0 (N0) to
be countable. Then by Barwise Completeness, L0 has a solid model
A = 〈A; S˚A, σ˚A〉
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such that
Ord ∩ wfc(A) = Ord ∩ LδN0 (N0).
Thus we have that σ˚A : N
A
≺ N0
A. By the Basic Axioms we have that N
A
= N and
N0 = N0
A. Thus we may say that σ˚A : N ≺ N0.
Let S = S˚A and
∗
σ = k0 ◦ σ˚A.
Then S is a D0-generic sequence over N0, and as k0 : N0 ∼= C we also have that k0“S
is C-generic for D. We need to see that S is D-generic over V . To do this, let X = 〈Xκ ∈
U1(κ) | κ ∈ D〉 be a sequence of measure-one sets in the sequence of measures U . We will
verify the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion. To do this, let E ⊆ D be dense
and have size δ with E ∈ C. Since δ ⊆ C, we have that E ⊆ C as well. Find a condition
(s, A) ∈ E that strengthens (∅,X ). Thus for κ ∈ domA, we have that A(κ) ⊆ Xκ. Define a
sequence of measure-one sets B in C so that
B(κ) =


A(κ) if κ ∈ domA
κ if κ ∈ dom s.
So we have that B is a sequence of measure-one sets in C. So {κ ∈ D | S(κ) /∈ B(κ)} is
finite. Thus {κ ∈ D | S(κ) /∈ Xκ} is finite.
This will be the D-generic sequence we need to satisfy our main claim. We will see in
the following claim that
∗
σ has all of the desired properties of our main claim, but it fails to
be in V [S], which is what we need. However, based on the following claim,
∗
σ will at least
enable us to see that our ∈-theory T from long ago, defined to assist us in proving the main
claim, is consistent over a suitable admissible structure.
Claim 3. The map
∗
σ satisfies:
1.
∗
σ : N ≺ N
CHAPTER 5. GENERALIZED DIAGONAL PRIKRY FORCING 138
2.
∗
σ(θ,D,U , c) = θ,D,U , c
3. Sk N(δ ∪ range(
∗
σ)) = C
4.
∗
σ“S ⊆ S
Pf. For item 1, we have already seen above that σ˚A : N ≺ N0. Since k0 : N0 ≺ N , the
desired result follows.
For item 2,
∗
σ(θ,D,U , c) = k0(θ0,D0,U0, c0) = θ,D,U , c.
Item 3 holds since N0 = Sk N0(δ∪ range(˚σA)). To see this, clearly we have that Sk N0(δ∪
range(˚σA)) ⊆ N0, since δ ∈ N0 as N0 ∼= C, and certainly range(˚σA)) ⊆ N0 as well. Then
because σ˚A is κ′-cofinal, by Lemma 1.4.3, we have, since σ˚A(κ′) < δ, that:
N0 =
{
σ˚A(f)(β) | f : γ −→ N0, γ < κ(0) and β < σ˚
A(γ)
}
⊆ Sk N(δ ∪ range(˚σA)).
Thus C = k0“N0 = Sk N0(δ ∪ range(k0 ◦ σ˚A)) as desired.
To see 4, note that
∗
σ ↾ κ(0) = σ˚A ↾ κ(0) since k0 ↾ ν0 = id.
This completes the proof of Claim 3.
We are almost done, but like we stated above, σ˚A is in V [F ], the generic extension needed
to obtain a countable admissible structure to apply Barwise Completeness to. But V [F ] is
not in V [S], and so
∗
σ is not necessarily in V [S]. We will use Barwise Completeness one last
time, to finally find an embedding σ′ with which to satisfy the main claim along with the S
we found above.
Let λ be regular in V [S] with N ∈ HV [S]λ . Then
M = 〈HV [S]λ ; N, σ, S; θ, δ,D,U , c〉 is admissible.
In order to satisfy our main claim, we need a model of T (M) in V [S]. By Claim 3, we
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have that 〈M,
∗
σ〉 is a model of T (M), but in V [F ], which is not V [S]. Still this means that
by Barwise Correctness, T (M) is consistent.
Consider the Mostowski collapse of M ; let
π : M˜ ≺M where M˜ is countable and transitive.
Note that M˜ ∈ HV [S]ω1 = H
V
ω1
since it is countable and diagonal Prikry forcing doesn’t add
bounded subsets to any κ ∈ D.1 We also have that N
A˜
= N , since M sees that N is
countable so M˜ sees that π−1(N) is, and it follows that π−1(N) = N .
Plus, T (M˜) is consistent, since otherwise its inconsistency could be pushed up via π to
one in T (M), contradicting the model witnessing its consistency that we found in V [F ].
So by Barwise Completeness, T (M˜) has a solid model
A˜ = 〈A˜; σ˙A˜〉
such that
Ord ∩ wfc(A˜) = Ord ∩ M˜.
Letting σ′ = π ◦ σ˙A˜, the main claim is now satisfied with σ′ and our λ-diagonal Prikry
sequence S.
Let us verify each of the properties of σ′ required by the main claim. The verification of
these properties shall use the agreement between A˜ and M˜ on the special constants of M˜
and on the ordinals. The fact that π does not affect N will be greatly taken advantage of.
First we show 1 of the main claim. Let’s say that ϕ[σ′(a)] holds in N . So ϕ[π(σ˙A˜(a))]N
holds in M . Thus ϕ[σ˙A˜(a)]π
−1(N) holds in M˜ , and thus also in A˜. Indeed we know that
N
A˜
= N , since A˜ agrees with M˜ about countable ordinals, which we may use to code N .
1As Fuchs [Fuc05] points out, this result is a modification to the proof that generalized diagonal Prikry
forcing preserves cardinalities.
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This means that ϕ[a] holds in N , as desired.
To see 2, we have σ′(θ,D,U , c) = π(θA˜,DA˜,U A˜, cA˜) = θ,D,U , c.
For item 3, let N˜ = N A˜, σ˜ = σA˜ and δ˜ = δA˜. So π(δ˜) = δ and π(σ˜) = σ. Because of the
way the ∈-theory T was defined, we already have:
Sk N˜(δ˜ ∪ range(σ˙A˜)) = Sk N˜(δ˜ ∪ range(σ˜)). (5.1)
To see Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)) ⊆ Sk N(δ ∪ X), suppose x ∈ Sk N(δ ∪ range(σ′)). Then we
have that N sees that there is some formula ϕ, z ∈ N , and ξ < δ where x is unique such that
ϕ(x, π(σ˙A˜(z)), ξ). In particular, x is in the range of π. Thus x˜ = π−1(x) ∈ N˜ and ξ˜ < δ˜ such
that ϕ(x˜, σ˙A˜(z), ξ˜) holds. Thus by (5.1), we have that x˜ is unique such that ϕ(x˜, σ˜(y), ζ˜) for
some y ∈ N and ζ˜ < δ˜. Thus pushing back up through π, letting ζ = π(ζ˜), we have that
x = π(x˜) is unique such that ϕ(x, σ(y), ζ) holds, so x ∈ Sk N(δ ∪X).
To see that Sk N(δ∪X) ⊆ Sk N(δ∪range(σ′)) works similarly. Let x ∈ Sk N(δ∪X). Then
there is z ∈ N and ξ < δ such that ϕ(x, σ(z), ξ) holds. So in particular, x is in the domain
of π. So we may find ξ˜ < δ˜ such that x˜ = π−1(x) is unique such that ϕ(x˜, σ˜(z), ξ˜). So by
(5.1), we have that there is y ∈ N and ζ˜ < δ˜ such that x˜ is unique satisfying ϕ(x˜, σ˙A(y), ζ˜).
Finally, by pushing back up through π, letting π(ζ˜) = ζ , we have that x = π(x˜) is unique
such that ϕ(x, σ′(y), ζ), so x ∈ Sk N (δ ∪ range(σ′)) as desired.
To see item 4, note that S
A˜
= S since S ⊆ N . So we have already by the definition of T
that σ˙A˜“S ⊆ SA˜. Thus π ◦ σ˙A˜“S ⊆ π“SA˜ ⊆ S as desired.
This completes the proof of the main claim.
We have satisfied the main claim, so we are done, we have shown that D is subcomplete.
Some slight modifications to the above proof give the following two corollaries.
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The first point is that the above proof also shows that generalized diagonal Prikry forcing
that adds a countable sequence to each measurable cardinal is subcomplete. Before stating
the corolloary let’s define the forcing. Again let D be an infinite discrete set of measurable
cardinals. Let U = 〈U(κ) | κ ∈ D〉 be a list of measures associated to D. Let D∗(U) = D∗
be defined the same as D(U) except the stem of a condition, s, in D∗(U) is a function with
domain in [D]<ω taking each measurable cardinal κ ∈ dom(s) to finitely many ordinals
s(κ) ⊆ κ. The upper part and extension relation is defined in the same way; the only slight
modification is that again we have (s, A) ≤ (t, B) so long as points in s not in t come from
B, which in the case means that for κ ∈ dom(s) we have that each element of s(κ) not in
t(κ) is in B(κ). We may again form a D∗-generic sequence S = SG for a generic G ⊆ D∗,
and we may write S = 〈S(κ) | κ ∈ D〉 where S(κ) is a countable sequence of ordinals less
than κ. The genericity criterion for generic diagonal Prikry sequences is as that for D, which
is given in [Fuc05, Theorem 1], as stated in Fact 5.0.2, with the modification that S is D∗
generic if and only if for all X , the set {α | ∃κ ∈ D α ∈ S(κ) \Xκ} is finite.
Corollary 5.0.4. Let D be an infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals. Let U =
〈U(κ) | κ ∈ D〉 be a list of measures associated to D. Then D∗(U) is subcomplete.
Proof Sketch. The modifications are mostly notational, and the main one that needs to be
made is to adjust the proof of the Claim within the proof of Claim 2. Here we have D∗1, the
generalized diagonal Prikry forcing as computed in N1, as well as D of N , and S1, which
we would like to show is a D∗1-generic sequence over N1 in this case. S1 is defined as σ1“S,
using a diagonal Prikry sequence S ′1 to fill in the missing coordinates, where S
′
1 is obtained
by forcing with D1 over V .
We will show that S1 satisfies the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion over
N1 and follow the above proof. To do this, let X = 〈Xκ ∈ U1(κ) | κ ∈ D1〉, with X ∈ N1, be
a sequence of measure-one sets in the sequence of measures U1.
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Note first that S ′1 is a generic sequence, it already satisfies the generalized diagonal
Prikry genericity criterion, namely: {α | ∃κ ∈ D1 α ∈ S ′1(κ) \Xκ} is finite. Recall that S =
〈S(κ) | κ ∈ D〉 is a D-generic sequence over N as well. We need to see that in addition,{
α | ∃κ ∈ D α ∈ σ1(S(κ)) \Xσ1(κ)
}
is finite.
By the κ(0)-cofinality of σ1, there is some w ∈ N such that X ∈ σ1(w), where |w| < κ(0)
in N . Thus in N1, |σ1(w)| < κ1(0). For each κ ∈ σ1“D, we have that Xκ ∈ σ1(w)κ ={
σ1(f)(κ) | f ∈
∏
κ∈D U(κ) ∧ f ∈ w
}
and also |σ1(w)κ| < κ1(0). All κ ∈ σ1“D of course
satisfy κ ≥ κ1(0) so by the κ-completeness of U1(κ), we have that Wκ := ∩ σ1(w)κ ∈ U1(κ)
since Xκ ∈ σ1(w)κ. So we have established that W, the sequence of Wκ for κ ≥ κ1(0), is
also a sequence of measure-one sets in N1. Note in addition that for κ ∈ σ1“D, we have that
Wκ ⊆ Xκ.
By elementarity, for each κ ∈ D, we have W κ = ∩
{
f(κ) | f ∈
∏
κ∈D U(κ) ∧ f ∈ w
}
is
a measure-one set in U(κ) and we also have that σ1(W κ) = Wσ1(κ). Moreover,
{
α | ∃κ ∈ D α ∈ S(κ) \W κ
}
is finite
by the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion for D, which must be satisfied by S.
Thus by elementarity,
{
α | ∃κ ∈ D σ1(S(κ)) \Wσ1(κ)
}
⊇
{
α | ∃κ ∈ D σ1(S(κ)) \Xσ1(κ)
}
is finite,
as is desired, completing the proof of the claim.
One might consider a forcing like D and D∗ that adds one point below each measurable
cardinal sometimes, and other times adds a cofinal ω-sequence below the measurable cardinal.
This forcing is clearly subcomplete as well.
Below we refer to the concept of subcompleteness above µ, which was introduced in 2.2.2.
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Corollary 5.0.5. Let D be an infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals. Let U =
〈U(κ) | κ ∈ D〉 be a list of measures associated to D.
Furthermore, let µ < λ be a regular cardinal, where λ = supn<ω κn, the first limit point
of D. Then D = D(U) is subcomplete above µ.
Proof Sketch. The idea is to follow the same exact proof as in the above theorem, except we
achieve the following diagram:
N
⌢
µ -
λ -
κ′ ∈ D -
δ -
ν -
N1
⌢
•
κ′1 ∈ D1
N0
⌢
-
-
ν0
•
µ-
λ-
κ′ ∈ D-
δ-
ν-
N
⌢
σ0
σ
σ1 k1 k0
Here we replace κ(0) with some κ′ ∈ D such that λ < κ′, where there are finitely many
measurables of D below κ′. So in particular, we let 〈N1, σ1〉 be the liftup of 〈N, σ ↾HNκ′ 〉 in
Claim 2. In order to show the Claim that we have a generic sequence over D1, we follow the
same argument as follows:
Let X = 〈Xκ ∈ U1(κ) | κ ∈ σ1“D〉, with X ∈ N1, be a sequence of measure one sets in
the sequence of measures U1 with only coordinates coming from σ1“D. We need to see that
{
κ ∈ D | σ1(S(κ)) /∈ Xσ1(κ)
}
is finite.
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By the κ′-cofinality of σ1, there is some w ∈ N such that X ∈ σ1(w), where |w| < κ′
in N . Thus in N1, |σ1(w)| < κ′1. For each κ ∈ σ1“D, we have that Xκ ∈ σ1(w)κ ={
σ1(f)(κ) | f ∈
∏
κ∈D U(κ) ∧ f ∈ w
}
and also
|σ1(w)| < κ
′
1.
So for all but finitely many κ ∈ σ1“D, namely for κ ≥ κ′1, by the κ-completeness of U1(κ),
we have that
∩ σ1(w) = Wκ ∈ U1(κ).
So we have established that W, the sequence of Wκ for κ > κ′1, is also a sequence of
measure-one sets in N1. Note in addition that for κ ∈ σ1“D, κ > κ′1, we have that Wκ ⊆ Xκ.
By elementarity, for each κ ∈ D, where κ > κ′, we have
W κ = ∩
{
f(κ) | f ∈
∏
κ∈D U(κ) ∧ f ∈ w
}
is a measure-one set in U(κ) and we also have that σ1(W κ) =Wσ1(κ). Moreover,
{
κ ∈ D | S(κ) /∈ W κ
}
is finite
by the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion for D, which must be satisfied by
S, and since there are only finitely many measurables in D less than κ′ in N . Thus by
elementarity,
{
κ ∈ D | σ1(S(κ)) /∈ Wσ1(κ)
}
⊇
{
κ ∈ D | σ1(S(κ) /∈ Xσ1(κ)
}
is finite.
Additionally the ∈-theories L and T would have to be defined so as to include as an
axiom that σ˚ ↾ µ = σ ↾ µ and σ˙ ↾ µ = σ ↾ µ respectively. We would then need to show
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that
∗
σ ↾ µ = σ ↾ µ, but this would follow since k0 is the identity on ν0. Furthermore, it
would need to be shown that σ′ ↾µ = σ ↾µ, but this would follow from the requirement that
σ˙A˜ ↾ µ = σA˜ ↾ µ, and since ordinals are computed properly by A˜.
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